Legislative regulation of railway finance in England by Wang, Ching-Chun
.'U MI V OP
.i'iU! tf. fl.ity



LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF RAILWAY FINANCE
IN ENGLAND
BY
CHING CHUN WANG
Ph. B. Yale University, 1908
THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements lor the
Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN ECONOMICS
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
1911
ran
NY\$5
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
1 HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
Recommendation concurred in:
V J
CONTENTS
Introduction x~ 3
Chapter 1.
General Legislation on Railway Finance
Page
(1) Peculiarities of the railway problem in England. (2)
Origin of railway legislation. (3) General policy of
Parliament concerning railway finance. (4) General
nature of regulation. (5) The three periods of leg-
islative activity. (6) Historical development of the
English system of legislative regulation of railway
finance-Early legislation influenced by the con-
ception of railways as being similar to turnpikes
and canals-Early irregularities in railway finance
and the coniolidation of clauses in 1845-The effect
of the railway mania of 1845 and its subsequent col-
lapse- Circumstances leading- to the enactment of
the Companies 1 Clauses Act of 1863- Extensions and
speculations- Parliamentary inquiry regarding the
borrowing powers, etc. of railway companies? 1863-4,
and the Railway Companies Securities Act of I860-
The railway panic of 1866 and its revelations-
The Railway Companies Act of 1867-Royal Commission
on Railways, 1867- Adoption of uniform system of
account s-e lose of legislative activity. (7) The
scope of the English system of regulation. (8) wljy
England has undertaken to regulate railway finance
and why she had adopted her unique policy... 1
Chapter II.
Legislative Supervision of Railway Capitalization.
1- Share ^Sapital.
(1) Introductory-Variety of railway securities-Sketch of
early legislation. (2) general provisions governing
share capital- Creation of shares and convertion of
loans into share capital-Ordinary shares- No compulsory
power to take land until all shares subscribed-Privil-
eges of shareholders and the transfer of shares- Can-
cellation and surrender of shares- Additional share
capital and new ordinary shares-Preference shares-
The splitting of shares into preferred and deferred
portions. (3) Restrictions governing the application
g,

of capital-Principles followed by the English legislature-
Financial difficulties of the forties led to further le-
gislation-Experimental legislation during the fifties-
Application of money raised by debenture stocks- Irregu-
larities in practice. (4) Prohibition of paying dividends
out of capital- Early regulations as shownn in the London
and Croydon Act of 1837- need of relaxation during the
forties-Provisions adopted in 1845- Standing order of 1847-
Self-contradictory provisions contained in the Companies
Act of 1862-Details rules prescribed in the Railway Com-
panies Act of 1867-Undef ined working expenses and irregu-
lar chargings led to violation of regulations-Efforts to
remove restrictions-Relaxation of restrictions in 1868 and
subsequent unsatisfactory results. (5) Conclusion. *5j
Chapter 111.
Legislative Supervision of Railway Capitalization.
2-Loan capital.
(1) Introductory- What constitutes railway loan capital-Policy
of Parliament governing railway capitalization by loans.
(2) Sketch of early legislation. (3) General provisions
adopted in 1845. (4) Effects of the collapse of 1847. (5)
Agitation for reforms (6) Tentative regulation of deben-
ture stock issuing. (7) Protection to security-holders
and limitation of rate of interest on loans emphasized.
(8) Confusion over legality of debentures. (9)Provisions
governing the creation of debenture stocks adopted in
1863-What led to the adoption of the provisions- Where the
provisions seemed to have failed. (10) Parliamentary
inquiry concerning debentures. (11) The Railway Companies
Securities Act of 1866. and the circumstances led to its
enactment. (12) Difficulties over debentures- Confu sing
ideas as to the clsdms of debenture-holder s-Drawbacks of
debenture s-Agit at ions for reforms- Three bills introduced
in 1867. The railway Companies Act, 1867-Protection of
rolling stock-The issue of pre-preference stocks-Priority
of debentures- Abolition of restrictions on rates of
interest. (13) Effects of regulation and conclusion. 63
Chapter IV.
Central of the Borrowing Powers of Railway Companies.
(1) Original notion of railway borrowings. (2)Early regu-
lation ineffective and some of the results-Principles
set forth in the standing orders and application of
the same-Purpose of restricting borrowing powers and
apparent defects of such restrictions. (3) General
rules laid down in 1845- Analysis of the rules? and their
defects-Irregularities in practice-Effort s to extend
limit of borrowing powers. (4) Disregard and defects

the regulations- Unavoidable, intentional and fraudulent
violations-Difficulties resulting from such violations-
Evasion of the limit of borrov.lng powers through the
issue ©f Lloyd* s bonds and its effect. (5) Agitation
for the abolition of the borrovdng powers. (6) Borrow-
ing should he placed in the hands of creditors. (7)
Parliamentary inquiries made in 1863 and 1864. (8)
Further strengthening of the limit of borrowing powers.
(9) Conclusion 102
(P. t1
V/
w, ex
hapter v.
on of Railway Sec
Early provisions
railway securitie
;s=As being set fo
jses act-Difficult
>f the early regul
Schemes of registr
limit tee on railway
f registration and
eper of the signet
rinciples advocate
tration. (4) Pari
mpts in Parliament
the select commit
i of 1865 and 1864=
on of securities,
jt of 1866-Rules ac
of railway returns
,
Analysis of the
railway companies
rowing power s-Defec
Conclusion
Chapter VI.
The Attitude of Parliament xowaras
The Watering of Railway Stocks.
(1) Introductory-Common forms of stock watering- Stock watering
by the issue &£dPIf f^Fggfif.a£$8fiks forbidden. (2) In-
direct stock watermg-By the payment of interest on
calls before opening line -By declaring uneared di-
vidends. (3) Provisions governing direct stock water
ing- The conversion of stocks- Duplication of stocks
in 1888- The Taff Vale and other cases- Extravagant
scope of stock watering began 1890. (4) Parliamentary
inquiry

the regulations-Unavoidable, intentional and fraudulent
violations-Difficulties resulting from such violations-
Evasion of the limit of borrovdng powers through the
issue of Lloyd* s "bonds and its effect. (5) Agitation
for the abolition of the borrovdng powers. (6) Borrow-
ing should be placed in the hands of creditors. (7)
Parliamentary inquiries made in 1863 and 1864. (8)
Further strengthening of the limit of borrowing powers.
(9) Conclusion
Chapter v.
Registration ©f Railway Securities.
(1) Introductory. (2) Early provisions governing the re-
gistration of railway securities-As being embodied
in private acts- As being set forth in the first
companies clauses act-Difficulties resulting from
some defects of the early regulations. (3) Reforms
agitated for-Schemes of registration advocated before
the select committee on railway borrowing powers,
1863- System of registration and returns proposed by
the deputy keeper of the signet of Scotland, 1864-
Analysis of principles advocated-Extreme views re-
garding registration. (4) Parliamentary inquiry and
abortive attempts in Parliaments- Work and recom-
mendations of the select committees on railway bor-
rowing powers of 1863 and 1864- Unsuccessful bills
on registration of securities. The Railway Companies
Securities Act of 1866-Rules adopted governing the
registration of railway retums-Bffect s of the Se-
curities Act. Analysis of the situation during the
sixties- Why railway companies exceeded the limits
of their borrowing power s-Defect s of the prescribed
limit. (5) Conclusion 133
Chapter VI.
The Attitude of Parliament Towards
The Watering of Railway Stocks.
(1) Introductory-Common forms of stock watering- Stock watering
by the issue^^pyelepgngg^Jggks forbidden. (2) In-
direct stock watermg-By the payment of interest on
calls before opening line -By declaring uneared di-
vidends. (3) Provisions governing direct stock water
ing- The conversion of stocks- Duplication of stocks
in 1888- The Taff Vale and other cases- Extravagant
scope of stock watering began 1890. (4) Parliamentary
inquiry

inquiry of 1890-The select committee on the conversion
•f stocke-ItB problems and work-Stock watering not
defended-Freedom and publicity favored by witnesses-
CcnclwBions and recommendations of select committee
and analysis of the same. (5) Regulations governing
stock watering-Direct and indirect checks- Resume of
status concerning stock watering by railway companies-
analysis of the same. (6) Results of the English sys-
tem of regulation. (7) Underlying reasons for stock-
watering- Immediate and general effects of stock water-
ing. (8) Conclusion
Chapter Vll.
The Regulation of Railway Accounts.
(1) Early attempts to regulate railway accounts. (2) Preli-
minary steps towards uniform system of account s-The
keeping and depositing of half-yearly loan accounts
as required by the Railway Companies Securities Act,
1866-Circumstances which led to the adoption of the
provisions-Resume and analysis of the early situation.
(3) Uniform system of accounts adopted in 186 8=- The
introduction of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868-
Other bills introduced concerning railway accounting-
Principal provisions contained in the bill-Forms of
account s-The penalty clause- Current opinions concern-
ing the adoption of a uniform system of accounts.
(4-1 Some defects of the uniform system of account s-
No definite date for closing financial year- Half-year-
ly accounts not as suitable as annual account s-Lafeb
of uniformity in practice. (5) Improvements recommend-
ed by the committee of the Board of Trade, 1909. (6)
Conclusion
Chapter Vlll.
Government Auditing and Inspection
(1) Early system of independent audit by the railway com-
panies. (2) Provisions governing early auditing-Election
qualification, duties and powers of auditor s-Early
disatisfaction-Main objects of early system-Practical
difficulties -Government audit urged. (3) Regulations
governing the auditing of accounts adopted in 1867.
(4) System of government audit and inspection adopted
in 1868- Analysis of provisions contained in the Re-
gulation of Railways Act, 1868-Current opinions- Scope
of the system- System of government inspection, its

usefulness and defects. (5) Conclusion 227
Appendix 245
Bibliography 254
Viiy 259

IttTROCUCTION
The purpose of this study is to find out what rules the
English Parliament has adopted from time to time for the regulation
of railway finance, and to ascertain, as far as possible, why these
rules were adopted, how they have been applied, and what are some
of the results.
To accomplish this the writer has endeavored to trace the
historical development of the English system of railway financial
legislation and to note the special circumstances which led to the
adoption of the various legislative measures. Much attention is
also given to the contemporary opinion expressed both in and out
of Parliament, as well as the nature of the inquiries made by the
various parliamentary committees, etc.
In preparation for the study, the writer, first of all,
made a general survey of practically all the so-called railway acts
so as to have a fairly good idea of the general nature of legisla-
tive regulation governing the entire railway enterprise in England.
been
Special attention has given to the various provisions in these
acts, regulating railway construction, amalgamation, accidents and
rates. In fact, the writer during his first two years of research
intended to make a study of the legislative regulation governing
all these branches of the railway enterprise in that country, and
it was only after fully realizing the impracticability of such an
extensive study with the time at his command that he began to
concentrate his attention upon only one hpase of the English
system of legislative regulation.
-

In this study, the writer used the series of the so-called
finance sets as a hack hone. After having hecome familiar with
the provisions in these finance acts and having classified these
numerous provisions into a number of divisions, he then traced,
as far as he could, the parliamentary debates upon these measures.
He also endeavored to compare the original hills with the amended
ones as well as to examine other contemporary hills which had any-
thing to do with these finance hills, with the hope of understand-
ing the position of the legislators. The writer also took care to
examine the popular, the railway, as well as the expert financial-
writers' opinions prevailing during those years when these regula-
tive measures were adopted or agitated for. In doing this the
London Times, the Railway Times and the Economist were most fre-
quently consulted.
In order to appreciate the value of the various measures
and to understand why they were adopted, considerable attention has
been
also given to the general condition of railway finance during
those years. In this, the provisions of the acts of Parliament
formed the outline or skeleton of our discussion, while the con-
temporary opinions and existing circumstances constituted the
detail
.
To secure a more intensive treatment of the main points
of his subject, the writer has felt himself obliged to omit quite
a little valuable material concerning a number of interesting
topics. But this was unavoidable in view of the limit of his time.
In the following pages, he endeavors first of all to trace the
development of the general legislation on railway finance so that

a fairly comprehensive idea of the nature of legislative regulation
may "be gained. Then follows a review of the efforts of parliament
to secure proper restriction upon the issue of capital securities,
attention being given, in the first place, to share capital.
Although loan capital forms only about one-third of the total
railway capital, the metbcd of control has loomed large in the
English system of regulation. Accordingly tbe questions of limit-
ation upon the borrowing powers of the railway companies, the regis-
tration of railway securities, as well as the regulation of loan
capital itself have been treated in seme detail. The attitude of
Parliament toward railway stock watering is shown in the following
chapter. To the important features of control of accounts, govern-
ment audit and inspection two chapters are devoted.
Most of the information contained in this study is obtained
from such original sources as the British Statutes at large, re-
ports of parliamentary and departmental committees, parliamentary
debates, direct communications from offices of the Board of Trade,
etc. The Parlisjnent
a
papers prior to 1860, except in a very few
cases, however, have been inaccessible to the writer. He has en-
deavored to make good this defect by as free a reference as his
opportunities permitted to newspapers and other sources of material.

CHAPTEK I.
GENERAL LEGISLATION ON RAILWAY FINANCE.
England as the pioneer of railway enterprise was naturally
called, upon to make the first experiments in the regulation of
railway finance as in the regulation of other "branches of the rail-
way enterprise. English statesmen had recognized the importance
of regulating railway finance before any other country had seriously
considered the question. As early as the railway itself was in-
troduced, we find traces of efforts made by the English Parliament
in this direction.
One thing which especially stands out to the credit of
the English legislature is the fact that it had learned a treat
deal about the regulation of railways during the first fifty years
of railway enterprise and had then arrived at certain vital and
correct conclusions which have not been properly understood in
some other countries until very recently. English legislators
have recognized, since the early thirties, that the interest of
the railways is bound up with that of the public and that the in-
1
terests of the two could not be separated. Herein lies a partial
explanation why Parliament has never enacted laws which might be
properly called hostile to or even stringent upon the railway
companies
.
The English railway system is more or less like that of the
United States, in that both are private enterprises, and under
private operation. The part played by both Governments is that
See the remarks of
l.Mr. Homes in the House of Commons, 1836. Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates, series 3, (hereafter called Hansard) v. 46, p. 1336.

of a supervisory nature. Both have thought of purchasing and own-
1
Ing thieir railways, and both have refrained from adopting that
course
.
The systems of regulation of the two countries are also
similar. The early railway charters in the United States "reveal
2
almost at a glance," says Prof. B . H. Meyer, "their common origin
in the English law." The principles underlying the federal laws,
as well, hear much resemblance to those accepted in England. But
in spite of such great similarities there is a striking difference
between the two systems of regulation. This difference, however,
lies not so much in the regulations themselves as in the manner and
emphasis of regulation. First of all, the United States has never
tolerated any strict regulation of railway finance, while England
has always regarded the regulation of this branch of railway enter-
prise as essential. Then again in England there is only one kind
of regulation, -namely, that adopted and enforced by the national
legislature, while in America the numerous systems of state re-
gulation have been of greater importance than the federal regula-
tion, though recent developments indicate a large increase of the
importance of the latter. The railways in England, therefore, do
not have any of the complicated controversies resulting from the
conflicting regulations adopted by the various states in the
United States.
England also has enjoyed from the beginning many advan-
tages, which other countries envy. There has always been a class
1. Detailed provisions were made in the Railway Regulation Act, 1844
(7 & 8 V.c.85) for Government purchase of railways under certain
conditions
.
2. Annals of American Academy of Pol. and Social Science, vol .10 ,p390

of enterprising capitalists reedy to embark in railway undertakings
and a Class of nen qualified by ability and business habits for the
duties of railway directors, to say nothing of the experienced en-
1
gineers. Therefore, instead of having trouble in persuading
capital to embark in railways when the enterprise was first intro-
duced as was generally the case in other countries, England found
it necessary to caution capitalists from investing too readily.
Her problem in the beginning was not to induce investors to come
forward, but to caution them to be steady and to protect them from
being swindled by "bubble" schemes. Her difficulty has not been
to spread her railway system but to prevent< excessive construction.
The English railway system had its origin in the enter-
prise of individuals interested in the different localities. The
efforts were not fostered by the legislature as objects of national
concern, but were regarded as projects undertaken for the profit
of their promoters, which Parliament might sanction for the public
advantage. In dealing with these undertakings the legislature
followed the policy which had been pursued with success and benefit
to the country for half a century, in allowing private enterprise
to develop and manage inland navigation. Under this system
each project was considered entirely on its own merits, and
sanctioned by a private act of Parliament which contained the
2
entire statute law applicable to the undertaking.
In the regulation of railway finance, as in other branches
of government activity, each, country has adopted a policy deemed
1. London Times, February 13, 1845, p. 4.
2. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. VII.

at the time to be the best stilted to its own special requirements.
"The continental system is a paternal system in which the govern-
ment overlooks and controls all the acts of the companies. The
American system is one of complete freedom. Neither system is
exactly suited to our (English) requirements, or our characteristics
But the English system is like the American, in so far as it is
based on principles or freedom." This remark of the Royal C°m-
1
mission on Railway? of 1865-67 regarding the rate system of Europe
and America applies equally well in the case of railway finance.
The fundamental principle of all English legislation on railways
is influenced by the idea of affording complete freedom to the
railway companies, as far as possible. In fact the boast of that
country has been that "unlike Prance and many other neighboring
countries, the characteristics of its undertakings were not
stulified and destroyed by a system of inter-meddling and bureau-
2
ocracy, so obvious elswwhere." Thus the general policy of the
Board of Trade, the Government office which has much to do with
railways, "has rather been to favor the utmost liberty to public
3
companies to arrange their capital in any way they pleased."
But at the same time the English Parliament recognized
that for the public advantage it is desirable that a railway should
4
yield a reasonable return to its investors. When a railway pays
little or no dividend on its capital, working expenses may be cut
1. Report of Royal Com. on Railways, 1867, p. lii.
2. Economist, July 6, 1844.
3. Evidence before Select Committee on Railway Stock Conversion,
1890, p. 37.
4. Report of Select Committee on Railway Borrowing Powers, 1864,
p. iii.

down injuriously, with the resulting disa dvantages and evils of
insufficient or inefficient service. Then again the embarrassment
of one company in failing to furnish reasonable returns on its
capital might discourage ether investors iron coming forward to put
their money in the beneficial railway enterprise, which fact would
result not only in the checking of the railway industry itself
but in the hampering of the growth of all other industries and
co mere e in general. "Furthermore, England has for years recognized
the value of encouraging the circulation of capital, as shown by
her effort to provide for the investment of all trust funds. These
and other reasons led Parliament to attempt, from the beginning
of railway enterprise, to regulate railway finance not for the
direct interest of the government but for the security of the in-
i
vestors. From a. close study of the efforts of Parliament in
regulating railway finance, one cannot fail but be impressed with
the feeling that the English legislature has constantly borne this
mind.
In England, during the early years of its railway history, afe
even now in the United States, there were many people who did not
believe in government regulation of railway finance for the pro-
2
tection of investors. A leading lawyer in London said, "I do not
see why the Legislature should interfere to protect them (railway
investors) more than other people. If they choose to take shares
upon those conditions, it is their own affair." A prominent
1. Report of Committee, dated April 24, 1837, p.xxvii, in Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1837, vol. 14, part 1.
2. Evidence before Select Committee onRailway Companies 1 Borrowing
Powers, 1864 p. 20.

"who may "be assumed to have had no special familiarity with the
1
subject on which they were legislating." As Parliament has power
to adopt any general or special measures to regulate any branch of
railway enterprise as it sees fit, one may readily expect that
occasional deviations from the adopted principles are not seldom
made
.
The nature of the English system of regulation is also
characteristic. Railway finance in England is regulated by two
sets of rules: -
A. General laws applicable to all companies.
B. Special laws applicable to particular companies.
The general laws are based on broad principles and are
embodied in the general acts of Parliament. These general acts
Q
are applicable as a whole or only'be incorporation in the special act
of the companies as the case may be. The special acts resemble the
charters in the United States, but are obtainable only from Parlia-
ment by fulfilling certain requirements.
In the first place, the special act creates an incorporated
company with, all the corporate privileges attaching to such in-
corporation. In the next place, it gives power for, and prescribes
rules governing the raising of capital. Then it grants the com-
pany the necessary powers to take land, etc, lays down the rules
governing meetings of the company, the construction of the road,
and defines the right of the public in using the railway. It also
outlines the powers of the company in charging tolls etc. The fact
a
that out of total number of forty-four sections of a recent
1. W. M. Acworth: Elements of Railway Economics, 1905, p. 132.

1
railway "bill fourteen are devoted to financial matters, fairly
indicates the importance attached "by Parliament to the regulation
of railway finance.
In these special acts are included not only the special
regulations made to meet the individual conditions of the company,
hut also various provisions contained in the general companies
acts. A clause is uniformly inserted subjecting the company to
"the provisions of any general act relating to railways now in
2
force, or which may hereafter pass."
It follows, as a consequence of Parliament having granted
to each company in its special act its corporate privileges, that
when the company desires to alter the terms of that incorporating
act, to enlarge its original capital, or in any way to vary the
conditions under which the capital is to he raised, a fresh ap-
3
plication of Parliament becomes necessary.
The most important of the general acts governing railway
finance are the Companies Cluases Acts, 1845 and 1863, Railway
Companies Securities Act, 1866, Railway Companies Act, 1867, Re-
gulation of Railways Act, 1868, and Railway Regulation Act, 1871.
All except the first two acts named above are applicable to all
railways without incorporation in the special acts. In the enact-
act s
,
ment of special Parliament is guided by a set of standing orders
as well as its model bills and clauses.
1. The Coventry Railway Bill, 1910 now withdrawn.
2. Standing Order JTov 168b of the House of Commons, 1906.
3. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xlii.

The development of English legislation upon railway
finance has "been a continuous one, yet it may be sharply divided
into three periods. From 1801 to 1844 forms the first period,
1845 to 1871, the second period, and from 1872 to date forms the
third period.
Although railway finance has received much consideration
from the beginning, during the first period it was regulated in a
more or less haphazard manner. The legislative measures then taken
were modelled after the special canal and turnpike enactments.
There was no general law governing railway finance.
The second period, covering the twenty-seven years from
1845 to 1871, is by far the most important in the history of
English legislation on railway finance. Concurrent with serious
railway manias and disastrous railway panics, a feature of this
period, the English system of financial legislation underwent
rapid evolution and was subjected to repealed tests. The financial
proolems of railways formed a comiion topic of every day conver-
sation and were kept constantly before the eyes of Parliament.
Numerous inquires were set on foot, and attempts made to bring
the system of legislation to a higher state of efficacy. As a
result of this unparalleled activity of both the puolic and Parlia-
ment, all the important gnneral acts governing railway finance
were passed during this period. Hot only have the rules then
adopted remained unchanged, but not even additions have seen made.
The regulations England uses to day in governing railway finance
fitly tibO^ft n-flnptftfl p-rior tn 1871. ~«ffi o. i fint nr QthftrVlSJ-

as these regulations may be, the fact that they have seen service
for over forty years without being modified clearly indicates
either one of two facts. First, it may mean that the English, system]
had been developed to such completeness prior to 1871 that no
modification has become necessary or, secondly, it may mean that
after the exertion during the sixties, the English have been under-
going a state of reaction and have since become toG inert to modify
these rules. While both hypothecs are to a certain extent per-
missible, history shows that the first appeared to be by far the
more reasonable.
As has been indicated before, no fresh legislation on
railway finance has taken place since 1871. From that year on it
has been a period of application of principles already adopted
during the first two periods. Stock-wat ering received consider-
able attention in 1890, but no general legislation or new principle
was evolved. Moreover, the present outlook indicates that with the
exception of some legislation on railway accounting, no material
changes are likely to take place in the near future.
While the general purpose cf all the legislation is to
afford security to the investors, yet the place of emphasis of
each period is distinct and different from those of the others.
Thus the early legislation was largely for the purpose of insuring
the bonna fide character of railway enterprise before granting
parliamentary recognition and of demanding, though without a true
understanding of its significance, publicity of railway affairs.
Different from almost all other nations, as already stated, the
English did not have trouble in inducing investors to embark in

railways. On the contrary, she had exercised a restraining in-
fluence, c Thus the most prominent topic of legislation during the
early period was the matter of securing an efficient system of
subscription contracts and of requiring substantial deposits of
money on each share subscribed, before permitting railway enter-
prises to receive Parliamentary sanction.
The question which received the greatest emphasis during
the second period was how to restore the confidence of the in-
vesting public. The early regulations proved to be too indefinite,
and railway finance was found to demand public interference.
Therefore, efforts were mostly directed toward finding methods of
regulating railway finance rather than to the discovery of new
• "iprinciples.
Coming down to the third period, we find the place of
emphasis nas returned to that of the first period, especially in
the matter of publicity. The most important inquiries made during
this period have invariably resulted in the demanding for greater
publicity. In spite of this similarity in emphasis, however, there
is nevertheless a distinct difference in that what has been done
during the third period is more definite and has been done with a
much clearer conception of what publicity means in the regulation o
railway finance than during the first period. After forty years'
experiment, England has remained where she was four decades ago,
as far as the standing rules are concerned; but she seems to have
perceived with conviction whereabouts in her system of regulation
she should place more emphasis in the future.

In tracing the historical development we find that prior
to 1844 English legislation on railway finance was limited to the
provisions embodied in the numerous private acts. Each company-
had its own special acts which contained the entire statute lav;
1
applicable to the undertaking of that company.
Early legislation was greatly influenced by the currc &t
conception of the railway as a turnpike. Time and again we find
acts passed which dealt Jointly with stage roads and railways as
if the two were similar. The Duke of Wellington is said to have
stated that in dealing with railways it was above all else necessary
2
to bear in mind the analogy of the King's highways. This remark,
misleading as it appears now, was well representative of the cur-
rent belief.
Then, again, the early acts followed very closely in their
general scope, the provisions which had been applied to canal
companies. The earliest canal acts, however, gave no power of
3
borrowing, while the railways had been permitted to borrow from
4
the beginning, to a certain extent. Thus the act of May 21, 1801,
the earliest railway act providing for the construction and main-
tenance of a railway from Wandsworth to Pitlake, provided, "Pro-
prietors may raise L30,000 by shares of one hundred pounds each,
1. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1367, p. vii.
2. C. F. Adams; Railroads, p« 82.
3. The first act in which these pov/ers appeared was passed in 1770
By degrees the borrowing powers of public companies were restricted
to one-third of their share capital. See Report of Royal Commission
on Railways, 1867, p. vii.
4. 41 George 3, C. 33.

to "be numbered and deemed as personal estate. Names of proprietors
to be entered in a book, and tickets of their shares distributed
to them. Proprietors may raise £15,000 more if necessary, by
subscription or mortgage."
Before 1847 considerable laxity, however, prevailed in
the manner of framing the provisions governing the raising of
capital. But the great burst of railway extension in 1836 awakened
some degree of legislative activity, and the committees of Parli-
ment on railway bills began to feel the necessity of enacting
clauses conducive to the public welfare. A select committee was
appointed to inquire into the matter, but no legislation -Took
place. But the restrictions imposed by Parliament, in 1837 and
subsequently on the obtaining of railway acts, temporarily arrested
I
speculation.
In- 1839 a select committee was again appointed to inquire
into the state of railway communication, as a result of whose
I
recommendations a general "saving" clause was inserted in the
2
Craydon railway bill. In 1840 another select committee was ap-
1. Quarterly Review, v. LXXIV, p. 239.
2. The "saving" clause inserted in the Croydon bill reads:
"And be it further enacted that nothing herein contained
shall be deemed or construed to exempt the railway by this or
the said recited acts authorized to be made, from the pro-
visions of any general act relating to railways which may
pass during the present or any future session of Parliament.''1
Hansard, v. 47, pp. 682-684. Compare with a similar
clause resolved by Parliament to be inserted in all railway
bills, since 1844, which appears in the next page.

1
pointed by the House of Commons to inquire into railway affairs.
Although no general legislation took place, this committee seemed
to have done considerable good in throwing light upon the nature
2
of railway transportation.
Under this irregular system of legislation numbrcus char-
ters were granted and liberal encouragements were sometimes given
to the construction of railways. Then came that disastrous rail-
way mania of 1844, and England "awoke one Lay" as Mr. C. F. Adams
dramatically describes it, from dreams of boundless wealth to the
3
reality of general ruin."
To see what could be done to improve the situation, a
parliamentary committee was appointed early in 1844. It recommended
and Parliament resolved that the following "saving" clause, which
had been once inserted in railways bills in 1839, should be uni-
formly inserted in all railway bills passing through Parliament,
namely: -
"And be it further enacted that nothing herein contained
shall be deemed or const ruea to exempt the railway by this or the
1. Report of Roayal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. x.
2. This committee was the first body of officials to point out to
Parliament that the right reserved to the public by the early
railway acts of running their engines and carriages on the
railways was practically a dead letter, for the reason that
(l) no provision had been made for ensuring to independent
trains etc. access to stations and v^a.tering places along the
line, (2) the rates of charges limited by the acts were almost
always too high to permit independent parties to work their
trains, (2>) the necessity of placing the running of all trains
under the complete control of one management interposed much-
difficulty in the way of independent traders. See Report of
Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. x.
3. C. P. Adams; Railroads, p. 85.
4. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867,' p. xi
.

said recited Acts authorized to be made from the provisions of any
general Act relating to such Bills which may pass during the
present session of Parliament, or of any general Act relating to
railways which may pass during the present or any future session of
Parliament .
"
The committee gave to the question of railway legislation
a more comprehensive consideration than it had hitherto received.
As a result of the inquiries of this committee, provisions were
1
made, in the Railway Regulations Act, 1844, for the suppression of
loan notes which had "been issued without legal authority during
the rtpid railway extension.
By this time the provisions of the special acts governing
each company ha.d become very complicated and numerous. The number
of clauses contained in some of these acts had gradually increased
from 95 as in the act for the Wandsworth and Croyden Railway, 1801,
to 381 as in the act of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway passed
2
in 1844. As remarked Lord G. Somerset in the House of Commons,
there were an "immense" number of statutes relating to these rail-
way matters which occasioned a grea.t amount of uncertainty. In
order to obtain greater uniformity in the general provisions in-
serted in railway acts and tc render them more concise, the
3
select committee of 1844 recommended that the numerous clauses in
railway acts which "were common to all and undisputed" should be
consolidated into a general act.
In the following year, Parliament following the recommend-
ations of the select committee of 1844, for the first time passed
1. 7 & 8 V. c. ss. 19-21.
2. Hansard, v. 77 p. 170.
3. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xi.

three clauses consolidation acts, containing the clauses which
were applicable to companies in general and which had been usually
inserted in the private acts, as well as some other general pre-
visions which Parliament deemed it desirable to enforce. This was
dene with the hope of securing uniformity. The acts, however, did
rot preclude committees of either house of Parliament from dis-
pensing with some of these provisions in particular cases.
One of the three general acts had to do with the regu-
1
lation of railv/ay finance. This act, contained provisions for re-
gulating the manner in which the companies7 capital should be raised,
capital
,
the borrowing of further the rights and responsibilities of
shareholders, the powers and duties of directors, the declaration
of dividends, the keeping and auditing of accounts, and, in a
general way, the manner in which the companies' financial affairs
2
should be conducted.
The expectations of the legislature in enacting the gen-
eral act was fully and quickly realized. The consolidation of the
numerous clauses brough about a great degree of certainty and
uniformity, and made the law more accessible and intelligent to the
public
.
It must be remembered that, at the time when the Companies
Clauses Act, 1845, was passed, the great railway mania was raging
at its height. The profitable returns afforded by the earlier
railways having attracted a large amount of capital, and
1. The , Companies Clauses Act
,
1845, 8 V. c. 16.
2. See also Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xii.

competing lines had been proposed to most of the important centers
of population. Parliament as the report of the select committee of
1844 showed, sanctioned many such lines for the purpose of en-
couraging competition, with the "belief that the remedy for the
evil consequences of any monopoly which a railway was considered
to possess, was to be found in the construction of a competing
1.
line. Neither before nor after, said the Economist in 1845, had
there been any one object of speculation into which all ranks and
classes of men entered so warmly as during those few years of the
rreat railway mania. There seemed to be "no business tec absorbing,
no profession too grave, arc no privacy too secluded , to be able
2
to keep off this universal mania."
Reaction soon followed action with equal force. The
feverish railway extension led to a demand for capital for in-
vestment larger than the resources of the country could supply.
Consequently the public were compelled to retrace their steps.
As the railway fever was intense, so was the railway collapse
3
complete. At the end of 1847 an act had to be passed to extend
the time for the construction of certain railways, and in 1850
4
another act to enable railway companies to abandon powers of
proceeding with portions of their undertakings, and to release
them from the conditions which had been attached to such powers.
The complete collapse may be shown by the fact that of the 8,592
miles of railway sanctioned in the three sessions of 1845, 1856 and
1847, no less than 1,560 miles were abandoned under the power of
1. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xvii.
2. Economist February 1, 1845.
5. According to Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xvi.
4. Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850, 13 & 14 V. c. 83.

1
the Railway Abandonment Act.
The financial difficulties caused "by the pressure for
capital led the House of Lords to appoint a committee in 1649 to
consider whether the railway acts do not require amendment, with a
view of providing for a more effectual audit of accounts, to guard
2
against the wrong application of the companies' funds. This com-
mittee recommended, for the first time in railway history, the
3
adoption of a uniform system of accounts and government audit.
No immediate legislation, however, took place.
These and other events which took place during the latter
forties and the fifties "brought to light many new problems in
railway finance, as a result of which sundry additional provisions
different from those contained in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,
were frequently introduced into railway hills. Accordingly, the
4
Companies Clauses Act, 1863, was enacted to extend the former
clauses act. This act of 1863 contained four new principles, of
which the first three had to do with railway finance. The first of
these three related to the cancellation and surrender of shares,
the second had to do with the creation of additional capital, and
the third governed the creation and issue of debenture stocks.
During this period, the railways, in addition to their
tendency toward extension, had a general habit of "buying up"
every thing in order to keep off all other lines from their own
districts, at the same time invading as far as possible those of
1. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xvii.
2. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xviii.
3. Ibed.
4. 26 & 27 V. c. 118.

other linos. This of course proved as costly to themselves as it
was to their enemios. Heavy debts ./ore contracted "for tho purpose
of securing old traffic against intruders and for developing new
traffic for extensions and branches." These struggles developed to
such an extravagent extent that in spite fci the favorable gross
incomes, the dividends were low. Therefore, some shareholders
"sincerely believed that if the Committe-rooras of the House of
Com ions were closed for five years, it would be the most im-
portant thing that had ever been done to protect railway property.
*
But Parliament apparently failed to realize clearly the
serious nature of the situation. It had adopted a number of re-
strictions, but it failed to see to it that these restrictions
were enforced. Consequently the T^eculative schemes as well as
established companies found it quite easy to get around the
parliamentary restrictions. Men of straw were secured to sign up
subscription for shares. Borrowed money was produced as paid-up
portions of shares for deposit. Furthermore , not only was the
legal limit of borrowing powers in may cases exceeded by the ex—
cessive issue of debenture, but a sort of note called Lloyd's bonds
1. London Times, February 9, 1863, p. 9.
3. London Times, February 23, 1865 p. 8. 3. Ibid.
•V They are a sort of railway exchequer bonds, representing what in
the United States is called a floating debt, which is to be capital- Ji
lized and paid off sometime or other. They bear the name of the Im^^^
who originated thenu/fhe following was a common form; "The railway ~"
company hereby acknowledge themselves to owe to A.B., of
Contractor for public works the sum of L for works executed and
materials supplied to the said A. 3. , the said Comoany for the purpose
of their undertaking; and the said comoany in consideration of" the
premises and of the engagement of the eaid A.B. to forbear and
give time of payment of the said sum of L until the day and
year hereinafter mentioned, hereby undertake to pay to said A.B.
his executors or administrators the said sura of on the
da^ 0±" with interest in the meantime at the rate of percent
per annum, giventhe common seal of the company, this day of 18 "
Report of select Committee on railway borrowing powers^ 1864 FTsiT

were issued for amounts of money many times in excess of the statu-
tory borrowing powers. As only the securities issued within the
parliamentary limits were legal and hence valid, much confusion and
difficulty followed the excessive issues, which in turn greatly
damaged the credit of railway companies. No further money, conse-
quently, was forthcoming.
Parliament, as most .governments would do when in diffi-
culty, appointed two select committees, one in 186? and the other
in the following year, to investigate the matter. These two
select committees made a number of good recommendations for the
betterment of railway finance, but no action was taken by Parlia-
ment to five effect to these recommendations until 1866, when the
1
Companies Securities Act, 1866, was passed, requiring, under pen-
alty for failure, the railway companies to have registered officers
and to deposit with the registrar of joint stock companies state-
ments of their borrowing powers and half-yearly loan accounts.
In the schedule of the act were also set forth the particulars to
be specified in these statements and half-yearly accounts. The
act also prohibited railway companies from borrowing any money be-
fore depositing the statement of their borrowing powers just re-
ferred to. Moreover, the directors were required to declare "each
of himself" on every mortgage deed or bond, or certificate of
debenture stock, that the specific security was issued under the
borrowing powers of the company as registered.
This measure, useful as it has proven to be, was far from
in
being effective dispelling the chaos. The "arcadian simplicity of
/\
the early times" where most railway bills before Parliament re-
1. 29 30 V. c. 108.

presented the enterprise and capital of a number of bona fide in-
vestors had long passed away. Instead, the "speculative element"
prevailed. Subscription of railway shares actually became, in
some cases, a process of "selling in the market of the powers
1
conferred by the Legislature." Contractors 1 schemes, instead,
of railway corporations became the center of railway activity.
These contractors' schemes soon became unable to pop up their
2
undertaking, and they had to resort to the "finance" companies
for help. As the latter were nothing but paper creations of
credit, founded on works that were not or could not be completed,
and as these finance companies themselves offered no security, the
result could be readily expected. >Tot only did the finance com-
panies fail to bolster up the contractors' schemes, but the latter
3
actually dragged the finance companies to mutual ruin. Thus
came the terrible collapse of 1867. There was so much confusion
and distrust of what was taking place in the railway companies,
"that all which the railway hoards now say is searched between the
lines; is suspected of ambiguity even when plain; is taken in a
sense unfavorable to the railway when doubtful; is believed when it
4
is against the board, and disbelieved when for the hoard."
The panic gave a bitter, but a beneficial lesson, as a re-
sult of which several fundamental principles were evolved. It was
5
realized that the difficulties were to a great extent caused by
1. London Times, May 15, 1866.
2. These finance companies were formed for the avowed purpose of
providing the capital which would enable the contractors to carry on
their works. See Hansard, vol. 183, p. 857-858.
3. Ibed.
4. Economist, December 21, 1867.
5. Hansard, vol. 185, pp. 784-785.

the mistaken view held by Parliament orginally in copying; the
provisions of the old canal bills for the regulation of rail-
way finance, without noticing the difference between the securities
issued by the canals and those by the railways, and without weigh-
ing the consequences of so large an amount of permanent works being
1
provided for by a floating instead of a fixed debt. With the
idea that a railway, like a canal or a turnpike road, was to be
open to e.ll the world, so that any body might place his own en-
gines and carriages on the line and run them, on condition that he
paid the company certain tolls for the privilege, Parliament in
granting a lien on the tolls gave what it then considered to be as
2
good a security as the mortgage on a landed estate. Therefore,
the security for railway debentures was made to cover only the
permanent road-bed and the tolls^as railway charges were then calle
of the undertaking; and the rolling stock was excluded.
The revelations of 1867 made clear the vast differences
between the railways and the canals, and made Parliament realize
the disi rability of extending the security of railway debentures to
the rolling stock of the companies. Consequently the Companies
Arrangement and the Debenture Holders Bil fewer e introduced in the
1. Under the canal bills, the loans raised were precisely like
mortgages of any other landed estates and were usually for
seven or fourteen years, and the total amount was said to be
small. Under the railway bills, altogether over £ 1^0,000,000
had been taken from the floating capital of the country under
much shorter dated securities, which were not mortgages in the
usual sense of the term and could rot then be held by trustees.
According to H. C. E. Childer, Hansard, vol. 185, p. 784-785.
2. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 786.

session of 1867. After considerable deliberation by a special
committee the two bills were fused, as they were, into the Railway
Companies Bill. The purpose of the bill, as outlined by the Duke
of Richmond was to give greater security to railway property and
1
to all classes of shareholders.
The circumstances connected with the passage of this
"finance" bill were entirely different from those connected with
those of former years. It received a very thorough investigation
in the committee as well as in both houses of Parliament. Indeed,
the bill came out from the cornmitt ee room in a very different form
from that in which it originally sent. The committee discussed
every clause in the bill and had a division upon almost every one.
There was so much objection on all sides, that "if all their
objections prevailed, there would not be a single clause left in
2
the bill."
The Bill received royal assent in August, 1867, and be-
3
came the Railway Companies Act of that year, The novel, and by
far the most important feature of the Act was the provision made
for the protection of the rolling stock and plant from seizure,
thus affording additional security to the debenture-holders and
insuring the convenience of the public. Besides providing for
the creation and issue of debenture stock and new capital, and
stipulating the rules governing the abandonment of railways, the
act made it possible for the companies to adopt "schemes of ar-
4
rangement " in case they became unable to meet their engagements.
1. Hansard, vol. 188, pp. 489-490.
2. Hansard, vol. 189, pp. 157-161.
3. 30 & 31 V. c. 127.
4. Hansard, vol. 189, p. 159, also see ss. 6-22 of Act.

Moreover for the first time all restrictions upon the rate
of interest on debentures were removed, and henceforth the compan-
ies were given the liberty to arrange and pay whatever rate of
interest suited them best instead of being handicapped by the rate
sanctioned by Parliament
.
Another new provision introduced was that no dividends
should be declared until all accounts of the company were audited
end a declaration made by the auditors to the effect that the pro-
posed dividends were bona fide.
Just about this time, the Royal Commission cn Railways of
1865-1867 also made its report, in which special attention was
celled to the importance of a uniform system of accounts for the
effective regulation of railway finance. Although its work has
been regarded as a failure even by such a prominent authority as
1
President Hadley, its conclusions regarding the importance of
uniform accounting have proven sound and of great value.
Almost simultaneously with the report of the Royal Com-
mission, the railways and the public also became aware of the
great importance of adopting some uniform system of accounts.
Members of Parliament began to realize the inadequacy of the old
system which permitted each railway to adopt its own system of
accounts and to keep it in its own way. This irregularity in
accounting was recognized not only as one of the causes of the
panic, which was then not yet over, but was considered as unde-
2
sirable in itself. It was fairly generally recognized that there
was no cure for the mischief of delusion, nor e.ny hope for railway
1. A. T. Hadley: Railroad Transportation, 1903. p. 169.
2. London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.

property, except by the introduction of a principle of accounting
in which nothing would he admitted as profit hut the surplus of
actual receipts over actual expenditures. Consequently much agi-
1
tation took pla.ce. A number of hills for the regulation of rail-
way accounts, were introduced into Parliament as a result of which
the Regulation of Railways Bill, 1868, was prepared and introduced
hy the Board of Trade. In preparing this bill, the Board of Trade
not only gave careful consideration to the recommendations of the
Royal Commission on Railways and took advantage of the experience
of the previous years, hut consulted frequently a number of rail-
way accountants and other experts. Parliament also gave the
measure unprecedented attention. It no longer, for the time being
at least, had any fear of general and sentimental opposition to
sane measures on this subject. The only question before it, there
fere, was what should be done to restore to railways their lost
confidence and what measures should be adopted to prevent future
"malversation" in railway finance.
Under such favorable circumstances, the Bill received
unusually careful consideration instead of the former party
3
quibbles, and obtained rcyal assent in July, 1868. Henceforth all
railway companies were required to prepare and present, semi-
annually, a statement of accounts and balance sheets according to
<ed
the forms prescribed. The officers were subject* to severe penalty
for falsifying such accounts or statements. A system of govern-
ment inspection and audit was also adopted.
1. The Railway and Joint Stock Companies Account Bill and the
Companies Audit of Accounts Bill, etc.
2. Hansard, vol. 191, p. 1536.
3. 31 & 32 V. c. 119.

The part of the act dealing with accounts and audit was
at once recognized as of a "novel" nature, and hence received much
1
discussion. In spite of the fact that the Act contained seven
parts, of which only one dealt with accounts and auditing, the Act
has been called with reason an accounting Act. Although the gener-
al usefulness of a uniform system of accounts was felt, the true
import of such a system was not fully recognized. Much less the
possibility that this measure should be the culmination of a
century's work in legislation on railway finance. Nevertheless,
this was the case. With the exception of the enactment of the
2
Railway Regulation Act, 1871, dealing with railway statistics, and
the insertion, since 1890, of some special clauses in the special
acts governing the watering of stocks, no general legislative
measure has been adopted since. Even the somewhat antiquated re-
quirement of semi-annual accounts as well as the forms of these
accounts adopted prior to 1871 are still used to day. The system
of accounts has, indeed, been found inadequate, and a departmental
committee with Mr. W. W. Acworth, the welknown English railway
economist, as a member, recommended in 1909 its modification. A
bill was actually introduced to give effect to the committee's
recommendation, but nothing has been done. Hence with little
qualification, we may say that English legislation on railway
finance was closed by the passage of the Railway Regulation Act,
1871, and. what guides England to-day in regulating the financial
affairs of her railways is exactly what guided her four decades ag
1. Economist, March 21, 1868.
2. 34 & 35 V. c. 78.

To describe briefly the present scope of English legis-
lative control of Railway finance, we may say that before incor-
poration, the enterproneurs are required to produce sufficient
evidence that all the proposed share capital has been subscribed
for by bona fid e investors and that a deposit varying from 5 to 10
per cent of the total estimated cost of the undertaking has been
made. The conditions under which the share capital may be raised
and the privileges and responsibilities of the subscribers, as
well as the rules governing the issue, concellat ion, and surrender
of such shares are prescribed in detail. Preference shares with
a fixed rate of dividend may be issued according to the regulations
laid down by Parliament, and ordianry shares may be "split" into
preferred and deferred portions under certain conditions. Stock-
watering is permitted, but it must be dene in the open; and a
record of such operations must be made in the company's accounts.
The companies are given power to borrow on mortgage to the
extent of one-fourth of their total paid up capital. But such
borrowing powers are not be to excercised until all the shares of
the company are taken and one-half of the total on such shares has
been paid up. Only the securities issued within the statutory
limits are regarded as legal securities, to enjoy the special
privileges given by law to mortgagees.
In incorporation and in raising additional capital, the
companies are required to state in each and every case the purpose
for which money is raised, and they are prohibited from applying
any money so raised to purposes other than those approved by
,
Parliament.

Semi-annual accounts of all the incomes and expenditures
are to be kept according to the uniform system of accounts adopted
in 1868, and annual statistical returns must he made to the Board
of Trade according to the rules prescribed in the Railway Regu-
lation Act of 1871. Government audit and inspection of the
Companie's affairs may be resented under certain special circum -
stances.
Aside from these restrictions, the English railways are
permitted to do as they please in managing their financial matters,
subject to the common law of the country. But Parliament has
power to pass any general law governing railway finance as it sees
fit. Railway companies may change their original terms of in-
corporation, or vary the conditions under which their capital may
be raised or spent, or effect any other modifications regarding
financial affairs; but in each and every case, they are required
1
to apply to Parliament for special permission.
England, we have stated, undertook to regulate railway
finance long before some other countries realized the importance
1. In practice, the permission can usually be obtained without
any difficulty, if there isP-^serious opposition. The following
passage from an editorial of the Economist, April 9, 1870
to a large extent expresses the situation:
The "position (of Parliament) towards applicants for
powers is very simple. It is the mere dispenser of an author-
ity which the applicants wish to possess, and which, it confers
upon them in order that the country may gain. Both parties
are quite free in the matter. The companies to make a profit
apply for the power, and Parliament believing that its con-
stituents will gain, assents to the demand."

Ay of this branch of government activity. Thus, it may well be
asked in the beginning, (l) Why did England deem such actions
necessary? and (2) what led her to adopt her unique policy? The
first question may be answered by stating that England has long
recognized that public advantage requires that railways should
yield reasonable returns to those who invest in such undertakings
and that certain amount of government interference is required
to help investors to identify the securities issued by railway
companies, which they tre asked to take up. To raise a sufficient
barrier against swindling operations and to protect the public
from "bubble" schemes seem to be objects underljrinf all the legis-
lative actions of Parliament.
In answer to the second question as to why Parliament has
adopted its particular policy in regulating railway finance, it '
may be said that although parliament attempted to adept more
stringent measures for the purpose of realizing the purposes just
referred to, it was constantly reminded of the fact that England
is a country of free enterprise. The general feeling has always
been that the state should interfere as little as possible with
what is being or capable of being performed by private enterprise.
There has been even considerable cry that "the cost of a railway
1
is a matter with which the public and Parliament have no concern."
The idea that an enlightened view of their own interest would al-
ways compel railway officers to have due regard to the general
advantage of the public has always been kept prominently before
the attention of all its activities. Moreover Parliament is an
1. London Times, June 4, and June 12, 1886.

elective body, and has consequently been influenced by popular
conceptions in dealing with even such scientific questions as the
regulation of railway finance.
Moreover, by the time Parliament had fully realized the
importance of more strict regulation, its laissez faire rules had
already been established, and an enormous amount of capital in-
vested in the railway business. Parliament therefore felt that
it would be unjust in any way to withdraw the early concessions
which led to the investments. The constant desire to make rail-
way investments safe securities on the one hand and to interfere
with railway management as little as possible on the other, seems
to have caused Parliament to adept its unique system of regulation
of railway finance which seems to lie between lais^ez faire and
ahsolute control.

CEAPTEB II.
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION OP CAPITALIZATION.
I - SHARE CAPITAL.
The greater part of English railway capital is raised by
1
the issue of three classes of instruments, varying in security and
interest. The net income is liable in the first instance to the
claims of the debenture^holders, then to those of the holders of
preference shares, end ultimately to those of the holders of ordi-
2
nary shares.
In general a. railway raises its capital in the first in-
stance by issuing ordinary shares. When this class falls to a
discount, or for some other reason, the company has recourse to
inviting subscriptions to preference or guaranteed shares. The
holders of the latter class of stocks are, to a certain extent, •
not only proprietors but semi-creditors of the company, in that
the net income of the company is first of all secured to them in
priority over the ordinary stock holders. When the ordinary and
preference stocks are both taken up, and, theoretically paid for
in cashto the amount of the nominal value, then the company nay
use its authority, granted by Parliament, to- borrow money on de-
1. Formerly railway securities were divided into five classes:
ordinary, guaranteed, preferential, loans, and debenture stock.
About 1870, the second and third classes as well as the fourth
and fifth classes were merged. In addition to these principal
classes, there are also various subordinate issues such as
rent^charge stocks which are practically guaranteed stocks, and
preferred and deferred stocks. The latter two, however, are
but components of the ordinary stock. There is another very
rare class (according to Wm. J. Stevens, British Railways, p.
4.), called the contingent right stock which shares in divi-
dends with the ordinary stock after a certain rate on the
latter has been paid.
2. See London Times, August 27, 1871.

benture, mortgage, or otherwise, to the extent of one-third of the
A3
amount raised by shares or one-fourth of the total capital.
Among the several important features into which the par-
liamentary committee on railway bills would make inquiry before
recommending the passage of such bills were the financial affairs
of the applyinr company. They would scrutinize, first of all, the
amount of the capital to be raised by the company, whether by the
creation of shares or by loans. Thus besides considering the
location and nature of the line, special engineering difficulties,
expected traffic, etc., the committee on railway bills, in 1844 as
kin the case of the Brighton and Chichester Railway, considered
carefully the following questions:
1. The amount of the proposed capital and the amount of loans
to be raised.
2. The amount of shares subscribed for and the deposits paid
thereon.
3. The names and places of residence of the directors with
the amount of shares taken by each.
4. The number of shareholders who might be considered as
having a local interest in the line, and the amount of
capital subscribed by them, together with their names and
addresses
.
5. The number of other share-holders and the capital taken
by them.
It was only after being satisfied with respect to these
points as set forth in the bill, that the committee would recommend
its passage. The manner in which these provisions governing share
capital of railway companies were embodied in the special actsis
illustrated by the following passages from the London and Croydon
3jL. CT . John Fraserj^ British Railroads, 1903, pp. 26-27.
Railway Times, October 5, 1839.
£3:. Rarilway--T~iws , April 25, 1844.

Railway Act of 1837:-
"CXXXVI. And whereas the probable expense of making the
railway and other works hereby authorized will amcunt to the sum
of £1, 800, 000, and sums exceedinp that amount have been subscribed
under the subscription contracts ; be it enacted, That, not-
withstanding any thing in the several subscription deeds or con-
tracts
,
the capital of the company hereby incorporated shall
be 11,800,000 divided into 36,000 shares of £50 each; and that
such shares shall, as scon as conveniently may be after the passing
of this act, be apportioned and divided to and amongst the several
provisional Committee or provisional Directors , in the
proportion herein-before mentioned, "
The act further permitted the company to increase the
number of shares by diminishing the amount in value of each share
in order to facilitate the allotment of such shares among the
subscribers.
As these clauses became numerous and complicated Parliament
consolidated them and a number of other provisions into general
provisions to be applicable to all companies. Thus in the Companies
Clauses Act, 1845, provisions were made to the effect that the
capital of the companies should be divided into shares of the
prescribed number and amount and that such shares should be number-
ed in arithmetical progression. All the provisions as being out-
lined in the private act just referred to were also set forth with
precision. Further provision was made to enable railway companies
to convert their borrowed money into share capital under certain
^ t
conditions.
Hereafter called the Croydon Railway Act.
j fe. Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 16.
^3. "56. It shall be lawful for the company, if they think fit,
unless it be otherwise provided by the special act, to raise the ad-
ditional sum so authorized to be borrowed, or any part thereof, by
creating new shares of the company, instead of borrowing the same,
or having borrowed the same, to continue at interest only a part of
N such additional sum, and tc raise part thereof by creating new
shares; but no such augmentation of capital ... shall take place with-
'ythe previous authority of a general meeting of ^he company.

In England, as in other countries, the railways were given
compulsory power to take land; but they were net allowed tc exer-
cise such power until they produced a certificate under the hands
of two justices certifying that the whole of the capital or esti-
mated sua for defraying the expenses of the undertaking had been
subscribed under contract binding upon the subscribers. Companies
were also forbidden to reduce their capital by the pavment of divi-
dends; but they might reduce their capital in case the commission-
ers of railways authorized the abandonment of a part of their
undertaking and the commissioners favored such a reduction of
c ap i t al
.
As has been referred tc, the Companies Clauses Act of
1845 required that t v e capital of the companies should be divided
into shares of the prescribed number and amount. The holders of the
shares were entitled to enjoy the proprietary privileges according'
to the number of shares owned, and were at liberty to transfer his
shares. A provision, however, was inserted in the Companies
Clauses Bill, 1545, to the effect that no shareholder should
make any transfer of shares ir. respect of his subscription
"57. The capital so to be raised by the creation o^ new
shares shall be considered a part of the general capital, and
shall be subject tc the same provisions in all respects, whether
with reference tc the payment of calls, or the forfeiture of shares
on nonpayment of calls, or otherwise?,
:..<? Lands Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 18, ss. 16-17.
1.1(3 Companies Clauses Act, 1845, s. 121.
jl. II Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850, 13 & 14 V. cap. 83, s. 28.
^.
|V On account of the fact that many-people subscribed to shares
without any idea of ever paying for them, a provision v/as made in
the Railway Construction Facilities Act of 1864, (27 & 28 V. cap.
121, s. 28) tc render it unlawful for any company tc issue any share
created under the authority of a certificate cf the Beard cf Trade
not should any such share vest in the person accepting the same,
unless and until a sum not less than one-fifth part of the amount
of such share had. been paid up.

until he had paid all calls for the time being due on such share
held by him.
This provision received much opposition in Parliament. It
v/as objected on the ground that it was not only too hard a measure,
but it would prevent the solvent shareholder from disposing of his
shares until all the calls were paid up, thus giving an advantage
to the insolvent holders, as it did not matter much, to the latter
whether he effected a transfer or not. It v/as contended that a
call might be made for a particular day, and it would not be
1^
proper to prohibit the transfer of shares in the interim.
To this objection it was retorted that a call once made
would form a debt, and hence should be settled first. It was
further urged that the adoption of the clause would put an end to
the extremely harmful practice of railway speculation which was
very common at the time. These speculators, it was pointed out,
would often enter into engagements without the least probability
of their ever being able to meet them; and when they became deeply
involved for calls, they would shake off their responsibility by
transferrins their shares to men of straw. Thus after considerable
discussion, the clause v/as agreed to.
Further provisions, however, were made in the early special
acts, to the effect that transfers of shares and stocks should be
made by deed and should be registered in the registers of the
companies concerned, and that until such registration was made, the
seller of the share should remain liable for all the calls and
I'd. Hansard, vol. 77, p. 929.
1

the purchaser should have no part or share of the profits of the
undertaking, nor any voting power in respect of such transferred
15
shares. Forms of certificates of both shares and transfers of
shares were also prescribed.
So far so good; but Parliament seemed to have failed at
the most important point. It did net stipulate the time within
which such registration should be executed. When the prospects of
a company were good, the proviso that failure to register would
deprive the purchaser of his proprietary privileges was sufficient
to insure proper expeditious registration, but when the prospects
a
of company were bad, it was entirely differentia^ Consequently,
purchasers of railway shares often wculd hold the transfer in their
possession so long as it suited their convenience; the seller of
those shares having no means of compelling the purchasers to re-
gister the share, would remain always liable for the payment of
the calls. The law subjected these sellers to the liability of
paying calls, but afforded them no means of repossessing themselves
of their shares. Consequently the original holders having dispos-
ed of their shares in the market a.nd after the lapse of years when
call upon call he„d accumulated to a frightful amount, were some-
times subjected to legal proceedings, "because none of the many
parties through whose hands these shares had subsequently passed
had chosen to render themselves liable by conforming with the
requirements of the company's act." The brokers also took advantage
Companies Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 14-15. and s. CIV of the
Croydon Railway Act, 1837.
(j,2. Evidence before the select Committee of the House of Commons
1839. Railway Times, November 9, 1839.
p|3. Railway Times, November 9, 1839.

of this unfortunate situation by arranging schemes whereby it was
made possible that from the moment the deed was stamped for the
first time, the transfer whould pass from hand to hand possibly
for many months without the payment of any duty upon the several
1 <
transactions subsequent to the first.
The inconvenience resulting from such illegal transfer of
shares was seriously felt. Therefore, it was urged before the
select committee of 1839 that some measure should be adopted to
limit the period within which transfers of shares and stocks should
be registered. It was also suggested that unless registration was
made within the specified time, the transfer should lose its
validity and the share should revert to the selling party. Ho
action, however, was taken by Parliament to effect these reforms.
cu
But in 1850, a provision was made in the Abandonment of Railways
Act of that year, again providing that unless a share had been
duly registered and calls on it fully paid, it would not entitle
r i
its holder to the proprietary privileges. No provision, however,
was made tc stipulate a uniform limit of time within which such
registration should take place. Hence the regulations governing
the registration of transfer of shares remained as defective as
before, and nothing further has been done since.
The payment of calls also received much consideration in
1845. Companies were empowered by the Companies Clauses Act of
1. Second Report of select committee of the House of Commons, as
appeared in Railway Times, October 5, 1839.
2. Railway Times, November 9, 1839. » ,
i 3
.
Ev-iden-ce.,.,before select c ommi-t-^ee - of 1-8-39 , ia&iritu* Jfb«M .
f 4. Irid.
5. 13 & 14 V. cap. 83, s. 6.

that year to make calls for the payment of money upon the share-
holders by serving on each shareholder a notice at least twenty-
one days before making the call; but no successive calls should be
made at less than the prescribed intervals. The aggregate amount
of calls made in any one year was also prescribed. Every share-
holder was held liable to pay the amount of the calls made in
respect of his shares; and in case of failure tc pay such calls on
or before the proper time, he should be liable to be charged with
interest for such unpaid calls at the legal rate. The railway
companies were further empowered to sue and recover with interest
from such defaulting shareholders the amounts of the calls due,
for which purpose, the production of the register of shareholders
was prima facie evidence of such defaulting parties being share-
holders of the company and of the number and amount of their re-/'
gistered shares.
Moreover, the directors after serving proper notice might
at any time after the expiration of two months from the day ap-
pointed for payment of such calls, declare the forfeiture of such
defaulted shares on which calls were due and unpaid. After such
declaration of forfeiture being confirmed by a general meeting the
company might sell such forfeited shares. To saf e-guard^the
interest of the shareholders, however, it was provided that no
company should sell or transfer more of the shares of any such
defaulters than wh d-t- was sufficient to pay the arrears, etc., then
due from them. In case the money produced by any such sale was
^1. 8 V, c. 16, ss. 21-28. .
jj!>. 8 V. c. 16, ss. 34-35. ,, r> „ 3^-35-
1

Of
>
more than what was needed to pay for such arrears, interests, etc.,
the defaulters might claim the surplus.
The natter of cancellation and surrender of shares was
further amplified "by the Companies Clauses Act, 1863 , so as to five
the companies greater liberty in such matters and to make the pay-
* >?
ment of calls of even greater consequence to the shareholders.
Provision was also made to the effect that the last re-
gistered holders of such forfeited shares should not only be
precluded from all rights and interest in respect of such shares,
hut should also he held liahle to pay all arrears of calls, in-
terest, and expenses due in respect of the share at the time of the
cancellation, notwithst anding such forfeiture.
Moreover, companies were authorized to cancel forfeited
shares with the consent of holders and to accept, on such terms as
they saw fit, surrenders of any shares which were not fully paid
up; hut they were forhidden to "pay or refund to any shareholder
any sum of money for or in respect of the cancellation or surrender
of any shares.
1. 26 & 27 V. c. 118. s. 4.
'2. Section four of this act provides:- "Where any share is
1 after the passing of this act declared forfeited under and in pur-
suance of the provisions in The Companies Clauses Consolidate
Act, 1845 , and the forfeiture is confirmed by a meeting
in accordance with the same provisions , and notice of the for-
feiture has "been given, -then , if the directors of the company
are unahle to sell the share for a sum equal to the arrears of calls
and interest and expenses due in respect thereof, the company at any
general meeting held not less than two months after such notice is
^iven may, in case payment of arrears of the calls, interest and
expenses due in respect thereof is not made by the registered
holder of the share "before the meeting is held, resolve that the
share instead of "being sold shall he cancelled, and the share shall
thereupon be cancelled accordingly."
f3. 26 & 27 V. cp^K 118, s. 6.
,4. 26 & 27 V. c. 118, s. 10.
A

When a railway company desired to raise additional
*>t>
capital, it should apply to the Board of Trade for permission,
and the latter after beinF satisfied that the applying company had
complied with the requirements of the established rules governing
notices, etc., might settle a "draft of certificate" to authorize
the company to raise the prescribed amount of additional capital
for the purpose set forth in the certificate. For the purpose of
raisinr such additional capital, the company was at liberty to
issue new shares or stock or to make loans, unless the certificate
provided to the contrary. New shares or stocks issued under such
circumstances, or for the conversion of its loans into share
capital, as well as for raising additional sums of money in lieu
of borrowing should be considered as a part of the general capital
and should be subjected to the same provisions in all respects as
the existing shares, except as tc the time for making calls and
the amounts of such calls, which the company was authorized to
determine as it saw fit from time to time.
In order to safe-guard the interest of the shareholders,
ft
it was provided, by the Companies Clauses Act of 1645 that if at
the time when the augmentation of capital took place the existing
shares were at or below par, the new shares might be of such amount
and issued in such a manner as the director saw fit, but that if at
$1. Railway Companies Act, 1864, 27 & 28 V. cap. 120, s. 3.
j 2. R«iiwE^~€©inpenrtes .A^ s - 4 an<*
if Schedule iii.
>3. Companies Clauses Act, 1863, 26 & 27 V. cap. 118, s. 12 and
Companies Clauses Act, 1P45, 8 V. cap. 16, ss. 56-57.
34. Companies Clauses Act, 1845,. 8 V. cap. 16, ss. 58-60.

the time of the augmentation the existing shares were at a premium,
then, unless it was otherwise provided by the special act of the
company, the sum to be raised should be divided into shares of
such amount as would conveniently allow the same to be apportioned
among the shareholders in proportion to the existing shares, and
such new sharrs should be offered to the existing shareholders in
the proper proportion by letter.
The latter provision beneficial as it was to the share-
holders, seemed to have been more or less abused by some of the
shareholders through their neglect in acknowledging their accep-
tance of such offers. Consequently, a similar provision was made
in the Companies Clauses Act, 1863, with the proviso that in
case the company's offer to any shareholder was not accepted within
the time limit and in the absence of any special arrangement to
extend such time limit, then the company might dispose such new
(1 shares and stocks in whatever way it saw fit, "but so that not less
than the full nominal amount of any share or portion of stock be
payable or paid in respect thereof . " The latter provision pro-
hibiting the disposal of shares at a discount, however, was re-
pealed afterwards.
In several of the bills of the session dur^Lg 1859 and
1862, power was sought to accept surrenders of shares liable to be
forfeited .and to extinguish, without sale, the interest of the
holders of shares which had become forfeited, a.nd thereupon to
cancel or merge the surrendered and forfeited shares, and in lieu
of such cancelled shares to issue new shares to an aggregate
amount, limited in some cases to that remaining unpaid in respect
26 & 27 V. cap. 118, ss. 17-21.

of the cancelled or merged shares, and in others extending to the
aggregate amount of the whole of the cancelled or merged shares.
The Board of Trade thought that such irregularities were undesir-
able, and during those years repeatedly urged that the aggregate
amount of the new shares which might he issued in lieu of the old
shares should in all cases he restricted to the aggregate amount
remaining unpaid in respect of the cancelled or merged shares, so
that the sums which had been already raised by means of the old
shares might not be raised a second time. It believed that if
further sums were required for the companies' undertaking, it would
be better that authority to raise them should be sought as a power
to raise additional capital, for by so doing the nominal capital
of the company would correspond with the amount which the company
would have been authorized to raise by shares if the cancellation
or merging did not take place.
Following these repeated reccnmendat ions of the Board of
Trade, Parliament inserted a clause in the Companies Clauses Act,
1863; to the effect that the companies might issue new shares in
lieu of cancelled or surrendered shares; but the aggregate nominal
amount of such new shares should not exceed that of the old shares
after deducting the amount actually paid up in respect of such
old shares. r
By the same act, railway companies, after having created
new shares or stock, were permitted to cancel such new shares or
stock should they decide not to issue the whole of such new shares.
Report of Board of Trade on Railway Bills, 1861, pp. 22-23.
,/2. Ibjd.
%3. 26 & 27 V. c. 118, s. 11.
\4. 26-^«r~^M^e^^r8^ . s . 16.

As stated tx€Ff$-r-€", between the ordianry shares and the
debentures or loans of a company are the preference shares. The
latter bears a specified rate of dividend which shall obe met w-irth.
out $ne company's net income before any ordinary shareholder may
receive any dividend. Prior to 1863, the interest or guaranteed
dividend on tbese preferential shares was cumulative. If it is not
paid in one year, then it must be paid together with the dividend
due in the succeeding year in full, before the ordinary stocks
could receive anything. But in the Companies clauses Act, If 63,
a provision was inserted to the effect that preference shares
should be entitled to dividends only out of the profits of each
year; and if in any year ending on the 31st of December, "there
are not profits available for the payment of the preferential
dividend for that year, no part of the deficiency shall be
made good out of the profits of any subsequent year, or cut of
any other funds of the company."
With regard to the creation and issue of preferential
stocks, the same act provided ;that where any company was author-
ized by any special act to raise any additional sum by the issue
of preference shares or stock with the sanction of a general meet-
ing it might create and issue (according as the authority given
by the special act extends to shares only, or to stock only, or to
both) such shares or stock as the company from time to time saw fit.
It was, however, further provided that such stock should not affect
-3rr-
.
Vide
-p .
.
26 & 27 V. C. 118, s. 14.
26 8c 27 V. cap. 118, s. 13

antj guarantee, or any preference or priority in the payment of
dividend or interest, granted by the company under ^or confirmed bjft
any previous act.
The act also required that the terms and conditions to
which any preference share or shock was subjected, should he
clearly stated in the certificate of the preference share or por-
tions of the preference stock.
After the adoption of those provisions regarding pre-
ference shares, there was for a number of years a constant tendency
for the proportion of preferential capital to grow more rapidly than
that of the ordinary jcapital . Thus in 1858 the ordinary and pre-
A*4w4rmC4*44 LvthH*rvG*iv
"In-
ference capital werq/ikujDuie.! -anoth-er—as 56 w&& to 44, while in 1870
and 1871 the relative proportions were reversed, becoming 43 to
i 2
57 and 42 to 58 respectively. Such changes might have been
brought about by two entirely different causes. In the first place,
when railway enterprise became established, it might be reasonably
expected that the preference capital would tend to increase more
rapidly than the ordinary. When a railway pays large dividends
on its ordinary shares, it car raise money on easy terms by issu-
ing preference or debenture stocks at fixed rates of interest.
This seems to have been largely the cause in England. On the other
hand, when a company pays little or no dividend on its ordinary
shares, it will be compelled to resort to the issue of such pre-
ferential shares for raising money, in order to avoid heavier
sacrifices.
ql. Companies Clauses Act, 1863,26 & 27 V. c. 118, s. 15.
d2. Capt. Tyler's annual report to the Board of Trade, 1873, p. 4.

Another class of shares or
rather another nomenclature given to the ordinary shares, known
as preferred and deferred shares, Cas*e into vogue since 1868.
These, in reality, do not constitute any separate class of shares,
hut simply represent two divisions into which the ordinary shares
are divided. All the rules governing the ordinary shares are also
applicable to these sre-trsiri^ preferred and deferred stocks, ex-
govern
cept that special rules have been adopter to^the process or, and
the conditions under which, the division may be executed.
The f irst/\instance of
(
" stock* split t ing"
,
by whi ch the -drir*
vicidO n t^e ordinary shares/lint o preferred and def erred pwp«H4©Rs
13
i-s. kTungp , took place in 1854 in the case of the Great Forthern.
Luring that year £ 12 having been paid on each £20 share of that
Company, a panic seized upon the public mind and grave doubts were
entertained as to whether the Ircldly competitive scheme of that
company could be comptyLed in the face of adverse circumstances.
At the same time the London and North-Western authorities were not
slow to take advantage of the situation in making things uneasy
for their competitors. In order to push the thing along, the
directors of the Great Forthern adopted the proposition, -not to
forfeit the shares and confiscate the whole of the payments thereon?
but to lay aside £10 for the defaulting subscribers, and to give
the remaining £2 as a bonus to future subscribers, with the whole
of a dividend up to Z%
t
calling the holdings of the old subscribers,
B., or deferred, and those of the new subscribers, A., or preferred
stocks. This procedure speedily restored confidence in the under-
C
taking and carried it through its vicissitudes.
4%. Railway Times, May 2, 1868.

This affair received considerable attention; but it was
not until 1868 w!ESp stockjjsplitt ing IrtgSI tu tm^ome a burning
question. In that year, the South Coast end other companies ap-
plied for power to divide their ordinary stocks into preferred
and deferred ordinary, at the option of the shareholders. Con-
sequently strict requlations were addopted in the Regulation of
Railways Act of that year specifying with great elahoraticn the
precise conditions under which the division of stocks might he
effected.'
3.
Evidence "before Select Committee on Railway Stock Conversion,
1890, p. 37.
31 & 32 V. c. 119.
"13. Any company which in the year immediately preceding has
paid a dividend on their ordinary stock of not less than three
pounds per centum per annum may, pursuant to the resolution of an
extraordinary general meeting, divide their paid-up ordinary stock
into two classes, to he called. . .preferred ordinary stptk.
.
.. and deferred ordinary stock, and issue the same suhject to the
following provisions :
(1) Preferred and deferred ordinary stock shall he issued only
in substitution for equal amounts of paid-up ordinary stock :
(2) Such division may he made at any time, on the request in
writing of the holder of paid-up ordinary stock, hut not other-
wise; and such request may apply to the whole of the ordinary
stock of such holder or to 'any portion thereof divisible into
twentieth parts:
(3) Preferred ordinary stock and deferred ordinary stock
shall not he issued except in suras of ten pounds or multiples of
ten pounds:
(6) As hetween preferred ordinary stock and deferred ordinary
stock, preferred ordinary stock shall hear a fixed maximum dividend
at the rate of six per dentum per annum;
(11) The terms and conditions on which any preferred ordinary
stock of deferred ordinary stock is issued shall he stated on the
certificate thereof:
(12) Preferred ordinary and deferred ordinary stock shall
respectively he held on the same trusts, and suhject to the same
charges and liahilities, as those on and suhject to which the
ordinary stock in sihstitution for which the sum are issued was
held immediately hefore the substitution, and sc as to give effect
to any testamentary or other disposition of or affecting such
ord inary stock. w

There was no debate on this clause; but there was one in
the House of Lords on a similar clause of the South Coast Railway
Bill of that year just referred tc, from v/hich the clause in the
Regulation of Railways Act was copied . When the South Coast Rail-
way Bill was in the House of Lords, the clause giving power for
splitting stocks was struck out. But when the bill was considered
in the House of Commons, the original clause was re-inserted in the
bill. Finally when the bill came back to the upper house of
Parliament again, a motion was again made to emit that clause.
Lord Redeldale very strongly opposed the division of stocks, on
the ground that such a practice would savor stock jobbing.
On the other hand, the !Duke of Richmond, who was then
president of the Board of Trade, supported the clause on general
I
principles. He maintained that "the tendency of Parliament had
been not to interfere with the financial arrangements of these
companies; providing, of course, that parliament saw that no in-
justice was done to mortgagees, or other parties.." He further
claimed that to prohibit the splitting of stocks was entirely
Ml
opposed to the recommendations of the Railway Commission , v/hich
went very fully into the question, and, gave it as their opinion
that it was the more judicious course for Parliament to relieve
itself from interference in the financial affairs of railway
companies. Instead of proving injurious, he believed the proposed
subdivision of stocks would tend to s-ive all parties concerned an
additional interest in seeing that the directors did their duty.
U^. Hansard, v^. 193; ^ 1545.
He probably referred to the Royal Commission on Railways, 1867.
Hansard, v^% 193; JK 1545

After considerable discussion, the clause was adopted
sit
with thirty contents and seven non-contents. Since then the
regulations governing the splitting of shares have been elaborated
but not -nodified, and railway companies have been given the liberty
to divide their shares under t>iese or similar regulations.
Commenting upon this clause, the Railway ^ Times said that
it was certainly to be regretted that "the Legislature should have
lent itself to a system capable of further propagation of so vile
a mischief, "and it concluded that "we have only to hope that the
nuisance may become so prevalent as to ensure its own corrective."
But the hope of the Railway Times was not realized. On
the contrary, not only has the practice of "splitting" spread, but
it has also developed into the widespread "stock-watering" which
was not even thought of at the time when Parliament first gave-
its permission to stcckWsplitt ing . A comparison of the following
clauses of a railway bill passed in 1890 with cub sec tr-i^n—fH--of
_&ae*£c*-*3"-«B& the Regulation of Railways act, 1868, quoted above,
may serve to show the vast difference between the regulations
governing "splitting" as adopted in 1868 and the degenerated
practice which took place afterwards. The second clause of the
Bill of London and South-western Railway passed in 1890 provides:
1^2. In the Model Bills and Clauses of the House of Lords, 1909,
eight clauses (pp 24-25) were devoted to the regulations governing
the division of stocks.
t/fll. Hansard, 193; jv. 1549.
g|3. Railway Times, August 8, 1868, p. 819.
£^5. Railway Times, May 17, 1890.

The company would create ordinary stock of two classes,
-
(l) preferred 4^> ordinary stock, and (2) deferred duplicate ordinary
stock, both classes cf which to be in substitution of a corres-
ponding amount of paid-up ordinary stock; that is to say, LlOO of
I the preferred and £100 of the deferred ordinary stock should be
substituted for every £100 of the existing ordinary stock.
\
But, it may be remembered, what was permitted in 1868 was
a mere "splitting",- "pref erred and deferred ordinary stock shall
be issued only in substitution of equal amounts of paid-up ordi-
•n* ——
nary stock," while the later practice was actually "duplication",
wherewith stock certificates bearing a face value of £200 were
given, for every £100 paid in.
The chief reason which led the companies to indulge
in stoclrtj splitting was that they thought the divided stocks would
command higher prices than the solid property. But the Railway
Times both in 1868 and 1891, the years in which stock-splitting
bee-an and reached its highest point of development, respectively,
by
have proven ^the market quotations of the two kinds of stocks of
several companies that the expectation of the companies was by no
means well founded in many cases. On the other hand, the same
paper shewed that much confusion resulted from the splitting of
stocks. Investors were in many instances led to take up one
section of these divided stocks under the delusion that the de-
ferred portion (as in the case of the Great northern, the originator
of the scheme, just referred to) had been previously paid. up. As
this was far from being the true state of affairs in many instances,
much disappointment and suspicion t&ffk~-&r&c£ . Therefore, Parliament
See Railway Times for November 14, and November 28, 1868, and
. May 23, 1891, p. 606.
Railway Times, May 2, 1868.

was blamed for being too ready to comply with "every request r.iade
to it by speculators in the most desparate condition."
In England it has been held from
the beginning of railway legislation that it is not the legitimate
business of a railway company to apply tc one purpose the funds
which have been raised for another and that it was the duty of
railway companies to keep up the value of their capital assets - no
dividends may be paid out of capital. In the early railway
acts of incorporation provisions were made as tc the purpose for
which the company was incorporated and the proper mode of applying
the capital raised. Thus in the first companies Clauses Act a
specific provision was made to the effect that all the money raised
by the company should be applied, firstly, in paying the costs and
expenses incident thereto, and, second^, in carrying the purposes
Ibifed.
See Report of Committee on Railway Companies Peters, 1864 ,P. 58.
Section CLXX of the Croydon act cf 1837 provided "That all the
Jiney to be reaised by the said company by virtue of this Act shall
he laid out and applied, in the first place, in paying and dis-
charging all costs and expenses of applying for, obtaining, and
passing this Act, or preparatory or relating thereto, incurred...;
and the remainder of such money shall be applied in end towards
purchasing lands, and making and maintaining the said railway and
other works, and in otherwise carrying this Act into execution;
and that the expenses incurred by the several provisional committees
or boards of directors for the said. .. .lines shall be raised
and paid by the subscribers to the said several lines.... in pro-
portion to the amount of their respective subscriptions...."
8. V.c. 16. S. 65.

of the company into execution. It was further provided by that
act that, unless expressly provided to the contrary, companies might
receive and apply to the purpose of the company any calls to be
made, notwithstanding mortgages.
Thus both the private and the public general acts required
that the companies should first of all apply its capital to the
payment of expenses already incurred for forming the company, and
then to the execution of the purpose for which the company was
incorporated.
The financial difficulties and pressure for capital caused
by the extravagent extension of railways during the forties led
to considerable violation of the foregoing provisions. Therefore
the Lords' committee of 1349 was instructed to devise means to
guard against the application of funds to any other purpose than
those authorized by Parliament. This committee recommended that
railway companies should be required to explain in their capita.!
accounts not only how money was raised but the undertakings to which
it was applicable and the manner in which it was actually spent.
During the latter part of the fifties and the first part
of the sixties, in many railway bills for constructing new works,
provisions v/ere not made for raising additional capital; but the
companies were permitted to apply to the new works any money which
they might have been authorized to raise by previous acts and which
might not be required for the purposes for which the money was
originally raised. In order tc protect the shareholders from the
8. V. c. 16, s. 45.
fe. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p:xviii.
^1

danger that might arise from the application of the funds of rail-
way companies tc purposes not sanctioned by Parliament and not in
contemplation at the time when their powers were obtained, both
Parliament and the Board of Trade thought that it was very impor-
tant to take advantage cf every suitable opportunity to ascertain
and limit the amount of money that might be raised and to define
clearly its application. Moreover, the Board of Trade emphasized
this point successively for several years beginning 1859.
When the Companies Clauses Act of 1863 was passed, a
clause was devoted to specifying the application of money raised
by the issue cf debenture stocks, thus giving effect to the re-
commendation of the Board cf Trade. It enacted that money raised
by debenture stock should be applied exclusively either in paying
off money due by the company on mortgage or bond, or else for the
purposes to which the same money would be applicable if it were
raised on mortgage or bond.
In the Railway Construction Facilities Act of the following
year, provision was again made to the effect that railway companies
"shall apply every part of the money raised only for purposes for
which it is by the certificate (of the Board cf Trade) authorized
to be applied .
"
In practice, however, there seemed to be considerable
violation of these rules, especially by the smaller lines. A
striking example may be fcund in the case of the Brecon and Merthyr
LI. .<goard of Trade annual report on Railway bills, I860, p. 22.
4 2 . 9>&Ogl d oJHE-rade annual rep-o rt en rail-way bill© , 1863, p. 19.
.3. 26 & 27 V. c. 118, sec. 32.
£4. 27 & 28 V. c. 21, sub-sees. (4) and (5) of sec. 29.

Railway Company. After having repeatedly violated the lav/ in
raising its capital, this company authorized the issue of £20,000
for the construction of, and with a special hypothecation on, a
"branch called the Ivor & Eowlais, which latter was authorized in
1865 but not yet commenced in 1867. It was also found that the
act of 1865 had already authorized the creation for the construc-
tion of this line, shares and debentures to the amount of £20,000
and had specially provided that the money should only be applied
to that purpose; and that such shares and debentures for £20,000
had actually been issued under the name and were then existing;
but that the money was not applied to the line which was left en-
tirely untouched.
Moreover, this kind of irregularities seemed to have con-
tinued for some time. Thus in 1869 a complaint, which had many
parallels in railway affairs, was made against the Caledonian
Railway by the Forth
ft
Clyde Navigation Ccmpa.ny ,^whcse undertaking
vrrfefe many others the Caleccnian had amalgmated. The charge was
A.
that the absorbing company had applied the money raised under the
(,{5. This railway about 66 miles long was originally contracted to
be constructed by a certain Savin at £10,000 per mile; but act
after act had since been obtained by its directors and the cont-
ractor for increasing the capital, until, instead of the original
authorized capital of £-700,000, the shares and debentures issued to
the contractor for its construction amounted to £2,000,000. In
this amount there were no less than ten kinds of preference shares,
each ranking in order of date, and fourteen issues of debentures
also ranking in order of creation. Then the company again ob-
tained from the Board of Trade, under the general Railway Act,
1864, and vv'ithout any sanction for new lines, powers to create
£570,000 of fresh preference stock and £190,000 of fresh debentures
stock for which they could not find any market. See London Times,
November 13, 1867, p. 4.

special borrowing powers of the particular undertaking to general
purposes, to the amount of more than £100,000, in breach of an
engagement with the absorbed company. In this connection, the
Economist said that in many cases even v/here there was ^ot any
apparent objection, the public had been "not a little injured"
through the diversion of the borrowing powers conferred. It
further said that "if the Legislature lays down rules in order
to secure the proper execution of undertakings which it authorized
and which it has a claim to see executed by virtue of the privi-
leges conferred..., care should be taken to have the rules put in
force, and a breach of them aught to be rendered impossible."
^[Another form in which capital has been applied to purposes other
than those authorized by Parliament is the payment of dividend out
of capital. This practice has been prohibited since the early
thirties. Thus in the Croydon Act of 1837 the provision was made
to the effect that no dividend should be made exceeding the net
amount of clear profit at the time being in the hands of the
company, nor whereby the capital of the said company should in any
degree be reduced.
During the forties there seemed to be a need for a relax-
ation of these restrictions. During that period many railway
companies received their capital by instalments and had to pay in-
terest pending construction: When calls were made at a time
when a high rate of interest could be obtained the subscribers
were unwilling to meet such calls. "To obviate this difficulty"
.
Economist, November 6, 1869.
i/k. 1. V. c.cxisT, s. CXCIII. v
Hansard, v^T. 78; 48.

it was suggested that "it was not unre& scnabl e for railway companies
to resort to the Ui'ri^ire^iTe-s-s-l ike practice of allowing interest
on calls before a railway is opened, and consequently before it has
and
any revenue. The interest was therefore charged to capital, served
to swell the capital expenditures." It must be stated that in
some cases the payment of such "interest" out of capital during
construction appeared necessary, for in such cases it was "utterly
rediculcus to hope for the payment of deposits unless interest be
allowed upon them during the construction of the line. Men cannot
afford to lock up their capital in a total sacrifice of present
#7,
results for the chance of any future proceeds, however abundant."
In still other cases, the practice was known as being advantageous
to all concerned.
On the whole, however, it seemed that the payment of
dividends out of capital was not desirable. It was well known as
Lord Somerset pointed out that many companies had gone on pay-
ing dividends out of their capital stock, as if they were in a
most flourishing condition. These companies sometimes went on
paying dividends cut of their capital until their capital no longer
exi st ed
.
Under such circumstances, Parliament saw fit to insert a
clause in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845, stipulating that "the
company shall not make any dividend whereby their capital stock
will be in any degree reduced."
[fe. Interest here is used really in the sense of dividend.
-Railway Times, jpril 27, 1844.
^\*.^R3rt±w«3rTI5Ee-s., July 25, 1846.
Hansard, to*t 78; fqs% 48-49.
t. 8 V. c. 16, s. 121.

The general interpretation given to this clause, as shown
by the debate in Parliament, was that it was not to prohibit the
payment of dividends from the interest of capital or pending con-
struction, but to prevent the payment of dividends cut of the
capital stock after the works were completed and when no profits
had been obtained.
In 1847 after the panic which followed the great railway
extension of 1845, a standing order was passed by the House of
Lords which remained in fore for many years, providing that in
every railway bill a clause should be inserted prohibiting the
payment of interest out of capital.
The Companies Act, 1862, also proyided in the first sche-
dule that no dividen\ should be paid except out of profits earned.
But this latter regulation was not compulsory on the companies re-
gistered under that act, for they were empowered by section 14 to
make rules of association excluding the regulations in the first
schedule, and were thus practically enabled to make what regulations
seemed best to the shareholders. Consequently a curious anomaly
arose out of the conflict between the standing order and the
Companies Act, 1862.
„n
In the Railway Construction Facilities Act, 1864, pro-
visions were again made prohibiting the application of capital for
the purpose of paying interest or dividend on account of calls made.
In 1867 a cla.use$ was inserted in the Railway Companies Act of that
^year which prescribed in detail the conditions under which a rail-
?\W Hansard, v*dr. 78; 48.
.
.15 Railway Times, March 16, 1889.
.IV, 25 & 26 V. c. 89.
.17 Report of select committee, 1882, p. iii.
27 & 28 V. c. 121, sub. -sec. (3) of s. 29.
6.- fjS0 & 31, V. c. 129, s. 50.

way might declare any dividend. It said that no dividend should be
declared "by a company until the auditors hed certified that the
current half yearly accounts contained a full and true statement
of the financial condition of the company, and that the dividend
p^^p^-sexr^ttr^he declared was hcrta- f-tete after charging the revenue
of. -the -htritf— yea r with, all expenses which ought to be paid thereout
In—the judgment of the auditors.
But the act further provided that "if the directors dif-
fer from the judgment of the auditors with respect to the payment
of any such expenses cut of the revenue of the half year, such
difference shall, if the directors desire it, be stated in the re-
port to the shareholders, and the company in general meeting may
decide thereon, subject to all the provisions of the law then ex-
1
isting, and such decision shall^for the purpose of the dividend^
be final and binding." Takinp advantage of this last proviso,
Many railway companies, like the Brighton, charged large sums to
their capital account, in opposition to the opinion of the account-
ants and auditors that the same should have been charged to revenue.
After violating the law in this manner, they would then legalize
their illegal act by calling a general meeting of the company and
abide by the decision of the meeting which according to law should
be "final and binding."
One of the chief reasons which led to the evasion of the
law v/as that, as a member of Parliament remarked in 1867, "There
is no where to be found a clear definition of working expenses,
%fk. London Times, Fovember IB, 1867, p. 8.
See ttbit~&7erk. Praser^ British Railways, 1903, p. 117.

that is to say there is nothing to define the charges which ought
to go to make up the workinp expenses of a company, before you
arrive at the profit upon which the debenture interest forms the
$y un
first charge." The .Government itself was said to be .able to dis-
^— i\
tinguish working expenses from capital charges. When once being
asked to define and determine what constituted the profits of a
railway, the Board of Trade appointed a committee to consider the
matter. This departmental committee reported, however, that "it
was too complex and difficult a matter for them to undertake, and
they recommended that the question be referred to a small body of
experts specially appointed for the purpose. The Board of Trade
was consequently asked to appoint such a committee, but it declined
to do it.
Under such circumstances, it became an easy matter for
railways to disregard all principles of accounting, if they saw
fit. The gross income representing the returns from which the
working expenses must be deducted before any money should be used
for dividends, was a definite quantity and could not be meddled
with; but the working expenses were not , and might be "switched."
So some of the railway directors, in order to make their business
appear "rosy", often charged part of such working expenses to
capital and declared dividends out of capital.
Moreover, the matter of charging certain items of current
expenses, such as the purchase of enginees, etc., to capital was
viewed with more or less approval by the shareholders. In some
Hansard
,
-v^i-. 186; 1030.
C. Ay Fraseiy British Railways, 1903, pp. 52-53.
London Times, October 29, 1867, p. 6.

cases it was not considered at all improper or injurious, still less
dishonest ^to defray a portion of the current expenditure out of
money borrowed, and treat as net income or profit what then appeared
as the remainder. These shareholders even would often exact divi-
dends whether earned or not, and would connive at the means so
long as the immediate end was secured. A decent dividend not only
enriched their pockets, hut kept up the market value of their
shares. Five per cent j in hand, with their holdings at par, even
temporarily, appeared far more comfortable than three per centl
with the stock at a discount, in spite of promising hopes. There-
fore, accounts were "cooked" on the one hand and "swallowed" on the
other.
In 1882 an open effort was made to remove the restrictions
-S1V
prohibiting the payment of dividend out cf capital. A committee
was appointed by Parliament to consider the matter. This committee,
after six sessions and a month's work, reported that the prohibi-
tion of the payment of interest out of capital was in accordance
with "sound financial principles and acts as a protection to the
public." In special cases, however, the committee recommended
that it might be permissible, subject to strict rules, to pay
:..^London Times, November 18, 1867, p. 8.
Railway Times, March 16, 1889, p. 374.
l.^See Report of Select Committee, 1882, Parliament Paper, 1882,
' vol. 13, p. iii.
i
4. PThe rules recommended /WiefTy\wj^rJ):
(1) ' Clauses defining the amount of interest, and the terms for
which it is payable, to be inserted in every Mil, and to be speci
ally reported on by the Board of Trade before being submitted to
the Committee (on Railway Bills).
(2) Such interest to be an addition to the authorized ca.pital
of the undertaking.
(3) Power of issuing debentures to be reckoned on the capital
exclusive of such addition for interest.

interest upon capital during construction.
Although the effort of the railway companies was unsuccess-
ful, it brought about much agitation, as a result of which the
House of Lords in 1886 modified its standing order so as to give
power to railway companies, under certain strict provisions, to
pay interest out of capital.
The relaxation of the earlier regulations, however, was
not accompanied with such good results as was expected. On the
contrary, much evil was done. The effect of paying interest cut of
capital, as observed a writer
,
has been to give a certain parti-
cular stock an altogether ficticious value, and genuine investors
have been victimized. The same writer also alleged, not without
reason, that the dividing up of principal money as profits and the
lack of restraint as to their enormous expansion of capital ex-
penditure, regardless of its productivity of revenue, can, and did,
only eventuate in a diminution, or even entire cessation, of divi-
dends on ordinary stocks.
(4) Payment of&uch interest to continue only during construction
of the works, or for such less period as the .Committee may think
fit to authorize, according to the circumstances of the case.
(5) The rate of interest to be fixed by the Committee, but in
no case to exceed 5$, W\, MuX*
(6) The prospectus and share certificates to contain on the
face of them an intimation that interest is payable out of capital
during construction only/^C"
The committee also recommended that these provisions should be
enacted in a general act, instead of mere modifications of the
standing orders. See report of Select Committee, May 19, 1882,
Parliamentary Paper, 1882, vol. 13.
Railway Times, March 16, 1889, p. 373.
MJB. -Railway Times, March Ibid.
3^m Praser^ British Railways, 1903, pp. 108-109.
Xohn-Jlr^asej^3r±4*teto~~&*i2xrE^^.jL 9t>3>lp-.-—1-4-4^.

The result of charging working expenses to capital has
proved to be equally objectionable. It necessitated the overburden^
of the business with overWre-ltaiiisi-y large capital charges, which
sooner or later would give much embarrassment to the property.
In so far as the public was not clearly aware of these manipula-
tions, the practice proved exceedingly illusory. It was merely a
matter of white-washing the true state of affairs by throwing ex-
penses on the revenue of the future. Indeed, the besetting evil
it*
of railway finance, as observed the London Times, "has arisen
from the confusion of two things- capital and revenue." some of
the most serious disputes, which affected in a remarkable degree the
property of some important compares, turned entirely upon the mysti-
fication over the charging of these two items. Directors were
charged with carrying to capital ^ expenses which belonged to re-
venue; and proprietors cTamoiN^cjisl-y demanded that capital accounts
should be closed. The general effect was that ficticious divi-
dends made it almost impossible to estimate the value of any rail-
way property.
Prom the foregoing pages, it is clear that most of the
regulations governing the share capital of railway companies were
adopted prior to 1845. It is only in a very few instances where
any changes have been made after the passage of the Companies
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845. But these changes, although
few in number, have proven of great importance as well as of a
unique nature. Indeed, it is largely in the adoption of her
London Times, November 18, 1867, p. 8.
-L-endon. S-imo&, October 28, 1867, p. 6.

regulations since 1845 concerning such matters as the creation of
preferred and deferred stocks and the application of capital that
Endland especially differed from other countries.
A special feature revealed is the fact that practically all
the measures concerning the share capital of railway companies, as
we have seen, were adopted as a .matter of course. With the ex-
ception of those concerning stcck^splitt ing and the application of
capital practically all the rules governing railway share capital
were adopted without any debate in Parliament. ITor did they re-
ceive much discussion from the public. This, however, is not the
case concerning the regulation of the other branches of railway
finance as we ^mgy'see in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III.
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION OF RAILWAY CAPITALIZATION
II - LOAN CAPITAL.
In the earlier years of the English railway system loan
capital consisted of mortgages or "bonds, which were commonly called
debentures, and which resembled the bonds issued in the United
States. In later years a class of securities called debenture-3tock
came into vogue. The debenture- stocks were similar to the debenture
in that each of them represented a debt with a fixed rate of in-
terest against the company. They were
,
however, distinctly dif-
ferent in two respects. Firstly the debentures were issued usually
for limited periods, while the debenture- stocks were usually per-
petual; and secondly, the former "were represented by deeds issued
by the company to cover large lump-sums of money, whereas the
latter were issued in circulating cert if icat es , in coupon form, to
represent more convenient amounts. Debenture stocks, however,
were practically little known until the fifties. Accordingly
Parliamentary regulations applied at first to the temporary de-
bentures or morgages, but were gradually modified to take care of
the permanent debenture- stock
.
1
The cardinal policy, as said a member of Parliament, to
which opinion we subscribed, has been to make the debenture cap-
ital of railways a secure investment. with this goal in view,
Parliament has endeavored to regulate the loan capital of railways
from the beginning of the enterprise. In each of the special acts,
1. Hansard, vol. 183, p. 785.

which create'.: the company or enabled it to prceecute its work, the
amount of the loan capital as well as the manner in which the com-
pany might raise it were invariably set forth in detail. Aside
from some occasional, slight irregularities, the proportion of the
loan capital wa.s usually limited to one-third of the share capital
1
of each company. This was done to give security to the debentures
or mortgages. Before a company could raise any additional capital
by leans or in any way alter the provisions of its incorporation act
it was required to appear before Parliament for a special act grant-
ing such power. Thus from the beginning railway companies were
subjected to explicit regulations set forth in their special acts
in raising money bv loans. The following passage from the London
2
and Croydon Railway Act of 1837 may serve to illustrate exactly how
and under what conditions railway companies were permitted to raise
money by loan.
"And be it further enacted, that it shall be lawful for
the said company, by an order of any general or special general
meeting of the said company, after one half of the said capital
shall bave been paid up, from time to time to borrow and take
up at interest any sum in addition to their said capital of one
million eight hundred thousand pounds, not exceeding in the whole
the sum of six hundred thousand pounds, on the credit of the said
undertaking, as to them shall seem proper; and the said company and
directors after an order shall have been made for that pur-
pose at any general or special general meeting, ...... are hereby
empowered to mortgage, assign, and charge the property of the said
undertaking, and the rates, tolls, and other sums arising or to
arise by virtue of this Act, or any part thereof, as a se-
curity for any such money to be borrowed as aforesaid, with in-
terest ; and a copy of the order of any general or special
general meeting authorizing the borrowing of any such sum of
money, certified by one director or by the secretary or clerk of
the said company to be a true copy, shall be sufficient evidence of
1. See also Chapter IV on the Control of Borrowing Powers of
Railway Companies.
2. 1 V. c. cxix, sec. C. L. X.

the making of the order....; and all which mortgages, assignments,
and charges shall be nade under the common seal of the said company
by deed duly stamped, in which the sonsideration for the same shall
be t ruly stated "
The forms to be used for such mortgages as well as for the
transfer of the same were prescribed. Provisions for the registra-
tion of the execution and the transfer of such securities were also
1
set forth in detail.
For the security of the creditors, section CLXI of the
same Act provided that in case of non-payment of interest as
specified in the Act, by en order of two justices of the peace,
"some person may be appointed to receive the whole or such part of
the said rates, tells, or sums as are liable to pay such interest
so due and. unpaid "
The time for repayment of the principal was required to be
2
clearly specified in the mortgage deed, and if no time was speci-
fied, the holders of such mortgages might demand payment after
twelve months from the date when the loan was made, "upon giving
six calendar months' notice in writing to the secretary or clerk
3
of the company...." If the company failed to meet such demand
of repayment cf the principal due and if such prin^ipa^ in the
as
i f*
aggregate amounted to the sum of £20,000, ^n the case of the non-
payment of interest, two justices might order the appointment of
4
receivers.
1. See Chapter V on Registration of Railway Securities.
2. Sec. CLXIII.
3. Sec. CLXIV.
4. Sec. CXXV.

Prom these provisions, it is clear that besides the limi-
tations upon the borrowing powers of railway companies, two dis-
tinct principles were laid down, (l) the real security of the
1
mortgagees wa? limited to the "undertaking", the tolls and rates of
the company, and (2) these mortgages were for limited periods,
liquidated or renewed upon the expiration of such periods. Both
of these principles gave rise to much difficulty afterwards, the
one on account of its own defect which was not foreseen at the
time and the other because of the wrong conception of it by the
publ i c
.
These special provisions regarding loan capital soon be-
came too numerous and hence difficult for the railways to follow.
Under such circumstances, it was but natural that many irregular-
ities took place in making loans, irrespective of the intention of
Parliament to prevent them. To simplify matters, Parliament de-
voted no less than twenty sections of its first Companies Clauses
2
Act to regulations governing loan capital of railways. In this
general act, the miscellaneous provisions scattered in the numerous
special acts governing the limit of borrowings, the registration
of mortgages and transfers, the appointment of receivers, etc.
were amplified and set forth in a compact form. The forms of mort-
gages and transfers contained, in the special acts were also improved
upon by making the provisions more specific and more adapt ible to
the new conditions. The powers of re-borrowing and of conversion
of loans into share capital were also amplified. But the most
notable change was that regarding the evidence of authority for
1. By undertaking was meant the business of the Company.
2. Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8. V. c. 16.

borrowing. Formerly, as seen in the Croydon Act, nothing was re-
quired to show that the company had complied with the requirement
s
set forth in its private acts as to the requisite subscription and
payment of o.ne half of its capital etc. before borrowing. The only
evidence necessary was a copy of an order of a general meeting
certified by a director or the secretary or even the clerk of the
1
company. By the general act of 1845, however, a new- provision
was made to the effect that in addition to such a certified copy
of an order of a general meeting, a certificate of a justice of
the peace shewing that the definite portion of the company's
capital, stipulated in its special act, had been subcribed and paid
up shoild be presented before a company made any loans. Thus the
financial affairs was placed, to a certain extent, under the super-
vision of a public officer.
first clauses consolidation
In examining these clauses of the^act one cannot help
being impressed with the great care which Parliament took in order
to make the loan capital of railways a safe investment. Indeed,
if these provisions had been conscientiously followed they might
have proved effectual to carry cut the intentions of Parliament
and to prevent much difficulty which occurred later.
It must be remembered that when the aforesaid general act
was passed, a. railway mania was raging. This and its subsequent
collapse, which took place two years later, furnished a good test
of the usefulness of the financial provisions just referred to.
Up to 1848 about LI 7 5, 000, 000 had been invested in railways, of
which about £40,000,000, or one-fourth, was raised by loans; and
1. Companies Clauses Act, 1845 (8 V. c. 16) sec. 40.

about L20,000,000 was still then required to be borrowed to carry
or. the work. On account of the collapse of 1647, "exhorbit rates
of interest had to be offered; and not withstanding such induce-
ments, some of the best lines could not be completed for want of
funds. During the collapse, railway credit was greatly damaged.
Whatever loans were made, were only for short periods. In order to
clear off the wreckage of 1847, Parliament in 1850 passed The
3
Abandonment of Railways Act M to facilitate the abandonment of rail
ways and the dissolution of railway companies..." This Act pro-
vided that the companies' share as well as loan capital should be
4
reduced proportionately with the amount of work abandoned.
<$Aside from this incidental provision contained in the Abandonment
Act of 1850, nothing was done to alter the rules laid down in the
Companies Clauses Act of 1845 during the period. Even the de-
rangements caused by the crisis of 1847 failed to induce Parliament
to adopt any new or to modify its old measures. But beginning
about 1850 complaints against the existing system, of loans began
to be made by numbers of investors. As the debentures issued
under the existing system were by deed for large lump sums, people
with money to invest were debarred from placing it in such de-
bentures becuase they could seldom find such as would suit them
in amount and length of time to run. Some companies also expressed
dissatisfaction with the inconvenience end expense attending the
5 5
existing system of arranging their debenture debts. It was felt
1. C.L.Webb:Letter to H.Labouchere, Board of Trade, on Railways.
1849, p. 48.
2. Ibid.
4, Sec. 28, 13 & 14 V. c. 83.
3 % 13 & 14 V. c. 83.
5. Railway Times, Dec. 31, 1853 p. 1354.

that securities for money lent to railway companies should be issu-
ed for more convenient amounts and that they should also be made
easier of transference. Therefore, it was urged that divisible
debenture stocks be issued and the existing system of stamps and
registration remoddled. But it was at once recognized that it
would be difficult to get rid of the stamps, since the Government
would not forgo its revenue from this source. To meet this
difficulty, a proposal was made that the Government should not be
stripped of its tax, but it should receive it, only in a different
way. In lieu of the existing system of stamps, each company should
a
pay fixed annual sura to the Government, calculated on an average of,
say the preceding three or four years, or in some other way satis-
factory to both parties. Then the debenture stock certificates
might be issued without stamps and passed from hand to hand with-
out registration. In support of this system, the success accompany-
ing a corresponding change in the East India Company's bonds, made
was 1
under similar conditions, cited.
To do away with registration would apparently save some
trouble; but it was apprehended that such a course might create
confusion and also impair the security of the debenture-holders.
To avoid such danger, it was proposed: (l) Any company wishing to
avail itself of the power of the act should be required to show
that, on the average of the preceding three years, its net annual
profit had been equal to 10^ on its debt; (2) the amount of the
1. The bends of the East India Company were once stamped, but in
1835 the company obtained powers under the Act 5 & 6 Wm. c. 64
to pay an annual sum in lieu of stamp duty. Cf
.
Railway Times for
Sept. 25, 1952.

debt should in no case he increased after the application to
Parliament for adoption of the Act; (3) that such company should be
bound, under penalty, to publish quarterly in the London Gazette,
a statement showing the amount of its debt, the sum required for
payment of the quarter's interest on the same and the actual
amount of net profit earned during the same quarter. It was
thought that, with these particulars before them, the public
could at once detect any irregularities in a company's loan capital
and that in the absence of any irregularities, a profit equal to
lO^o of its loan capital would constitute a sufficient security to
the company's debenture holders.
The division of debentures into convenient units repre-
senting L100 to LI, 000 was enthusiastically expected to have an
important and beneficial effect. Instead of a person who wished to
sell say £5,000 railway debentures having to wait until he could
find another person having that exact sum to invest, he would be
able to divide the amount among a number of purchasers. By this
process, transactions would be greatly facilitated and the market
extended. Moreover, when the debt was spread over a gref.t number
of persons, it would not be so easy for combination of large money-
lenders to demand repayment of loans at inconvenient times so as to
embarrass the company for their own benefit. Thus a great diffi-
culty with which the companies had to contend would disappear.
Following these agitations further efforts were made
during the years from 1851 to 1853 to effect an alteration of the
existing debentures by the issue of stocks carrying a fixed rate
1. Railway Times, Sept. 25, 1852, p. 1008-09.

of interest and affording their owners the same privileges as the
1
debentures, in lieu of the existing bonds. Parliament, however,
failed to see the necessity of passing any Act to accomplish the
changes; but self-interest induced a number of companies to con-
vert their debentures into such perpetual debenture stocks. The
innovation was looked at askance. The idea was still rife that
loans were only a temporary charge which ought to be gotten rid of
as soon as possible. Anything which had to do with perpetuating
such loans at once aroused suspicion. In commenting upon such
2
practices, the Railway Times said that such operations were
"suggestive of grave reflection." It lamented that railway companie
should change their debts into a parmanent part of their capital-
ization, and regarded such a change as an unmistakable evil. It
urged that those companies which had borrowed to a large extent
"would do well to make up their minds to pay off debentures
before they partake of any dividends, no matter how moderate or
ligitimately earned." "Every proprietor who is capable of serious
thought, and who desires to leave an uninccmbered estate to his
children should make it his duty to strive for an extinction of
the loan debt of every company with which he is connected....;" for
when a company was out of debt it was cut of danger. But it soon
became clear that the debts cf railways, once contracted, were
going to remain. The companies clearly realized the usefulness of
these debenture stocks. This class of securities would enable
persons who had no speculative desires, who had no enterprising
tastes, who had no practical knowledge, to aid in the successful
1. Railway Times, Dec. 31, 19 53, p. 1354.
2. Railway Times, May 8, 1852, p. 473.

completion of splendid undertairings ; they would enable such persons
to obtain the single object which they desired— a fixed secure in-
come. ' But what was of far greater importance was the fact that
debenture stocks would save the companies from being swamped by
debentures falling due at unfortunate times. This great advantage,
however, was not clearly recognized until some years afterwards. It
was the need of money which,. left a number of railway companies to useA
debenture stocks gradually. Beginning with the fifties, it oecame
quite general for railway companies to apply to Parliament for
powers to create this class of stock for the purpose of paying off
mortgages and bonded debts, or as a means of raising money in lieu
of borrowing on mortgages or bonds. Therefore, it became important
that the legal powers under which the old debentures should be
extinguished and the debenture stocks created, should be clearly
defined. Ho general legislation took place. What Parliament did
was to insert clauses in the bills of the companies seeking powers
to make such conversions of new issues. In these special acts/,
s
Parliament prescribed in detail the manner in which such conversions
of debentures or the creation of new debenture stocks might be
affected. The following passage from the Act of 1851 of the London
and northwestern Railway which was one of the most important companies
using this class of securities, may serve to show in mhat way
Parliament legislated on the issue oi such stocks:
That it shall be lawful for the company from time to
time, with the consent of three-fifths of the votes* of the share-
holders present_^n_jperson_or by proxy at any genera meeting of
T.|{ Stf Economist, May"" Z ~ 1863 pp~. ~37r.
:J.>oBoard of Trade, General Report on Shares, loans, etc. I860 p. 17.
f.>ll5 V. C. cv. Quoted by John 7/hitehead in his book on Guaranteed
Securities. 1850. pp. x-xi. I

the company convened with due notice of that object, to resolve
that any portion of the borrowed capital of the company, or anydebenture or other security for which or for the interest where-
of the company are lawfully liable, not exceeding an amount to
oe defined in ang by such resolution, may be converted into stock
of the company of like .amount, either by agreement with, the holders
of such mortgages or bonds respectively before the same respective-
ly when due, and issuing stock of a corresponding amount, instead
of reborrowing the same so paid off; and also, with the like con-
sent, from time to time, to resolve that the whole or any part, to
be defined in and by such resolution, of the moneys which the com-
pany shall have authority to raise by borrowing under the powers of
any of their Acts
,
shall or may be raised by the creation
and issue of stock of a corresponding amount, instead of borrow-
ing the same; and also, with the like consent, to attach to the
stock so authorized to be created and issued for any of the pur-
poses aforesaid a fixec and perpetual irredeemable yearly dividend
or interest at any rate not exceeding the rate of£3 10s. for every
£100 thereof
; and the stock so created and issued shall be a
charge upon the tolls and undertaking, and lands, tenamem;s, and
hereditament s of the company, but shall be distributable, trans-
missible, and transferrable
,
and the said interest or dividend
shall forever have priority of payment ever all ether dividends on
any other stock or shares of the company, whether ordinary or pre-
ference, or guaranteed, and the stock when so created shall be
termed ' London and ITorth We.?tern Debenture stock; • provided that
nothing herein contained shall m anywise prejudice^ or affect the
rights cf the holders of mortgages or bonds of the company "
Four distinct principles were set forth in this clause:
(l) Debenture stocks might be issued in redeeming debentures fall-
ing due as well as for raising additional loan capital within the
company's powers, (2) the rate of interest was fixed with the con-
sent of Parliament; (3) the security of such stock should consist
a charge upon "the tolls and undertaking, and lands, tenements, and
hereditaments" of the company; and (4) such stocks were to be
•distributable, t ra,nsmissible and t ransf errable as personal estate.
It must be remembered that some of these principles were not new,
but were copied from those governing the issue of the older forms
of securities. On close perusal, it may be seen that the provisions
contained in the clause were such as to make the debenture stocks a

safe and clearly-defined investment. Indeed, Parliament had by
this time recognised to a certain extent the necessity of this class
of securities for the improvement of the financial condition of the
railways, and commenced to take steps to give the holders of de-
benture stocks every possible protection and security. Thus in the
same act just referred to provisions were made to the effect that
if written demand for the payment of dividend due on any dubenture
stocks was not met satisfactorily within thirty days, the proprie-
tors of such stocks holding on amount in nominal value of £20,000
or upwards might, without prejudice to their right to sue, require
1
the appointment of a receiver.
By these provisions, the debenture stock holders were
given the power to recover the arrears of their interest either
by bringing suit in any competent court or by requiring the ap-
pointment of receivers. It may be noticed, however, that only
the interest was secured, and the principal was not mentioned.
There was some dissatisfaction over this fact, but it was generally
2
conceded that so long as the interest was made sure, the principal
would take care of itself, for what the average investor wanted was
not so much the possession of his principal but a regular and re-
liable income that grew out of the principal. This was especially
true when his security was easily marketable.
The chief reason why Parliament took such precautions to
give great security to the holders of debenture stocks was that
there was an abundance of money ready for investment and the only
1. 15 V. c. cv. XII.
2. Economist, Feb. 23, 1867.

thing necessary to induce investors to eome forward was indisput-
1
able security. With this point in view, Lord Redesdale in 1856,
endeavored to insert a clause in the railway hills of that session,
making the railway directors personally liable for any illegal
issue of debenture stocks; but this proposition, which if adopted
might have prevented much trouble, was "killed" in the committee
2
room.
But it must also be noticed that what Parliament did was
for the protection of the holders of legal securities. If one's
security was legal, he was safe. ¥o protection was extended to
the holders of illegal securities. Parliament prescribed the rules
governing the issue of railway securities, and laid down the prin-
ciple that securities issued in violation of these rules were ill-
egal and hence not within the protection of law. Per se this doc-
trine appeared proper and good. But how were the investors to know
which securities were legal and which were not? Parliament gave
adequate protection to the holder of legal securities, but it
failed to enable the investors to distinguish the legal from the
illegal. Hence in spite of the repeated and apparently earnest
efforts of Parliament much dissatisfaction existed. complaint was
heard everywhere as to how was a person able to know if his security
3
was a legal one. The borrowing power ^ of a railway company was by
its nature a restricted one, of which the limit depended upon the
due combination and right understanding of various clauses in
1. Railway Times, Aug. 4, 1855, p. 781.
2. Railway Times, April 26, 1856, p. 514.
3. It was often heard in bank parlors, "How do we know this de-
benture is worth anything. The validity depends on its accordance
with the borrowing powers of the company, and what those powers are,
or how they have been exercised, we do not know." See Economist,
July 11, 1863.

several acts of Parliament, some of which were not easy for many
persons to procure or even were out of most people's habit to think
of reading. Moreover, they could hardly construe correctly the
meaning of these acts without a lawyer's aid, even if they did read
them. Yet if these acts were not justly construed and precisely ob-
eyed the debenture would give no effectual charge upon the line,
and hence the holder of it would have no legal claim to priority
over even a contracted debtor of the company. Furthermore, the
nature of the law was such that a debenture which, was once bad
would remain bad, A debenture which was invalid at its
issue because it was in excess of the borrowing powers, would not
be improved because other debentures were paid off. The contract
was illegal when it was executed, and it could not gather legality
1
by subsequent payments to third parties.
In spite of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the use
of debenture stocks continued to become more extensive. To insure
uniformity in practice and to facilitate the use of such stocks,
2
the Board of Trade repeatedly recommended, during the latter part
of the fifties, that provisions should be made in a general Act
embodying the principles governing the issue of such stocks. Con-
sequently Parliament in 1863 codified into general law the various
provisions scattered in the special acts as well as some of the
recommendations of the Board of Trade. A large part of the Ccmpan-
3
ies Clauses Act of that ye?r was devoted to the regulation of de-
1. Economist, May 2, 1863.
2. Board of Trade, General Report on Railway Bills, 1861, p. 23.
3. 26 & 27 V. c. 118, Part III.

benture stocks. Provisions were made as to the creation and issue
of debenture stocks, the priority of such securities, the limit of
the rate of interest and the enforcement of payment of such interest
j
either by action orby the appointment of receivers. The companies
were also required to keep a register of its debenture stocks issued
and to deliver certificates to holders of debenture stocks, etc.
In short practically all the provisions contained in this act
governing the creation and issue of debenture stock were modelled
after those governing the creation and issue of the earlier forms
of securities, and which had been heretofore inserted in special
acts. It provided , in great detail, for the regulatuon of the de-
benture stock itself, but it failed to afford any effective means
by which the regulations might be enforced. It gave further pro-
tection to the holders of legal debentures; but it did not evolve
any means by which one might be enabled to tell which debenture was
a legal one and which was not. It stopped v^hort at the point where
action was demanded. Hence, in spite of the act, little, improvement
was made to clarify the doubt which prevailed. In the meantime
gross encroa-chments upon the acts of Parliament were made.
Being at a loss as to how to mend the situation, Parlia-
ment appointed a select committee in 1863 to inquire as to what
1
should be done to prevent such encroachments; and the Y/ork of this
committee was continued by another select committee appointed in
the following year. Both of these committees were of the opinion
that holders of statutory debentures duly registered, should have
a right to recover and secure the payment of all principal and
IV
1. See Chapter on the controlof Railway Borrowing Powers.

interest due to them in priority to the holders of other obli-
1
gations not issued under the authority of Parliament. They also
recommended that the right of the public to the use of the railways
should be protected and that the rolling stock and plant of a
railway should never be seized by creditors. Moreover, the comm-
ittee recognized the evil resulting from the lack of means to es-
2
tablish the legality of debentures. Therefore it was also urged
as a modified protection to the holders of such debentures that
there should be a semi-annual declaration in the Gazette of the
state of the borrowing powers of the company and an endorsement
upon each certificate. This was not expected to render it impossi-
ble for the companies to issue debentures beyond their borrowing
powers; but it was hoped that the knowledge of the fact that their
misconduct would be palpably and continually kept before their
own eyes, would be a powerful force in restraining the directors
from exceeding such borrowing powers to any considerable extent.
3
Many plans for verifying the legality of debentures were proposed,
of which one advocated that there should be an examination of the
debenture accounts by a public department, and that a stamp should
be affixed to the debenture whose goodness had been ascertained.
It was also urged that the chairman and secretary of the railway
company should be required to certify under their hands the amount
of debentures at any time issued, and should be made liable to
penalty if the amount was false or if the debenture issued were in
excels of their borrowing powers. The great trouble with a scheme
1. Select Committee of 1864, Report, pp. III-IV.
2. Evidence before select committee of 1864, p. 27a
3. Economist, July 11, 1863.

like that was that it did not provide for the most common case in
which debentures were issued "by mistake. -As the directors were
liable in almost all cases under such a scheme except that of
mistake, it was readily recognized that such a scheme would not
prove very effective.
It was also proposed that all debentures illegally issued
should be made binding on the company and have a claim prior to the
dividends of the shareholders. This was based on the usual
assumption that the shareholders appointed the directors who man-
aged the business and should, therefore, be liable for their
misconduct. But it was recognized that "considering how little
real influence most shareholders, in fact, have in. the appointment
of the directors, it appeared rather hard to reduce their dividends
1
if the directors are dishonest...."
Parliament, however, was not ready to adopt any of these
propositions. So the situation drifted from bad to worse. The
goodness of debentures and the repayment of the money borrowed,
2
as in the case of the Great Eastern, became the subject of a com-
plicated controversy even between the directors and the deputy
chairman of the company. The one would say that bad securities
had been issued, while the other would deny the charge; and the
world had to judge between them. In some cases debentures were
issued when no real capital whatever had been subscribed. As in
3
the case of the Eastern 'Section Railway, certain "receipts" were
exchanged between a financial agent and the company by which an
1. Economist, July 11, 1863.
2. Economist, Aug. 12, 1865, p. 970.
3. Economist, Oct. 27, 1866.

"apparent capital" was created. Thus the parliamentary requirements
and restrictions were utterly disregarded. But this case was not
the worst. Some men who were known to have "the greatest repute for
integrity and the highest standing", went so far as to "pawn" de-
bentures not only in an illegal manner, but even for fraudulent
purposes. As revealed in the case of the London, Chatham and Dover
1
Railway, supposedly genuine debentures issued by the company were
found later to have "nothing in them." In defence of the company,
one of its directors declared that those "debentures were not
debentures at all." He admitted that he had obtained money on them,
but he said "They were not worth anything." They were "quasi things
and the good securities were elsewhere. It was no wonder, there-
fore, that the whole basis of railway credit was utterly shaken.
To make things still worse, the treacherous instrument
2
called Lloyd's bonds also came appeared in the financial market.
What followed was but natural. Distrust and dissatisfaction over
railway securities was felt everywhere. It was urged that the
Government should see to it that the law was complied with. A
3
loud cry was also raised demanding that Government should stamp all
the debentures issued as it stamped money and "ascertained the
4
qualities of schoolmasters," so that only the allowed number
would be permitted to circulate.
Nothing, however, was done by Parliament to meet the de-
mands. In the meanwhile the railway panic of 1865-67, which was
1. Economist, Oct. 27, 1866.
2. For a description of these bonds see Chapter I, p.
3. Economist, TTov. 17, 1866.
4. Economist, Oct. 27, 1866.

the result as well as the cause of the growing distrust in railway
rebentures, was setting in, during which a number of companies
suffered great embarrassments. The credit of some railway companies
like that of the South Eastern was greatly injured on account of
the pressure brought about by the renewal of their debentures.
Other companies, like the London, Chatham and Dover, met with, "utter
1
and disgraceful failure? due to similar causes. What was even
of greater consequence was the effect of such happenings upon the
credit of the whole railway system. The accidental circumstance of
mere neighborhood to the "exploded" companies was construed into
some participation in their faults. In the midst of this chaos,
a royal commission was appointed to examine the whole matter,
with a view toward Government purchase as a solution of the pro-
blem. Parliament intended to postpone 2,11 action until the
commission had finished its work; but the prevailing difficulties
made early action necessary. Therefore, in 1866 the Railway
2
Companies Securities Act was passed for the purpose of remedying
the situation.
By 1867 the panic subsided; but the old ominous contro-
versy over the nature and value of railway securities was still
rife. In fact it held all other financial matters in abeyance. Of
the aggregate railway capital of about 1450,000,000 more than 27^
3
represented debenture debts, the number of investors in such se-
4
curities numbered no less than 100,000.
1. Economist, 1866, pp. 1484-1485.
2. 29 & 30, V. c. 108. See Chapter on Registration of Railwya
Securities.
3. London Times, Feb. 6, 1867, p. 9.
4. Hansard,
,
vol. 185, p. 297.

Meanwhile it became clear that the current belief was that
a man lending money upon a debenture, lent it upon a mortgage not
only of the income, but also the property of a railway company. But
this belief was shattered by the decision of the Lord Justice in
1
the London, Chatham and Dover Company's land case, in which the
principle governing the question was laid down "at some length and
with great perspicuity." It was held that the holders of railway
debentures were not only without any immediate hold on the general
property of the undertaking as distinguished from its income, but
were not entitled to any claim to the rents or proceeds from the
sale of the company's Burplus land. In other words, the debenture-
holders had only a hold on the tolls and earnings of the line and
not on the property of the company. The whole question seemed to
have turned on the interpretation given to the word "undertaking"
in the security which the debenture-holders received for their
money. The popular idea was that by that term the debenture-
holders were "mortgagees of the whole property and effects of
the company." But the court held that the object and intentions of
the legislature we re to create a railway "which was to be made a»nd
1. During those years many companies acquired, either accidentally
or involuntarily, more land than they ultimately needed, and such
lands sooner or later were resold, so that the proceeds might re-
vert to the capital of the concern. The London, Chatham and Dover
more than other companies, had considerable amount of such lands
which was valued at about LI, 000, 000. The debenture-holders,
naturally enough, desired to establish their claims upon this as
well as other properties of the company, and applied to the Court
of Chancery for a receiver to take and hold for their benefit the
proceeds from the disposal of such lands when sold and the rents
in the meantime. It was on this slaim that the decision referred
to in the text was rendered. See London Times, February 6, 1867,
p. 9, from which the quotations on this case are taken.

and maintained, by which tolls and profits were to be earned, and
which was to be worked and managed by a certain company..." "The
whole of this when in operation is the word contemplated by the
Legislature, and it is to this that the name undertaking is given."
This decision and the financial depression of 1865-67
brought to light the following broad and practical points regard-
1
ing railway debentures.
-p<irst . The court of cihancery would not undertake to
manage a railway for the debenture holders. It was true that in
some cases the Court of Chancery did, for limited periods, under-
take the management of large concerns; but this was done with the
view of windingup that concern. But it could not wind up a rail-
way. A railway was, as had been recognized then, an unending
business and the court could not wind it up.
Secondly. The debenture-holders could hardly manage the
railway in case their interest and principal were in arrear,
even if they wanted to do so. Theywere not a corporate body.
They could not appoint directors to manage for them. The1 aiaj ority
of all but one had no more legal capacity than the one.
Thirdly. The debenture-holders had not even a preferential
claim or mortgage on any outlying surplus land.
Fourthly. The debenture-holders could not sell the rail
way. The right of building the railway was given by Parliament
to a certain specific company. Neither that company, nor any
lav/ court could sell it save by the assent of Parliament, "Once
1. Cf. Economist, Feb. 2, 1867.

a railway company, always a railway company." It was a sort of
a consecrated entity, which only Parliament could create, and whici
only the sane "body could change.
Fifthly. The mortgagees could not split their securities
in spite of the Act of 1S63, the old form of debentures represent-
ing lump-sums of money were still the most common form of securit-
ies issued by railway companies. Thus the investors must take the
security as a whole and as a unit, and as they found it.
But the raal state of affairs was not as object ional as
these difficulties would suggest. All, but the last of these
drawbacks applied only to the poorer roads, which were in difficul-
ty, and did not have any reference to the debentures of strong,
solvent companies.
But the most objectionable drawback of the railway de-
bentures was the falling due of such securities at fixed and
often unfortunate seasons. This was fairly recognized in the
early fifties, but was made clear during the depression. Experience
had taught the hitherto credulous that short-period debentures
were dangerous and uncontrollable, "a lottery within themselves."
Some companies "highest in credit, most secure in revenue... and
unassailable in repute found themselves. ... as helpless as the vilest
excrescence which had been able to foist itself into the family of
railway interests.." Thus the Railway Times urged that short-
period debentures nftNS$ be abolished and in place debenture-stocks
issued at such a rate of interest as would establish for them an
immediate and permanent popularity. The Economist also advocated
t. Rsjjiwg^^ the other quotations are

that in the interest of the companies as well as the investors,
it w s essential that a large portion of the existing 110 millions
!
sterling- of debenture "bond? which would mature at fixed periods,
very often without any or at least with insufficient notice, should
he changed into debenture stocks, representable in consols at the
option of theholder, by certificate to bearer in coupon form. Some
1
members of Parliament also recognized the evil of the existing
system of debentures. Many solvent companies were often placed in
considerable embarrassment by the claims of the holders of such
short-period debentures. Indeed, to permit a large amount of
capital raised with short-period debentures to be sunk in a fixed
undertaking was regarded as a great error on the part of Parliament.
The Legislature was forced to recognize this evil, when borrowers
were compelled to come constantly or "almost hourly" before it for
3
renewals of their loans.
Under such conviction, many people firmly believed that
permanent debenture-stocks should be created in place of the ex-
isting "accomodation bills," as the railway debentures were called.
4
jt was urged that this reform would not only save the companies
the periodical recurrence of the danger inherent with the fall-
ing due of short-period debentures, but would also mean an immedi-
ate source of saving in money and trouble to the railways. It
would releave the railways from the trouble of stamping, and would
save the commissions and fees to lawyers and brokers as wellas
the wages of the staff of clerks employed for managing the deben-
1. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 785.
2. Hansard vol. ol86, p. 1030.
3. Ibed.
4. London Times, March 23, 1867, p. 12.

benture business. Therefore, new debenture- stock s should be issued
to shareholders in place of dividends, and this procedure, it was
thought, would prove acceptable to the shareholders.
Another defect of the lav/ which v/as brought to light by
the financial depression, and which led to an enlightened and
most beneficial enactment, was the fact that the debenture holders
had no preferential claim on the rolling stock of the company which
formed the implement of the trade. In the absence of ary adequate
protection for the rolling stock, even if the debenture-holders did
unanimously concur in the management of a railway to compensate
their losses in interest cr principal, they would be still at
fault. They might undertake to carry but the carriages might be
seized by the contractor, the engine maker, or any other casual
creditor of the company, for the debenture mortgage was of the "tollg
or fares" of the railway, and there was not any specific pledge of
1
the carriages. Therefore legislation was needed to keep the
railway in tact in order to safe-guard the security upon which the
debenture-holders had a claim, -namely, the earnings of the company.
As might have been expected, the panic of 1865 and the
resultant discoveries regarding the validity and securities of
railway debentures created a wide-spread alarm among the owners of
these securities, which fact in turn involved many railway com-
panies in serious embarrassment. Interest to the amount of one-
half to one per cent, higher than ought to be paid according to
the natural state of the money market had to be offered in order
2
to iaduce investments. It became essential for Parliament to take
1. Economist, Feb. 2, 1867.
2. Hansard, . '
,
vol. 185, p. 787.

action in order to remove such alarm. Moreover, the fact that the
class of people who invested in such securities v/ere those who
1
needed the greatest protection made immediate action necessary.
Early in 1867 the Hailway Debenture Holders Bill was introduced
to prevent any one class of creditors from injuring the public and
other classes of creditors by seizing the rolling stock so as to
2
stop the working of the line. This measure, before being present-
ed to Parliament, was submitted and approved by "the highest auth-
orities" of the leading railways and was also approved by the attor-
3
ney general. What the bill asserted was that the whole undertak-
ing, engines, carriage and all, formed the security of the deben-
ture-holder, and that future creditors of other kinds should be
forbidden i rom seizing any such engines of any part of the plant,
or in any way breaking up the "living whole" on which the convey-
ance and convenience of the public as well as the money of the
mortgagees depended. The bill provided that:
"3. The undertaking as difined by the Companies Glauses
JConsolidation Act, 1845, and all the engines, carriages, wagons and
other plant, movable and inmovable (including work-shops), used or
required for the proper management and working of the railv;ay, and
belonging to the railway company, shall be security for the payment
and as the case may require, for the repayment, of the principal
money of the debenture debt; and it shall not hereafter be lawful
for any person to seize or take in execution, in satisfaction of any
debt or claim, (other than rates or taxes, or rent charges in respect
of which there is a power of distress, or compensation for personal
injury, or loss) incurred or made after the passing of this act,
such undertaking, engines, carriages, wagons, or other plant, in-
cluding workshops as aforesaid."
1. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 781.
2. The bill was introduced on Feb. 12, 1867. Hansard, vol. 185,
pp. 297-299.
3. Hansard, vol, 185 p. 781.

As is seen from th< passage, the bill did not help the
debenture-holder to his principal. It only secured him his in-
terest. For, obviously, it was only the sale of the line in vh ich
his money was sunk which could pay the mortgage when the credit of
the undertaking was so damaged that no new lender would come for-
ward to replat e the old ones. But this in reality was not very
objectionable, since so long as one received his interest regularly,
he usually did not worry much about his principal. This was es-
pecially true in England at that time, when the people were very
ent erpri sing.
This measure was regarded as both timely and helcful in
establishing the desirability of debentures. "No one could doubt",
1
remarked the Economist, "that this enactment is beneficial. It
amounts to preserving the interest of the mortgages from all danger,
if the line yields money enough to pay it, because the whole earn-
ing machine is kept together and intact to make what gains it
can. "
It was also felt in Parliament that, in the existing
feverish state of the public mind any attempt to oppose such a
measure as the Railway Debenture Holders Bill might conduce to the
spread of panic and to create the impression that Parliament was
2
not anxious to strengthen the position of the debenture holders.
Nevertheless, the bill was shelved for a while after the second
reading.
Being deeply inpressed by the need of protection of the
debenture-holders, some members evidently grew impatient with the
1. Economist, Feb. 23, 1867.
2. Hansard,
, ,
vol. 185, p. 788.

lack of action of Parliament
. Consequently early in
fl
pril, 1867,
a resolution was introduced into the House of Commons to the effect
that "in case where adequate security can be piven, the state
should assume the responsibility of the debenture debt of railway
companies unable to meet their engagements, upon conditions provid-
ing for the eventual acquisition of such railways by the state upon
terms of mutual advantage..." In fact the matter of government
thought of for
guarantee had been sometimes, .In the previous year it was
announced that the cabinet intended to adopt a loan for giving a
government guarantee to railway debentures and for obtaining a
sum of mcne^/ applicable to the payment of thenat ional debt by that
2 bruited
means. The scheme was .about in various forms, but in its essence
it was this,- that the Government should borrow the money needful
for railways at the cheapest rate it could in the market, and lend
it to the railways at what was called a "just" rate, namely, -a rate
which railways had been paying. This process, it was hoped, would
on the one hand enable the railways to obtain money upon fairer
terms than they otherwise could, and on the other hand, enable the
Government to gain the difference between the rate it would have to
which
pay and that it would charge.
So far so good. But serious objections were at once de-
tected. In the first place it was recognized that the chief
reason why the Government was an easy borrower-a borrower at low
terms-was because it was a small borrower. Even then, there were
1. The resolution was introduced by E.W.Crawford on April 2,
1867. See Hansard, vol.186, pp .1025-1063.
2. Economist, November 17, 1866, from which the other information
in this connection was obtained.

many dealers who declared that the public were withdrawing from
investment in "consols." If a large new loa.n were asked for, it
would likely tax the credit of the Government to such an extent as
to necessitate a great depreciation. But it was argued, not with-
out reason, that the proposed loan to pay off railway debentures
would not constitute a loan for new, additional money. The capital
represented in these debentures had been sunk years ago. All that
was needed was a. transfer from the books of the railways to that of
the Government. To this it was replied that such a transfer was
precisely what would impair the credit of the Government. Its
securities was then at a scarcity value. The money to be attract-
ed by a low rate of interest was limited and could not be much
augmented, consols were once sold for less than half of their
1
face value, and it was not beyond possibility that a disastrous
event like a war might occur to necessitate large loans. In such
cases, a government guarantee would prove, it was feared, exceeding
ly embarrassing, if not disastrous.
Moreover, even if the borrowing could have been done pro-
perly, it was still almost impossible for the Government to fix
the "just" rate at which to lend to the different railways. The
natural test of a proper rate of interest was the test of the
market. The railways which the public trusted would get their
money on good terms; those which the public distrusted would get
it on had terms. But it was asked how could a Government charge
one railway a/o and another railway b;',9 There would at once be a
cry of favoritism. Such a process would not only give rise to much
1. In 1797 consols were sold at 47. See Economist, !Mov.l7 ,1866
.

complaint, but would also offer a stronf temptation to the different
lines to corrupt the officials who had charge of determining the
rates of interest. Therefore it was urged that the true function
of a government in relation to railway credit was to see that the
law was complied with. The Government should use not its faculty
of borrowing, but its function of verification. Thus neither the
resolution of M. Crawford nor the contemplations of the cabinet
in favor of government guarantee, resulted in any action by
Parliament
.
But many members of Parliament clearly saw that something
must be done to prevent the spread of discredit over railway de-
bentures. Therefore, soon after the withdrawal of Mr. Crawford's
resolution just referred to, the Railway Companies Arrangement
Bill was introduced by the Secretary of State for India. This bill,
after being read a second time, was, in conjunction with the De-
benture Holders Bill, referred to a select committee, and the two
1
bills were "fused" into the Railway Companies Bill. This measure
was regarded as of great importance. Lord Redesdale was even of
the opinion that if it had been introduced twenty years earlier it
might have prevented many of the difficulties which railway compan-
2
ies had become involved.
When the Bill was discussed in the House of Lords, a pro-
viso was urged to the effect that whenever a company created any
debenture stock having a higher rate of interest than 5/£, it should
3
fall to that rate at the end of seven years.
1. Hansard, vol. 187, pp. 1723-1724.
2. Hansard, vol. 188, p. 491.
3. Hansard, vol. 189, p. 157.

But the Duke of Richmond pointed out that the question of
limiting the rate of interest had been thoroughly discussed by
the committee which examined the bill. This committee felt that
the companies which required such arrangements were in most cases-
probably in all cases--the best judges of what they needed, and
that they ought to be left to borrow money in the manner which
they thought best. If they could borrow at 5?o they were not likely
to pay 6f for it. Therefore, it was thought unjustifiable for
Parliament to restrict the companies in fixing the rates of ir-
1
t erest
.
But the most important and the most warmly opposed pa.rt
of the bill was that which prohibited creditors from seizing the
rolling stock of railways. This modification of the established
law by adding to the legal mortgages of the land estate, as it
was called, all the personal property that might happen to be upon
2
it was looked upon as too great a change.
It was, however, clearly recognized that it would be very
inconvenient to the public, who also had a right in railways, that
the rolling stock of the company should be liable, as it was then,
to be taken in execution by individual creditors, to say nothing of
the undesirability of destroying the reasonable security of the
debenture-holders- the first creditor, when a law would give oc-
casion to the stoppage of the nation's commerce, it slould be modi-
3
fied even if it were of old standing
.
1. Hansard, vol. 189, pp. 157-158.
2. Hansard, vol. 185, pp. 783-784.
3. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 784.

Another objection was raised against such a provision on t
i
the ground that it would deprive the trade creditor of his security.
It would give the debenture-holders an "unrarrantable" advantage
|
over all other creditors of a railway company, with the single
exception of the tax gatherers. It was feared that a case might
occur where a contractor engaged in constructing a line and de-
siring payment when the line was finished, would be unable to put
in an execution for payment in case the company had issued deben-
tures. The contractor for casual repairs, too, might be brought
into such predicament under similar circumstances. For these
reasons, a member of the House of Commons seriously opposed the
measure, and thought that it would be more appropriate to call such
a measure railway companies creditors' defiance bill instead of
1
railway debenture holders' fill.
Those in favor of the measure, however, denied that such
could be the case. On the other hand, ever if it did so affect
t>>e security of such trade creditors, that fact alone was not
sufficient to make the measure undesirable. Inasmuch as the bulk
of the railway revenue was received in cash, railway companies
should pay cash for their stores, labor, etc. and should not get
into debt on their account. Moreover, there was in fact a large
amount of property left untouched by the bill which could be seized
by such trade creditors, if such a course became really necessary.
In addition, the trade creditors were also at liberty. to have
2
recourse to appointing receivers.
1. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 783.
2. Hansard, vol. 185, p. 782.

The opponents to the measure further contended that the
clause wculd encourage solvent companies to delay the payment of
their debts. Moreover, it was inexpedient to oblige the creditors
of solvent companies to resort to the "cumbrous and perhaps tedious"
plan of netting a receiver appointed. If a railway were insolvent,
it would itself apply for the appointment of such receivers. In
other words, in the case of solvent companies, it would be im-
practicable and, in the case of the insolvent, it would be un-
necessary for the trade-creditor to have recourse to the appointment
of receivers. Hence he would get no protection whatever from the
1
clause providing for the appointment of such receivers.
To this it was answered that a creditor would have ample
remedy inasmuch as a solvent company would, under the provisions
of the bill, make immediate payments, while a receiver should be
appointed in the case of insolvent companies. TTo company that was
solvent would think for an instant of allowing a receiver to be
2
appointed. It was also urged that if the trade creditors had the
power of selling the rolling stock, there would be a serious effect
upon the shareholders. Such powers might be pressed at inconvenient
moments with the intention of bringing down the shares to a point
far below their value, and then the very men who had assisted in
bringing about that unfortunat estate of affairs might step in and
3
make a handsome fortune out of the misfortune of others. It was
further pointed out that it was only the small creditors who would
ever be tempted to seize the rolling stock. It would never be
1. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 1725.
2. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 1726.
3. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 162.

worth the while of large creditors to do so. No railway which had
the lightest regard for its own reputation would permit its rolling
1
stock to be seized for the purpose of securing small debts. Furth-
ermore, the measure was not directed against existing creditors.
As to future creditors, they would be given their credit with the
full Knowledge that they could not levy execution in case of de-
fault in payments. Thus they would be duly aware of what their
securities were. To give such creditors the power to apply to
the Court of Chancery for the appointment of a receiver to seize the
2
tolls of the railway was regarded ,therefore , as ample protection.
The opponents also endeavored to introduce an amendment
to the measure that should retain the power of seizing the rolling
stock in the hands of the creditors, unless the Court of Chancery
3
should appoint a receiver. But this amendment was defeated.
Another new and seriiously contested section of the Bill
was the so-called "arrangement " clause, providing for the creation
4
of "pre-pref erence" stocks, This provision was opposed on the
ground that it would interfere seriously with the rights of the
1. Hansard, vol. 189, p. 162.
2. Hansard, V. 187, p. 1725.
3. Hansard, V. 187, p. 1722.
4. Pre-pref erence stocks were securities issued in escess of a
company's borrowing powers in case that company became unable to
meet its 'engagements with its creditors. The first instance of
the issue of such stocks was that of the Caledonian Railway. In
1851 that company obtained powers from the House of Commons to
issue debentures in excess of its powers, for the purpose of paying
its debts. At the time the company was in a state of great embar-
rassment, and the course adopted proved beneficial. It was pointed
out in Parliament that in that case the creation of the additional
debentures (Pre-pref erence stock was not the name used) was equal
to putting a charge over the preference shareholders. Hansard, v.
187, p. 1246. For further discussion of this provision in Parlia-
ment, see Hansard, vols. 186-189, under Railway Companies Bill,
1867.

2
holders of the some £150, 000,000 in debentures. Persons who ad-
vanced money on debentures did so in the belief that they had a
first clamia upon the company's receipts; but if Parliament should
pre-
confer the power of creating preference stocks, the public would
be unwilling to advance any more money upon this class of securitie
in the future, or might have never invested their money in them at
all. It might be proper to permit the creation of such pre-
preference stocks by special act when the particular circumstances
a
warranted such procedure; but it would be impolitic to confer such
3
powers by a general act.
There was also much opposition among the holders of rail-
way debentures as shown by the fact that a formal protest was lod-
ged against such a provision being inserted in private bills of
the session by a large number of bankers, lawyers, as well as many
prominent railwaymen, in behalf of the holders of railway deben-
4
tures. These petitioners claimed that the effect of such a pro-
vision would be to depreciate or bring into disrepute the security
hitherto attached to acts of Parliament. It was claimed that "a
large proportion of these securities were held by trustees for in-
fants, married women and widows, or by persons of fixed incomes,
who invested their means in such securities upon the faith of the
acts of Parliament, and that such persons would have never made
any such investments had they supposed that Parliament would per-
mit their rights being affected by a later issue of securities.
2. Hansard, v. 189, pp. 159-160.
3. Hansard, v. 188, pp. 590-492, and v. 189, 163.
4. Railway Times, July 22, 1897.

After being cciiimitted and recommitted and modified in many
respects, the bill was parsed and became the Railway Companies Act
of 1867. The first important section of this act provided that the
creditors of a railway company might obtain the appointment of a re-
ceiver, and if necessary, of a. ma.nager, on applying to the Court
of Chancery to manage the railway, but that the "rolling stock a.nd
plant used or provided by a company for the purpose of the traffic
on the railway or of the stations or workshops, shall not, after
the railway or any part thereof is open for public traffic, be
liable to be taken in execution at lav/ or in equity at_ any time
after the passing of this Act , and before the first d ay of Septem-
ber
,
1868
. .
.
"
It may be noticed that the provision for the protection of
rolling stock was adopted for only one year. This was due to the
I fact that such a measure was still regarded as an innovation. On
i account of the aforesaid opposition and certain uncertainty as to
|
the practicability of such a measure, Parliament decided to try it
for twelve months so as to carry the matterover the next session;
and then if it were found absolutely necessary that there should
be a sale of rolling stock by the creditors, it ought to be so
1.
arranged by an Act of Parliament.
This precaution proved beneficial. It afforded time to t
try the principle out and it also gave a great stimulus to all
concerned to make close observation, with a view to altering the
rule either one way or the other.
1. Hansard, sec. 3. vol. 189, p. 162.

The result of the application of the provisions governing
the protection or rolling stock proved so advantageous that Pariia-
1
ment in the following year, by a special general act, extended the
time limit of the provision three years, that is until September 1,
1870, and at the end of the three years, Parliament found it ex-
2
pedient to pass another special act for the purpose of making the
provision "perpetual."
A large part of the act was also devoted to the elucidation
of regulations governing the preparation of a scheme of arrangement
between the company and its creditors. In this connection, ample
i
provisions were maee for settling and defining the rights of share-
holders etc., of the company as among themselves for raising money
by pre-preference stocks. Considerable protection was afforded the
holders of the different classes of securities which might be af-
fected "by such schemes, through the requirement of the consent of
three-fourths in value of each class of such affected securities,
before a scheme could be made. Moreover, the scheme must first of
all be filed in the court of chancery; and after hearing the direct-
ors, creditors or other parties whom the court might deem entitled
to be heard and on being satisfied with the nature of the scheme,
the court might confirm it. Notice concerning both the filing as
well as the confirmation of the scheme must be punlished in the
3
gazette
.
1. The Railway Companies Act, 1868, 31 & 32 V. c. 79. This Act
was enacted for the only purpose of extending the time-limit to 1870.
2. Railway Companies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 V. c. 31.
3. For details, see The Railway Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31, V.
c. 127, ss. 6-22.

Besides the provision prohibiting the seizure cf the roll-
ing stock, and that for the creation of pre-preference stocks, the
Railway Companies Act of 1867 contained a number of other important
clauses governing the loan capital of railways. In the first place
it provided that, except the claim of the rentcharges and lease,
"all money borrowed or to be borrowed by a company cm mortgage or
bond or debenture stock under the provisions of any Act authorizing
the borrowing thereof shall have priority against the company and thfc
property from time to time of the company over all other claims on
account of any debts incurred or engagements entered into by them
1
after the passing of this Act." Thus by this clause, the holders
of debenture stocks were clothed with an indisputable claim of
priority against the company over the holders of Lloyd's bonds and
other irregular securities. This measure was certainly urgently
needed for improving the desirability of railway debentures.
Section 26 of this Act provided that "money borrowed by
a company for the purpose of paying off, and duly applied in pay-
ing off, bonds or mortgages of the company given or made under the
statutory powers of the company, shall be deemed money borrowed
within and not in excess of such statutory powers."
As we have seen, the railways had much trouble in meeting
their mortgages falling due. It has also been shown that there
was much difficulty over the fact that securities issued temporarily
in excess of the borrowing powers even in anticipation of paying
off debentures falling due were sometimes regarded as illegal.
1. 30 & 31 V. c. 127 p. 23.

By the above provision Parliament endavored to remove this diffi-
culty; and subsequent events have amply shown that the effort of
Parliament was not in vain. That such a provision had been urgently
needed, few men who are familiar with, the financial affairs of
English railways can deny.
To make the debenture stocks more acceptable and
easier to issue » this act also removed all the restrict-
ions prescribed in the Companies Clauses Act of 1863 as to the rate
1
of interest. Therefore, the companies and their investors were
empowered to males whatever arrangements they saw fit in regard to
the rate of interest.
Thus closed the legislation on the loan capital of rail-
ways in England. Based upon the acts just referred to, the Lord
Chanceller in 1869 decided that railway companies should be held
liable for all loans irregularly contracted and even in excess of
2
its borrowing powers, thus removinr much of the temptation of rail-
3
ways to borrow illegally. Aside from the imposition, since 1868,
of a stamp duty of 2fo on the nominal value of the debenture stocks
transferred, nothing new has been added to the principles laid down
up to 1870. In spite of the temporary discontent with these
measures of Parliament, the regulations seemed to have proven
satisfactory. With the additional security and facility given to
railway debenture stocks it soon became common for railways to ask
Parliament for powers to issue stocks to be appropriated solely to
1. Sec. 25, 30 & 31 V. c. 127.
2. Economist, August 7, 1869.
3. See Sec. 12, 31 & 32 V. c. 124.

the liquidation and cancellation of debentures and other periodical
loans falling due. The desirability of such stocks was well
shown by the fact that by 1876 practically all the loans were con-
verted into this class of securities.
Our survey of this aspect of English railway finance leads
to certain conclusions, briefly expressed as follows:
l.| Other things being equal, long period debts or better
still, perpetual and devisable debenture stocks redeemable at the
option of the company are more desirable for railways than lump sum
loans or mortgages falling due after short periods.
a-
2.LJThe action taken by the English Parliament in 1867
prohibiting the seizure of rolling stock, revealed the advanced ideas
of that body and proved to be "a "btriS "s^&^^e ttm&£. the establishment
of stability in railway finance.
3. 1 The function of a government in regulating the
capitalization of railways by loans lies not so much in the adoption
of many complicated restrictions as in the enforcement of a few
essential rules, with a view of enabling the investor^ to telly
%±*as-ei#y the true financial condition of the concern in which he
invests.
Railway Times, May 2, 1868.
Z.'V* Board of Trade, General Report on Railway Shares, loan cap-
ital, etc., 1876. ~ -

CHAPTER IV.
CONTROL OF THE BORROWING POWERS OF RAILWAY COMPANIES.
In early years borrowing powers were granted to railway
companies for the purpose of relieving the pressure upon share-
holders from calls. There was no idea then that borrowings should
become a permanent charge upon capital. Parliament and the com-
panies alike were of the opinion that the vast profits to be de-
rived from railways would speedly enable the latter to pay off their
loans and in addition to declare dividends of a much higher rate
than what is now expected. The general belief was that railways
were to be constructed with capital raised from subscriptions, plus
a small proportion of loans for temporary purposes. It is hardly
necessary to say that these illusions as to railway profits were
soon dispelled. The idea of being able to pay off borrowed money,
however, was retained for many years, and wag not abandoned until the
constant and increasing requirements for renewals, replacements and
1
improvements, etc. bad grown out of all expected proportions.
With such a conception of railway borrowing in mind,
Parliament endeavored, from the beginning, to limit the borrowing
powers of railway companies as well as to lay down strict rules
2
governing their exercise. Thus in one of the standing orders,
1. Railway Times, August 22, 1863.
2. Standing Order No. 84. See Remarks on Standing Orders by a
Parliamentary Agent, London, 1837, p. 55. and Railway Times,
April 27, 1844. Also see Evidence before the select committee
on railways/ House of Commons, 1844, p. 29.

which guided early railway legislation, it was provided that no
railway company should he authorized to raise, hy loan or mortgage,
a sum of money larger than one-third of its share capital, and that
until fifty per cent, on the same should have been paid up, it
should not he in the power of the company to raise any money by
1
loan or mortgage.
Thus from the beginning, two principles were laid down.
Firstly, no railway company should borrow more than one-third of
its share capital; and secondly, no company should borrow at all
until one-half of its share capital had been paid up. The manner
in which these principles were embodied in the special acts may be
seen in the following passages from the London and Croydon Railway
2
Act of 1837:
"That it shall be lawful for the .... company by order of
any general or special general meeting
,
after one-half of the
said (share) capital shall have been paid up, from time to time to
borrow and take up at interest any sum in a.dditicn to their said
sapital of LI, 800, 000, not exceeding in the whole the sum of
L600,000 (or one-third of the share capital) on the credit of the
said undertaking "
3
It is further provided:
"That in case the compa.ny shall afterwards pay off all
or any part of the principal money so secured upon mortgage, assign-
ment, or charge as aforesaid, then and in every such case it shall
be lawful for the said company immediately or at any time there-
after again to raise in lieu of the principal money so paid off by
1. As has been referred to in Chapter I. the early railway acts
were modelled after the Canal acts, and the latter in the earliest
years gave no power for borrowing. The first Acts in which, borrow-
ing powers appeared were passed in 1770. By degrees this power of
the Companies were restricted to one-third of their share capital.
Report of Royal Commission of Railways, 1867, pr iii.
2. 1. V. c. cxix, Sec. CLX.
3. Sec. CLXVI of the same Act.

them such sum of money as they shall from time to time have paid
off, or any part thereof ; but so nevertheless that the
said company shall not in any event borrow upon mortp-afe, assign-
ment, or charge more than the principal sum of £600,000 in the
whole shall be owinp at any one time
,
over and above the
amount of the calls for the time being remaining unpaid in
respect of the said sum of £1,800,000 so authorized to be raised
by subscription.
i n
The purpose of Parliament so strictly limiting the
powers of railway companies to one-third of their share capital
was due to the general belief, already mentioned, that railways
should be built only with their subscribed share capital. Strict
limitation of loans was deemed necessary to pive the creditors of
the companies adequate security. The purpose of requiring 50^
of the share capital to be paid up before the exercising of
borrowing powers was adopted with the hope that such a requirement
would tend to place the shares in the hands of substantial in-
vestors.
It was also held that no sellers of land or of material
to a railway company could be prejudiced by the want of powers in
the company to srive any other security for payment of land or works
than they were able to give under their act of incorporation. The
company Was not entitled to call any credit or to pledge and part
of their property for any other purpose, nor should the directors
make any contract or sanction any engagements to pay money until
they had clearly ascertained that from one or other of the two
sources authorized by Parliament they had the power of fulling them
So far so good. But in practice these rules were not
always observed. Much consideration was usually given to the
1. Letter to the London Times, August 23, 1866.

peculiar circumstances of each case. The standing order just re-
ferred to was often "either dispensed with or modified so as to
1
meet the circum stances of the case." In fact another standing
order provided for a select committee cn standing- orders, whose
duty it was to "determine whether the standing orders ought or
2
ought not to he dispensed v/ith." Moreover, it soon "became clear
that not only were the "borrowings of railways to remain a permanent
charge instead of a temporary obligation as was expected, but that
the limit of the borrowing powers was altogether too narrow. The
state of the money market and other circumstances frequently made it
advisable for a railway company to raise a larger proportion of
its capital by loa.ns than what law permitted. Indeed it was only
by over-borrowings that some companies continued tc pay a fairly
3
good dividend.
Under such circumstances one may readily imagine what
happened. When a railway company wished to increase its loans, es-
pecially when it could declare bigger dividends by such a process,
it would find some way of so doing whether the law permitted it or
not. Moreover, the law itself was too imperfect to be effective,
for it only stipulated against the borrowing on mortgages and bonds,
whereas there were other ways by which money could be borrowed.
As was currently remarked at the time, one could always drive a
4
coach and six through any law if he tried hard enough. This was
exactly what happened. Money was borrowed in many ways and by
1. Remarks on Standing Order?, pp. 78-79.
2. Remarks on St. Orders, pp. 13-14.
3. Railway Times, April 27, 1844.
4. Evidence before Select Committee on Railway Borrowing Powers
1864 p. 22.

excess of the legal limit, in spite of the law. The best known ex-
pedient for evading the restrictions of Parliament was by the issue
loan not es
,
for which the directors issuinp them were personally
responsible. By the issue of such loan notes the companies had
1
"continually exceeded their borrowing powers." Thus the law pro-
hibiting railways from borrowing more than one-third of their share
capital on mortgages or bonds was evaded although not violated in
letter.
The early restrictive measures upon railway borrowings
coupled with what was done to evade them had generally a vicious
effect upon the property of the original shareholders, especially
when the company was not prosperous. In such cases, the borrowing
powers were usually exhausted and hence no money could be obtained
through that channel. Loan notes might be issued, but they were
obligatory upon the directors personally instead of upon the com-
pany. The directors would naturally become more desirous of relie-
ving themselves of their personal obligations according as the
condition of the company's finance became more desperate. There-
fore, they would proceed to Parliament and obtain authority to
issue shares either at a ruinous discount, or with an exhorbitant
rate of interest guaranteed upon them. The result would be an
immediate depreciation of the value of the old stocks. The proper-
ty of the original shareholders who encountered the risk of forming
the company was often ruined, and the credit of the concern would
also sink with the value of the old stocks. Thus it was claimed
that the standing order limiting the borrowing powers of railway
1. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867 p. xxiii.

companies had a tendency either to prevent railways from raising
their capital in the most judicious manner or to compel them to
1
issue securities of an ireegular character.
Efforts were made, during the forties, to urge Parliament
2
to abolish, or at least to broaden the limit. Nothing, however,
was done to remedy the situation. The law was neither modified nor
enforced. Like many other alt ra~st ringent laws, it wcs literally
disregarded. In some cases, sums of money larger than the amount
of the total authorized share capital were borrowed through loan
3
notes or other similarly illegal instruments.
The worst effect was that the public did not understand
clearly that such loan notes were illegal, and were astonished when
it was declared by the select committee of the House of Commons,
4
1844, that these loan-notes were "absolutely invalid," and that
the lenders had no means whatever of enforcing the repayment of
their money. The issue of such notes was not merely illegal but
actually a breach of the original contract under which the Act of
incorporation was obtained. Thus this select committee ot\ Railways
felt it highly important to adopt some means to prevent the re-
5
currence of practices so "highly objectionable.."
At the same time it was noticed that although the exist-
ing transactions were illegal and contrary to 'the public policy,
they were, nevertheless, of "a perfectly bona fide character" as
1. Railway Times, April 27, 1844.
2. Ibed.
3. Report of select committee of the House of Commons on Rail-
ways, May 24, 1844. Railway Times, June 22, 1844.
4. Fifth Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1844
Also see Railway Times, June 22, 1844.
5. Ibed.

ibZ
between the "borrowers and the lenders. The contracts were entered
into without a distinct knowledge of the illegality. Moreover,
the money so raised was applied for the execution of the work
authorised by Parliament. Therefore, Irk appeared that ignorance
^should do considered.
i><
With these problems in view, the select committee on Rail-
ways after many sittings at which much evidence was taken, recom-
mended the suppression of the issue of such illegal securities in
the future. At the same time, it expressed the opinion that in orde^
to avoid undue hardship upon investors and the danger of disturbing
[ the existing bona fide engagements, certain provisions ought to be
made by Parliament for the purpose of converting these loan notes
into valid securities.
Following the recommendations of this committee, Parliament
passed an act in 1844 to the effect that "from and after the pas-
sing of the Act any railway company issuing any loan notes or other
2
negotiable or assignable instruments purporting to bind the company
as a legal security for money advanced... other than under the
powers of some Act or Acts of Parliament ..... , shall for ever^uch
offence" be liable to a fine equal to the sum for which such loan
notes purported to be a security. The companies, however, were
permitted to renew their loan notes issued prior to the passing
of the act for any period not exceeding five years from the passing
of the act.
/-
ilJi. The Regulation of Railways Act, 1844, 7 & 8 V. c. 85.
H$. Italics are mine.

It was also provided that companies should pay off all theii'
notes issued or contracted to "be issued before July 12, 1844, as
the same might fall due, and that a register of all such loan notes
etc. should he kept by the secretary of the company, which should
be open, without charge, at all reasonable times to the inspection
of persons interested.
In the companies Clauses Act of the following year {
(1845) considerable attention was given to the question of rail-
way borrowing powers. The general rules governing the borrowing
powers of railway companies laid down in this first Clauses
Consolidation Act may be briefly sumed up as follows
(1) Borrowing powers must first be obtained from Parlia-
ment,
(2) All borrowings must be executed according to the pro-
visions and regulations contained in the acts grant-
ing such powers.
(3) All borrowings must be sanctioned by an order of a
general meeting of the company.
(4) In no case must such borrowings exceed in the whole
the sum prescribed in the special acts of Parliament,
which was generally limited to one-third of the share
capital of the company.
(5) Pifty per cent, of the aggregate sum of the share
capital must be paid up.
Por the enforcement of these rules, it was provided that
the certificate of a justice of peace and a copy of the order of
a general meeting should constitute sufficient evidence of powers

f/0
to borrow. Rules governing the manner of transfers of such secu-
rities as well as the registration of the same were prescribed in
detail
•
To strengthen these rules, it was further provided that
"at all reasonable times the books and accounts of the company
shall be open to the inspection of the mortgagees and bondholders..
..with liberty to take extracts therefrom, without fee or reward."
Thus within two years, the issue of loan notes, which was
one of the most effective instruments for evading the lav/, was
placed under severe penalty, and the general rules governing the
borrowing powers of railways as well as the methods for their en-
forcement were codified into a general act. But in both cases
loop-holes were left through which these rules were practically
nullified. In the case of the prohibition against loan notes the
phraseology of the law led some railways to construe, not without
treason, that the enactment applied only to negotiable securities,
as specified in the enactment, and not to the mere borrowing of
money on instruments not no£p^iahj.e . At any rate, some railways
made this their excuse to ge£^gb^e*md the restrictions against over-
borrowing. A new form of notes was soon devised by an expert law-
yer which proved to be of even greater consequence than the ear-
lier form of loan notes. In the case of the general law restrict-
ing over-borrowing, the regulations, per se, were strict enough.
But the enforcement of these regulations was left entirely in the
hands of the country justices. Under the act, these justices,
with their knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, regarding the
complicated system of railway finance and accounting, were depend-

ed upon to accertain whether or not a railway had fulfilled the
requirements of the law governing its borrowings; and their find-
ings were final.
Moreover, in spite of the general law, considerable ir-
regularity appeared to have existed in nractice. Thus in their
11
third report, the select committee 0^1648 on railways appointed
^ /m
by the House of Commons^ three years after the first general Act
was passed, pointed out that some bills of that session appeared
"to contain irregular or undefined powers of raising money..."
This committee also pointed out that the most objectionable pro-
visions were the general powers for raising money to pay off debts
of the companies, when the bills contained no distinct recital of
the facts or specifications of the amount.
In spite of such irregularities, it may be said that the
first period of the legislation oS railway borrowing powers was
closed by the Act of 1845. With the exception of the orovision con-
tained in the Abandonment of Kailways Act, 1850, providing for the
reduction of borrowing powers in proportion to the amount of work
abandoned, nothing very important was done during the following
fifteen years to alter the established rules.
In 1856 agitation for the more strict regulation of rail-
way borrowing powers was revived. A prominent member of the House
of lords endeavored^ insert clauses in the railway bills seek-
ing Sa*fc4aHH»*^^ during the cession of that year to the
'
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?LSep0r?o 0f the Board of Trade °* of theoeoiion, lobo p. 19.
,V 13 8c 14 V. c. 03.
Lord Eedesdale. See Railway Times, April 26, 1856.
t C

£2
effect that no money should bo "borrowed by 'the company except on
the authority of a minute signed by a majority, at least, of the
directors for the time being of the company, and such minutes
should be published in the London Gazette before any money 4* Ljl
raised under the same; and if any money should br borrow-
ed beyond the powers limiWd-~or given by this'^act, the directors
signing the minute authorising such borrowing should be personally
liable^for "the amount so raised beyond the powers, ^oiatiy a-ad
severally.
The purport of the provision was to prevent the Companies
from exceeding their borrowing powers, by making the directors
personally liable for such offences. This arounsed much opposition,
It was feared that it would alarm the public mind and shake the
confidence of directors in their colleagues . In st>eakinp- o^ this
provision, the Railway Times editorially remarked that it was "so
fraught with evil, so redolent of injustice, ind so hostile to
the whole moneied world that deals or invests in debenture
securities, that it cannot be tolerated."
The required advertisement in the London Gazette was re-
garded as worse than useless. Attention was called to the fact
that it was not always prudent for a purchaser, and frequently less
so for a borrower, to announce that he must obtain a certain sum
of money. These announcements in the London Gazette, though they
might be overlooked by the mass of the community, would be keenly
scrutinized by the "sensible" commission agents, who had no money
°jt ^I1? 0Wn but Wh0 Played a Sreat P^t in keeping others' money
.
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W?7 Siaes April 26, 1856, from which the^ other quotationsm this connection are taken.

Id,
in circulation. As soon as the advertisement appeared in the
Gazette
,
it v;as feared that," the highest existing ratos of interest
would be "uniformly" exacted from the borrowing company.
Moreover, if the directors were made personally liable,
as provided by the clause, it would prevent good men from taking
up seats in railway directorates. Even without any such liabili-
ties, railway companies had already found it hard to find really
"good and upright men to undertake the onerous but thankless duty
of directors."
No open opposition was made in Parliament. But the
parliamentary committee in charge of the matter unanimously re-
jected the clause even without hearing the arguments of those who u^.^ul.
prepared to oppose it.
But the question of borrowing powers of railways was still
a live one. In the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act af 1860 pro-
vision was made to the effect that ^ in case the proprietors of a
railway agreed for the purchase of any land in consideration of
the payment of a rent charge, annual feu duty or a ground annual,
the borrowing power of the railway should be reduced by an amount
equal to twenty years purchase of any rent charge, aaad feu duty or
ground annual, -as for the time being payable.
In the following year the question of the borrowing powers
of railways cane up again. In petitioning for authority to in-
crease their share capital for the purpose of subscribing to the
undertaking of another company, some railway companies endeavored
Railway Times, May 3, 1856.

t/i
to extend their borrowing powers in re opeet of/ such additions of
share capital. On the surface, this extension of "borrowing powers
seemed justifiable, in that the borrowings would be still within
the limit of one-third of the share capital. But upon examination
the Board of Trade concluded that any extension of borrowing powers
based upon the share capital created for the purpose of subscrib-
ing to the undertaking of another company was inconsistent in prin-
ciple with the rule laid down by Parliament which provided that
"in the case of a railway bill no company shall be authorized to
raise by loan or mortgage a larger sum than one-third of their
capital." The principal object of this rule was that the mort-
gage creditors of a railway company might have the security of a
definite undertaking, on which a subscribed capital was to be laid
out of an amount not less than throe times as great as the sum to
be borrowed. If a company were empowered to borrow on the basis
of an increase of its share capital to be used for subscribing to
the undertaking of another company, the lender of money so borrowed
would not derive any additional security whatever from such cre-
ation of new capital, for this additional share capital would not
be laid out in the subscribing company's undertaking
?
on which
alone the lender would have a charge, but elsewhere. Thus, the
spirit of the rule of Parliament would be destroyed. Moreover, if
this request of the railways were permitted, the additional share
The 126th standing order of the House of Commons and the 189th
standing order of the House of Lords. See General Report of
the Board of Trade on Railway Bills, 1861, p. 25.

i/sr
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capital would "be made the basis by both the subscribing and the
receiving companies i'or an extension of their powers. Accordingly
the Board of Trade recommended that such requests should not be
1
granted.
1855
About as has been seen in a previous chapter, debenture
S
stocks came into vogue as a security in place oi debenture bonds,
and Parliament took steps to reduce the borrowing powers of the
companies in proportion to the amounts represented by the debenture
stocks issued. In every railway bill seeking power to issue such
stocks, provisions were made to the effect that after the issiie of
such debenture stocks or the conversion of any mortgages or bonds
into such stocks, "it shall not be lawful for the company to issue
mortgages or bonds, or any other securities, or again to borrow the
sum so converted", and the borrowing powers of the company should
"to the extent of the sums so borrowed or converted or raised by the
a
issue of debenture stocks be extinguished.
The growing popularity of such debenture stock led the
Board of Trade to make repeated recommendations, begirding about
1858, for the adoption of some general regulations governing the
issue of debenture stocks. Among other things, it recoimnended (l)
that the powers to create such stocks should be defined; (2) that
money should not be raised by debenture stocks in lieu of borrow-
ing until such money might be raised by the exercise of the borrow-
ing powers of the company; and (3) that to the extent of the nominal
..Twlbed.
>.||l3 &_14 V. c. 83.
S.Jfehe London & Horth-western Railway Act, 1857, 15 V. cap ev\
I X Quoted by John Whitehead in his book on Guaranteed oecuriti^s
x 1859, p. XI.
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But under this smooth surface, something unexpected was
taking: place. The "borrowing: powers of many railway companies were
grossly abused or exceeded. In the first place a cry was raised
(Tvv
against the restrictions ever, borrowing powers to the effect that
*fcVr
they were ^ strict and that the limit was too small. Companies
were frequently in urgent need of larger sums of borrowed money
either to carry on works or to repay debentures falling due. -T-he
e-omnon -mode in which this difficulty was encountered^wa-s issuf/^
bonds to agents in several of the moneiod circlos in the country.
yBy so doing tho companiee would often suddenly discover itself to
.
have borrowed, through its various brokers, a larger sum than
was permitted/^ Then whatever securities were issued over and above
the limit were illegal. Such illegal issues, however, were not
practically very objectionable, and Parliament often recognized
1
such over-issues in spite of their illegality.
But intentional breaches of the borrowing powers were
also made. Some of the companies which were thejLeast entitled to
exercise such power were the most eager to exercise it. To get
around the restrictions, they resorted to ficticious subscriptions
and other improper methods. They filled their subscription* lists
with the names of"men of straw", and they nominally fulfilled the
requirement of having one-half of their share capital paid up not
with payments, however, made by bona fide subscribers as contemplated
by Parliament but through the agency of contractors' con-
Railway Times, September, 12, If63.
1
tut*
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amount of the debenture stocks disposed of, the borrowing powers
should be extinguished. Following th%s recommendations of the
Board of Trade, Parliament inserted a clause in the Companies
Clauses Act of 1863 to the effect that the "power of borrowing and
re-borrowing by the company shall, to the extent of the money raised
by the issue of debonture stock, be extinguished." As is seen this
Sjl
was not a new principal, but an old one embodied in a new act.
Thus/j>rior to 1863 the question of the borrowing powers
of railways was not of any great popular interest, although it had
always been considered of considerable importance in railway
legislation. The oust on of limiting the borrowing powers to one-
third of the share capital of railway companies had been established.
The public had seldom though^fox changing the established rules.
They also imagined that the restrictions laid down by Parliament
were observed. V/ith some slight exceptions, the act of 1845 was
considered as sufficient to safe-quard the interest of the security-
holders. In fact there was an idea that the recording of securities
by the secretaries of the companies was a sufficient sw**»4r&.y without
an examination into the details of the company. When the investor
got his debenture, he never thought of searching the companies books.
It would be useless; "it was never done; people trusted to its bein^
correct." r
l.V* General Report of the Board of Trade on Railv/ay Bills 1861,
:l.^26 So 27 V". C. 118, Sec. 34. ^
: 5.^7 Evidence before select committee 6^ borrowing powers of railway
dompanies, 1864, pp. 6-10.

lit
tributionc or advances made by financial agents. As soon as the
requirements of lav/ were in come such way complied with, they
would immediately have recourse to their borrowing pov/ers. In
many cases, the line was barely constructed almost entirely with
borrowed money, without any funds. being left for the equipment or
working of the road. Then the promoters would go to Parliament
to ask for pov/ers to canelo their ordinary shares which had been
created but not disposed of and to issue, instead, preference and
other shares with prior claims to those of the ordinary share-
holders.
Fraudulent breaches of the law were also quite common.
As in the case of the West Hartlepool Harbor and %ilway case, it
was discovered after a protracted inquiry by a select committee
that vast frauds had been committed. The company under its three
different acts of Parliament was authorised to raise £2,100,000
with power to borrow to the extent of one-third of the sum paid up
in shares. Thus, even if the whole share capital had been paid up
which was not the case, the utmost the company was empowered to
borrow was £525,000. But the company went abead and borrowed
2
L2, 700,000, without any authority from Parliament.
This discovery discredited railway debentures more
widely than did even the panic of 1847. The mind of the public
was appalled when it was shown that all this fraud was done in
spite of the "duly authorised, properly circulated" half-yearly
accounts as well as the service of "Committee of Assistance" which
1. Railway Times, May 2, 1868.
2. Hansard, Vol. 171, pp. 1302-03.

helped to keep the company's affairs straight. The debenture-
holders felt that they possessed no security either in the acts of
OUuJ,
Parliament, or in the returns of the Board of Trade, i much less in
the half-yearly accounts of the companies. In spite of all the
restrictions and protection which Parliament appeared to have given,
1
he might be robbed of his money at any time.
It was, however, not the mere breaking of the law, but the
effect of such breaches upon the investors , that proved especially
obnoxious. 'Then a company over-issued securities contrary to law,
much hardship must necessarily fall upon somebody. The securities
issued over and above the borrowing powers were illegal, and hence
the holders of such securities had no status before the law. If
the principal and interest/^ e# the holders of such illegal securi-
ties w^e_£&i4, the money must cone from somewhere. If they were
not paid, they would be losers. The holders of the legal securi-
ties would justly oppose the reduction of their interest to pay
the holders of illegal debentures. They advanced their money
upon legal security and they would object to any one else re-
ceiving one farthing until their claims were satisfied. These
holders of legal securities, who had no share in the management of
the company, certainly should not be made to suffer by the mis-
conduct of persons over whom they had no control. ITor should they
in equity suffer simply because other people had lost money upon
purchasing illegal securities.
Then it was urged that the holders of the excessive de-
bentures who advanced their money without any legal security^?
^f.. Economist, June 22, 1863, pp. 674-675.

tho co !aon should stand the loss. Tho-orct 1 oal Ifr;\ th 1 s appeared per-
missible. But the true state of affairs showed that this was -at-
th-e ^e-e-t too harsh a measure. It was true that these holders of
excessive debentures had no legal claim to depend upon; hut it was
also true that this was not entirely their fault. Their money-
was advanced in a bona fide manner. The company had received their
money into its hands and had either spent it on its authorized
works, or still retained it in its treasury. Moreover, it was
likely that neither the shareholders nor the holders of legal
securities could have derived their income were it not for the
money advanced by the holders of such illegal securities.
Finally it appeared that the shareholders, who in law had
the power to appoint directors and the managers of the business and
whose employees issued such illegal debentures, should be made
responsible. But there were also many practical objections to this
course of procedure. In the first place, it was pointed out that
these shareholders bought their stocks on the express assurance
embodied in the acts of Parliament that there should be only a
certain amount of fixed charges against the company with a prior
claim over their dividends. Although theoretically they had the
power of appointing the managers and directors, many of them, in
reality, were no more responsible for the conduct of their so-
called employees than the other classes of investors. They had
more enterprising spirit in investing their money in the stocks
of the railway, but they certainly should not be punished for
that enterprising spirit which was much needed.

All these and many other difficulties as shown elsewhere
in our study were direct results of the evasion and over-riding of
the borrowing powers which Parliament had taken special and con-
stant care to prescribe.
As mentioned previously, s4neo 1645, the issue of loan
notes or other negotiable or assignable instruments purporting to
bind the company as security for money advanced, wasytprohibited.
Owing to the narrowness of the limit of borrowing powers and some
less laudable reasons, some companies soon discovered an ingenious
way to get around this restriction. They devised the well known
1
device of Lloyd's bonds to bridge over the barrier against loan
notes. These instruments were issued neither as negotiable securi-
ties nor for "cash-advances," but as acknowledgments of obligations
for work done, materials supplied, or for debts contracted in ez-
2
cess of their borrowing powers.
The original purpose for which these bonds were devised
was, however, not altogether ^ad, and the circumstances under which
they were supposed to be used also appeared to Justify their ex-
istence. As often happened, a railway company suddenly discovered
that its expenditures were underestimated or its resources over-
estimated. In either cac;e the directors were in difficulty.
They were compelled under severe penalty to complete their works
1. See foot note in Chapter I, p. M for a brief description ofthese bonds. '
2. Report of select committee on borrowing powers of railways
1864, p. iii. - - * 9

within a definite time. Their funds were exhausted. The con-
tractor would refuse to continue the work without pay, and the
directors had no money to pay him. Moreover, if the work was left
to stand still, not only the capital already spent would remain
unproductive and the work itself woul
-d deteriorate, but the con-
tractor would sue. naturally a question would arise as to what
should "be done. As the law did not prohibit railway companies
from securing their debts contracted for the execution of the "bona
fide purpose of their undertaking, the directors would, therefore,
make some sort of an arrangement with the contractor "by which
they would furnish him from time to time with acknowledgments of
indebtedness, under seal of the company, for the amount due to him
on account of work done. On these evidences of credit the eon-
tractor yould secure money. In this way Lloyd's bonds were issued
to give time to the debtor company instead of pressing it to issue
shares and debenture- at great sacrifice.
This was the way in which Lloyd's bonds were originated
and in many instances used to the advantage of the railways and
the public; and they appeared quite desirable. ITo tenable argument
seemed to have been advanced to show that a railway company should
not issue to its contractors acknowledgments of indebtedness for
In each Railway Act there is always a clause stimulating thetime wnen the line must be completed and the penaltv for
fani
Ure
* Clause 34 of tke Model Bills of the House" of Lords
1909, says that "if the railway is not completed within five*years from the passing of this Act, then on the expiration ofthat period the powers by this act for making and completingthe railway or otherwiseiSrelation thereto shall (Tease exee-ot
as to so much thereof as is then completed'; and clause 35provides that deposit money shall not be repaid srxcent so far asrailway is omened.

the amounts actually due them on account of work actually executed.
Indeed, it was claimed that "if restricted to their proper purpose,
Lloyd's "bonds would, have been a useful and certainly not incon-
venient invo^rion." But these bonds were soon issued for dif-
ferent purposes. Speculative undertakings were gotten up wit .
hardly any hope of securing money through subscription; and these
bonds were issued at "an enormous sacrifice" in order to get the
undertaking completed. Ultimately debentures had to be issued.
The result of such a procedure was a great extra cost to the /
shareholders and the ov/ners of the property in general. Swind-
ling schemes were also floated through the instrumentality of these
bondt to coerce some existing companies to purchase or lease at
outrageous prices.
Moreover, the employment of the device tended to deceive
the investing public. With the current conception that the borrow-
ing powers of railways were strictly limited, investors were se-
duced into a belief that the work was so far completed with money
raised in accordance with the requirements of the acts of Parlia-
ment; while in reality their later investments instead of being
applied to further prosecution of the work, had to be diverted to
the payment of debts of which these new subscribers (the only
* if,
subscribers ^for that matter) were ignorant.
Railway Times, December 15, 1866.
-i(f9. Evidence before select committee on railway borrowing
-oowers
1864 p. 35. * " ° ; »
Evidence before select committee on railway bor^owin^ cowers
1864, p. 19. - - - ' *
^(,4,. Railway Times, December 15, 1866.

On the other hand it was contended that the complaint aga-
inst Lloyd's "bonds that they represented a violation of the
borrowing powers of the company, was unfounded. These bonds could
be^violation of the borrowing powers only when they were issued in
excess of the borrowing powers of the company; but it was only
occasionally that they were issued in excess of such borrowing
powers. But this argument neglected the fact that railway
companies could violate the law without exceeding the limit of
their borrowing powers. The companies were authorized to raise
so much money on shares and so much on loans. The latter/privilege
was not to be resorted to until the whole of the former had been
subscribed and one-half of its total amount paid up. Some companies,
however, whose undertaking were of/) an unpromising character that
could
they .neither secure subscriptions nor make palls, and who^sj
borrowing powers consequently did not materaliga legally, would
evade the law by resorting to Lloyd's bonds. Although the amount
raised was not in excess of the borrowing powers, the issue of such
bonds was illegal nevertheless.
Moreover, as is usually the case with such convenient and
yet illusive schemes, these Lloyd bonds soon lost their original
identity. In fact by 1864, the original fe^and the proper func-
tion of these bonds were practically forgotten. Instead of issu-
ing them to contractors for work done in order to relieve temporary
i^Railwi6^ t^T*7 18 'i!64duoted by ^ilway Jan.23,1864^3^K way Times, January 23, 1864.

pressure, companies usod them in coupon form for raising money, '
and also put them into circulation as negotiable securities.
Some directors incurred heavy obligations by the issue of these
bonds even without consulting the shareholders and without the
knowledge of the holders of statutory debentures. Indeed, within
a few years after their first use Lloyd bonds became quite exten-
sively circulated, and represented several million pounds in
nominal value. In some cases they were even regarded as statutory
securities. Thus their extensive application, and the purposes to
which they were applied, led the Railway Times to say that "no
other name than fraud can be given to transactions of this de-
scription, and the eminent legal ability which has been exercised
in drawing up the instrument so as to keeo it out of the range of
criminality must accept its share of discredit...." These
instruments "might or might not be within the strict limit of
* il-
legality," «e stated a member of Parliament, "but they certainly
had a tendency to be made a most fruitful means of deception and
concealment of the real position of the company's affair."
The effect of this expedient was the total evasion of the
statutory limitations of borrowing powers. While the legal
*yft. Evidence before select committee of 1864, p. 31.
yjfic . Hansard, 182; s> 825.
4 Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. XXIII.
4>':. Evidence before select gommittee of 1364, p. 127.
i/ji . Railway Times, June 25,^1864.
t^. Marquess of Clakricarde in the House of Lords. Hansard
190; jft. 1972.

/"borrowings wore limited to only one-third of the share capital, the
illegal borrowings by Lloyd bonds were subjected to no limitation
whatever. Thus the precaution of the legislature for the protect-
ion of the holders of statutory securities was nullified. This
coupled with the numerous and varied excuses offered by the compan-
ies for exceeding their borrowing oov/ers in other ways resulted in
much coniusion of the whole situation.' The investor had no means
of ascertaining whether or not the borrowing powers of a company
had been exceeded, and consequently whether or not the securities
offered by that company were worthless. They had to trust the rail-
way returns made by the companies to the Board of Trade, but they
had no means whereby to varify the accuracy of thece returns!^
If these returns were made with strictness, they might in them-
selves form a good prevention against over-issue of securities, or
at least to give some valuable information. But these returns,
besides being not always accurate, were not made until the end of
each year and were not published by the Board of Trade until
August or September of the year following. In the meantime the
public had to depend upon the "miserable and imoerfect" extracts
9 HI
therefrom as were given in the daily papers. Moreover, the acts
of Parliament were sometimes in such a state of confusion that
some of the railway companies themselves did not Imow what their
borrowing powers were. Thus the position of the debenture holders
..^Hansard, vo3n» 181; 338.
:. ^(.Railway Times, September 12, 1863.
.^Railway Times, September 26, 1863. Evidence before select
committee on borrowing powers of railways, 1363.
^Igvidence before Lords' committee of 1863. ^Sse Railway TimesSeptember 26, 1863. ™ J xj.in«b,
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became exceedingly unsatisfactory. By the kind of false shield
which had been thrown over the debentures through the limitation
of borrowing powers, the public were led to believe that the de-
benture holders had a protection which they really never had.
Being faced by such a serious stiuation, some people
advocated that borrowing powers should be abolished altogether.
They argued that "this Gordian knot, respecting which so much trouble
is taken to render it difficult to unloose, could be cut in an
instant. Abolished borrowing powers for the future, except in
so far as advances may be made on calls. Let no company
mm
raise capital by any other means than subscription for shares. Let
existing bonds be converted into debenture stock, and the whole
difficulty will be found to have 'vanished like a guilty thinp-
away. '
"
Certain members of Parliament seemed to be alive to the
serious nature of the situation. A resolution was introduced in
Parliament to the effect that the issue of securities should be
taken away from the directors appointed by the shareholders and
placed in the hands of persons representing the creditors. This
extreme character of this resolution reveals to a certain extent
the anxiety with which people searched for remedies. But it was
regarded as being of too novel a character and was withdrawn.
4 if6
...^Evidence before lords* committee f 1864, p 33.
2:.^ Railway Times, September 12, 1863.
^•5! Railway Times, August 22, 1863.
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Parliament, however, felt obliged to take some steps. As
most legislative bodies would have done under such circumstances,
the House of Lords appointed a select committee in 1863 "to in-
quire into the whole situation and report as to what legislative
measures are desirable for the purpose of restraining the directors
of railway companies from exceeding the limits ox the borrowing
powers fixed by the Act of Parliament." The committee made two
reports, in which some methods for the enforcement of the rules
governing borrowing powers were recommended. In the same year
when the Companies Clauses Bill was considered in connnittee, a
member in the House of Commons moved the addition of a clause
requiring companies possessing borrowing powers to make an annual
return to Parliament of the capital which they had raised, with
the object of preventing the recurrence of cases like that of the
West Hartlepool Company or any similar violation of the provision
forbidding companies from raising money on debentures or mortgage
until one-half of their capital was paid up. The clause .however
,
was neg ifrt ivod for technical reasons.
But the alarm which resulted from the general lack of in-
formation regarding the condition of the borrowing powers of rail-
way companies continued. Therefore in 1864 the House of Lords felt
if
^
expedient to appoint another select committee to continue the
if Hansard, vtrl^ 181, 3859586. U..^fa*> ^f>Jl tJi^jPor the recommendations of this committee, £8o cApter on " J *
j RefRrstrsr^^m^f1--^
K+51K. D. Has sard. <ty.,Se-e Hansard, f^. 172; p^K 935-936.
-.^See Appendix to Report of Select Committee on Railway Borrow-
ing Powers, /864 t and Hansard , ^ 171; p**. 1302-03. 3km a.rgo p.
-H8 Of tlli' B Ollfcft ILL , tj^ *J*rtr 4m^-vc^

inquiry commenced in the previous session. The purpose of appoint-
ing" this committee as well as that of appointing the previous one
was to devise some means whereby directors might be restrained from
exceeding the limits of their fixed borrowing powers. Parliament
appeared to believe that there was no question as to the merits of
the established rules limiting the borrowing powers of railway
companies. The only thing needed was to find some efficient way of
enforcing these rules. Therefore, Parliament reasserted its in-
tention of restricting such borrowing powers through the Railway
Construction Facilities Act of 1864
,
in which provisions v/ere made
/]to the following restrictions:
(1) "They shall not exercise the said powers of borrowing
any money until the whole of the share capital authorized by the
certificate is subscribed for or taken, and until one half thereof
is actually paid up, and until they prove to the justice who is to
certify under section 40 of the Companies Clauses Consolidation
Act, 1345, before he so certifies, that shares for the whole of
the capital are issued and accepted, and that not less than one
fifth part of the amount of each separate share has been paid up on
account thereof before or at the time of the issue or acceptance
thereof, and that all such shares were taken in good faith, and areheld by the subscribers or their assigns who are legally'liable
for the same."
(2) They shall not borrow a larger sum in the whole than one-
third of the amount of the share capital authorized by the certificate.
in that it required not only all shares should be taken in good faith
but not less than one-fifth part of the amount oi each separate
share has. to be paid up before a company could resort t o
5fc5^27 & 28 V. c. 121.
-eerti£iea~'fce to borrow money 1^*.,^
The latter part of the first clause was especially important,

', v . .. . . . . . • .-,
its borrowing powers. This provision put a strong check agair st
the practice of inducing "men of straw" to sign up subscriptions
and—4rh-e- subsequent false satiafaoti-on of the law by- using borrowed t\
money to meet the requirement of paying up one-third of the share
capital. It has proven so useful that provisions similar to it
inserted \
have been invariably ^ in railway Acts since.
This closed the legislative measures xrve-r the b orrowing
powers of railway companies. As has been shown, Parliament aeJfejtied
&e*m from the beginning, ©n the idea of limiting the borrowings of
railways to one-third of their share capital, and has v©ire»eatiy J
adhered to this principle throughout. Whenever the question of
borrowing powers came to its notice, all it endeavored to do was
to adopt measures to meet the changed circumstances with the
purpose of maintaining the /(limit •* Parliament appeared to believe
that the merits and necessity of limiting railway borrowings to
one-third of the share capital had g^fc-fren beyond the stage ©f -ad-
a^trtriag-afi^tart^^ All that was needed was to see that the limit
was not exceeded. The idea of inquiring into the adequacy of this
limit itself did not seem to have been entertained. Hor did
Parliament appear especially desirous to find out what were the
causes which led railway directors to exceed their borrowing^
powers. Even the fact that the established custom of borrowing on
other good securities invariably warranted a larger proportion of
loans than one-third of the share capital failed to induce Parlia-
ment to inquire into the advisability of modifying such restrict-
ions.
^•4L<£** Clause 7 of the Model Bill of the House of lords' 1909. a,^C*
It

/ 1) t
The legal limit of the borrowing powers was thus quite
definite. In practice, however, much latitude was given to the
companies as shown by the following table.
Proportion of borrowings to totplV v WWW ' - i 1 paid-up ce T)itfi.l a
ITame of Co. : 1860 1870 1880 1885**»W w %J 1890 1895 1900 1907 I
w % Jo
df
iQ Jo / t
Great Eastern 33 32 31 32 31 32 33 !
Great Northern : 15 23 24 25 22 26 25 25 !
Great Western : 28 35 25 24 24 24 25 24 \
Lond. Chatham :
& Dover : : 20 29 29 29 30 30 31
London & north--
V/e stern : : 27 28 25 25 27 32 32 32 j
Mersey 22 40 40 41 44 \
Metropolitan 24 29 27 29 27 26 28 !
Midland • 1 CJ 22 23 21 29 28 21 22 S
Horth Eastern : 28 25 24 24 24 26 31 30 \
These railways were picked at random, with some reference
to their location. The percentages were calculated from the
figures given in the Board of Trade returns. It is clearly seen
that some of these railways very much exceeded the limits of their
borrowing powers. While the legal limit was 25%, some of the
companies for a number of years borrowed to the extent of 30 or
more per cent, of their capital. Still others, like the Mersey,

whose loan capital equaled to more than 40% of their total capital.
The writer does not pretend to say that such "excessive" borrowings
v/ere bad in themselves, nor is he prepared to maintain that Parlia-
ment should not have given some latitude to the enforcement of its
rules; but his study of the contemporary opinions leads him to feel
that much difficulty arises from the loose enforcement of strict
rules
•
If the whole railway system of the Kingdom is taken into
consideration, similar irregularities seem to have existed. Thus,
in 1860 the loans equaled 23%, in 1870 it equaled 27%, in 1880
25%, in 1890 26%, in 1900 28% and in 1907 27% of the total paid up
capital.
So far as the writer has been able to discover, the
strenuous adhesion of Parliament to the idea of limiting the borrow-
ing powers of railway companies to one-third of their chare capital
arose simply out of the desire of giving- security, by that means, to
the holders of legal debentures. Yet if railways had been permitted
to borrow to the extent of one-half or even two-thirds of the bona
fide share capital it seems hardly likely that thereby the de-
benture-holders wo ild have been deprived of a reasonable security.
It hardly admits any doubt that it is desirable for a government
to limit the facilities for constructing railways with other
people's money; yet too stringent regulations are liable to be as
harmful as the lack of regulation. English experience seems to
justify the statement that broad but vigorously-enforced restrict-
ions may prove more beneficial than narrow but loosely-enforced
limitations.
1» Cf. A* T. Hadley; Railroad Transportation, 1903 p. 54.

/*3
CHAPTER V.
REGISTRATION OF RAILWAY SECURITIES.
From the two preceding chapters it is clear that from the
"beginning of railway enterprise, Parliament intended to give ample
protection to the holders of legal securities, and that for the
purpose of affording such protection it endeavored to restrict the
borrowing powers of railway companies. It is the purpose of this
chapter to emphasize the principal methods hy which Parliament
tried to carry out its intention.
In the early acts, hy which railway companies were in-
corporated or enabled to raise money on mortgage or bond, pro-
visions were made to the effect that an entry or memorial of all
mortgages or assignments should be made in the registers of the
companies within fourteen days from the time when the assignment or
mortgage was made, and that such registers should be open to the in-
spection of the proprietors or otter interested persons at all
i
reasonable times without charge. Provisions were also made re-
quiring that transfers of such securities should be registered in
the companies registers within twenty-one days of the execution of
the transfer and that only after such a registration was made that
the assignee might be entitled to the full benefits and payments of
2
the securities transfered. Clauses, to the above effect were
1. Section cxix of the London & Croydon Railway Act, 1837 provided
that "An entry or memorial of such. .mortgage or assignment, contain-
ing the numbers and dates thereof, and the names of the parties,
with their proper additions, to whom the same shall have been made,
and of the sums borrowed, together with the rate of interest to be
paid thereof, be entered in some book to be kept by the secretary ojf
clerks of the said company; which said book May be perused at all
reasonable times by any of the proprietors or mortgagees of the said
undertaking or ether persons interested therein, without fee or rewai'd
2. For the registration of each transfer, the company should be
paid the sum of two shillings and sixpence, ibed.

inserted in the private railway acts during many yoars, and were
found quite beneficial , and so in the Companies Clauses Consoli-
dation Aot of 1845, v/e find general provisions made for the regis-
tration of railways securities. In substance, these general clauses
were similar to those of the earlier private acts, with the excep-
tion (1) that the time limit within which the transfers should be
registered was extended from twenty-one to thirty days, and (2) that
"until such entry (of the transfer) was made the company shall not be
ee
in any manner responsible to the transfer, in respect of such mort-
gage," thus making the registration less rigid but of greater conse-
quence to the security-holders. Security-holders had not appeared
eager to avail themselves of the provision of the early acts re-
quiring the registration of the purchase and transfer of railway
securities. It was felt that unless registration was made a conditio]]
of the validity of such securities , the provision would remain a dead
_ , , TT the ofletter. Hence, came ^provision 1845, making it necessary to register
all transfers in order to render the company in any wise responsible
to the transferee.
Thus from the time Parliament began to prescribe the limit
- ... ,
.
system of
of railway borrowing powers, it adopted: this Registration as a means
of securing the observance of the same. It deemed that since all
securities were registered in the companies' registers and since
such registers were open to public inspection, there would be little
chance of companies exceeding the limit of their borrowing powers
without being at once detected. But it must be noticed what
Parliament apparently failed to emphasize, that although the manner
of registration w&6 thrashed out with much precision, the execution

of such registration was left entirely in the hands of the companies.
Prior to 1863, out side of occasional agitations, practically no
effort had "been made to modify these provisions* The general opin-
ion was that the registration done by the companies themselves was
sufficient to prevent irregularities. The public relied, and justly
1
in ordinary cases, on the integrity of the companies. Unfortunately,
however, in some cases this reliance was ill-founded. Many companies
made so little use of registration that they were not aware of the
2
exact limits of their borrowing powers, as prescribed by Parliament;
3
and many others purposely exceeded their limits in borrowing. In-
4
deed, the practice of overb orrowing, as remarked the Earl of Donong,
actually reached the stage not only of illegality but of fraud.
The public were told that Parliament had put a limit to the borrowing
powers of railway companies, but they soon found out that under the
semblance of this limit money was borrowed every day beyond the
5
authority which Parliament had given. Consequently, doubt, suspi-
cion and disgatisfa^fcon prevailed, which in turn depreciated the
value of "railway securities so much that they were often called
"insecurities.
"
1. Economist, May 2, 1863.
2. letter in London Times, August 23, 1866.
3. The West Harlepool, the Cork & Yanhol, the Carmarthan and
Cardigan, and the London, Chatham and Dover were among this
class. See Economist, June 20, 1863, Hansard, vol. 182, pp.
1580-1583 and Economist, December 22, 1866.
4. Hansard, vol. 171, p. 1297.
5. Hansard, vol. 183, p. 869.
6. Economist, August 12, 1865.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs gave rise to agitation,
A number of ohambers of commerce and other commercial bodies peti-
tioned Parliament in 1863 to modify the existing law, so that rail-
way debentures might be required to be registered and put on the
same footing as landed securities . Instead of the registers kept
by the companies as required by the Companies Clauses Act of 1845
,
which really formed no security to the public, it was ur£ed that ther
1
should be public registers kept in places of easy access. A
2
scheme for such registration was presented to the select committee of
1863 to the effect that every railway company should be compelled to
furnish the lender with a certificate stating that the latter was the
registered proprietor of the undermentioned debenture bonds or other
securities, duly sealed with the corporate seal of the company, viz:-
: Ho. : Date ; Description of security.: ITame . : • Amount. :
• • «
With the following note annexed :-
,T1T.B.- The proprietor of the above security is invited to
have it registered by signing and forwarded the annexed letter and
he is hereby notified that failure to do so, within thirty days from
1. Evidence before select committee of 186& on railway borrowing
powers, p. IE.
2. Railway Times, October 3, 1863.

the date thereof, may deprive him of his right to rank otherwise
than as an ordinary creditor of the company*"
According to this scheme, these certificates were to he re-
gistered in the Bank of England by a public registrar and the re-
gistration was to be followed up with a series of acknowledgments
which would place it beyond doubt . Holderc of registered securities
would alone be recognized as bondholders according to acts of Parlia-
ment and alone would be entitled to exercise the rights of inter-
ference which the lav/ accorded to mortgagees* On the other hand,
if the holder of such securities failed to register he would not be
deprived of his money or of his common lav; right, but simply of thoce
extraordinary privileges which belonged to the rightful and recog-
nized mortgagees.
To form a complete check, it was also urged that the Board
of Trade should be furnished with returns showing the extent of the
borrowing powers of each company. Then the proposed public regis-
trar, being in an independent office, should furnish the Board of
Trade with a return compiled from the registration of the securities
of each company, showing the amount which each company had borrowed.
By comparing these two independent returns, tne Board of Trade
could easily ascertain whether or not a company had exceeded its
borrowing pov/ers.
Another plan was proposed by the deputy keeper of the sig-
net of Scotland to the effect that (1) public registers should be
kept in London, Edinburg and Dublin; (2) that all existing companies
having debenture debts or stocks should be required to give to the
1. See evidence before lords' Committee of 1864, pp. 4-15.

respective registrars a return duly certified as at a certain date,
specifying the acts of Parliament under which they were authorized
to "borrow money, the amount so authorized, the amount which the
shareholders had authorized to be borrowed by resolution of general
meetings, and the dates of such meetings, together with the amount
of debenture bonds and stocks which had been issued and was then due
and outstanding against each company; and (3) that all existing and
future companies should be required to make returns from time to
time of all acts thereafter passed authorizing the borrowing of
money or effecting any changes of their borrowing powers. To ac-
1
oomplish such purposes an elaborate form was proposed.
1. Form: Name of Company
No. I. - Returns of Borrowing Pov/ers.
Date :
when :
Recei-
•
ved. :
ACTS OF PARIIAMESTi
Amo int :
author-
:
ized by:
Acts. :
Amount
;
sane- ;
tioned :
-
by :
•share- :
holders
;
;Date of :
Meeting
;
; when j
sanction-:
:ed :
Amt. of Deben-
ture Bonds and
:Debenture Stock
s out standing at
Date of Return
•
:Sonds.: Stock.
£ : £
:150, 000:50, 000
; 50,000:
: 300, 000:
1863
Sep. 28 :21 & 22 Vict. c. 65
:23 Vict. c. 61
:24 Vict. c. 40
: £
•200,000
: 100,000
r 300, 000
£
1200,000"
: 50,000
: 300, 000
\ 1863
:Jan. 10
:Feb. 12
iJuly 12
: 600,000 :550,000 : 500, 000:50, 000
* *
! 1864. Jan. 31. Sanctioned - £550,000
: In Circulation:
: (See Form No. II)
: Debentures — £ 496,000
: Debenture
Stock — 49.000 545.000
Within Limit £ 5,000

This form was to be filled out and filed by each company
with the keeper of the register. Each company should al30 be requi-
red to certify to its correctness and be held responsible for it.
Hg also proposed that each return should be registered in
a separate book or a part of a book for each company. It should be
incumbent on all companies, after the designated date, to transmit
to the respective registrars for registration, before they were
issued, all debentures and certificates of debenture stocks. The
registrar should register these accordingly by an entry in a snecial
1
form prepared for the purpose of the number, date, and amount. A
registration number and date should also be entered. A registration
fee was also recommended. Then after such registration the registrar
should certify on each instrument the fact and date of such re-
gistration.

l.Form for registering railway bonds, debentures, etc.:-
Hame of Company
No. II. — Register of Issue of Bonds or Debentures, and of Certifi-
cates of Debenture Stock.
Reg-:
is- :
ter :
Ho. :
Date
:: Humb er : : Date :
:
> Amount •Ho. of -
:Certi-,
:ficate
«
•
•Dn"hp <
•
•
: 1863 t 1863 r
1 :Sep.28' : Amount issued, per
Return
;
•500,000 : Amt .is-
:sued,
;per re-
tturn
•50,000
1 : Dec. 2 t 451 :Dec.l • 1,000
p <
<~>
.
A CO ft T
: 1 \ 500;
3 :\ » 3;
:
" 1 1 : 27 j:Dec.l;: 500
4 \ ! 453 ! : " 2 :! 1,000:
5 ; i 454 ! [ % \• 500 \
6 j : " Z\
: 28 it " 5:£ 1,000
:Amt.,31 Jan.18 64 : : 503, 000: •51,500
•Deduct Discharges
:
:( see ) Form Ho. III.
:
7,000: 2,500
•Outstanding, 31 :
•Jan. 1864
:
496,000: .49,000

To form a complete check, the doputy keeper of the signet
of Scotland also proposed that it should be incumbent on the com-
panies to send in for registration all debentures or other vouchers
of debenture loans or stock which were discharged. These should be
registered under a separate heading in the book or part of the
book applicable to each company. For such a purpose a third form
1
was recommended.
i-FomJTo 3: iIame of Company
Ho. XI r.—Register of Discharges of Debentures and Debenture Stock,
Date when
lodged.
Debentures.
Ho . of
Deben-
tures Date
Reg-
is-
tra-
ti-
on
Amount
Debenture Stock.
Ho. of
8er-
tifi-
cate
Date
Reg-
is-
trar
tion
Ho.
Amount
1864
Jan. 1
2
4
6
n 9
10
380
S82
384
1858:
Hov. 1
1859:
May 11
1860:
May 11
i
1,000
4,000
1,000
- 500
500
Amount, 31 Jan. 1864 7,000
1858:
May
15
2,000
500
2,500

Shis system, it must be observed, was intended for the re-
gistration of all debentures or debenture-stock certificates to be
issued thereafter. It was suggested that existing debentures shoulc
also be registered. The deputy keeper of the signet, however, was
of the opinion that it would be rather cumbersome to require the
registration of all existing securities. Moreover, such a process
would not afford any additional security than that afforded by simply
requiring all companies to give the total amounts of securities
which they had issued.
Others were of the opinion that it was necessary to have a
public register of all transfers and renewals in addition to the re-
gistration done by the companies as provided by the Companies
Clauses Act of 1845. Although such transfers or renewals did not
affect the borrowing powers, their consumation should, nevertheless,
be made more definite through some system of public registration.
1
Accordingly > another elaborate form was recommended for the purpose.
A representative of the Board of Trade also suggested a form
for registration purposes which resembled very much that proposed
by the deputy keeper of the signet of Scotland, as contained in
table Uo. I.
Under such a system of registration, it was thought that
ample protection would be afforded the public. Under table ITo. I,
the public could see the amount authorized by Parliament and the
amount sanctioned by the shareholders to be borrowed, and under
tables 2 and 3, they could see the amounts issued and those dis-
charged. A comparison of the figures given in these tables would

indicate at once how much legal debt was out-standing against the
company and what was the condition of the company's borrowing power.
It was also recognized that there would not be much trouble to start
such a system of registration, since a similar system of registra-
2
tion had already been used in the case of landed securities.
1* Table Uo. IT. -Subsidiary Register of Transfers, Renewals and Dis-
charges of Debentures and Debenture Stock comprised in the Return
made by the Company as due and outstanding at (date).
DEB31TTURE3
.
DEBENTURE STOCK
Amount outstanding per Return at
(date) - & - 500.000
Date
when
lodg-
ed
ITo.of
Deben
tures
Transfer,
Discharge
or Agree-
ment of
Renewal
.
Regis
tra
tion
Ho
»
Date :ITo.
Amount
when
lodg
ed
of
Cer
tif
ic
ate
Transfer
or Dis-
charge
Rig~
is
tra
tion
Ho.
Amount
1864
1. Jan
3. "
5 "
560
396
491
Transfer
Renewal
by Agree-
ment.
Discharge
1
2
3
is
1,000
2,000
5,000
1864
2 Jan
7 "
58
60
40
Transfer 1
2
Discharge
1.000
2,000
1,000
6,000 4,000
er, it would comenote.—This being a mere subsidiary Regist
to an end when all the debentures and debenture stock outstanding at
the establishment of the Register have in course of time come in for
registration in consequence of transfers, agreements of renewal, or
discharges. All discharges entered in this subsidiary Register
would also be entered in the ordinary Register of discharges, Form,
ITo. III.
2 There were already registration offices under the Companies Act,
1862.. See Evidence before Lords' committee of 1864, p. 4.

It was further urged that if the registrars were appointed
with definite instructions to register nothing beyond what the
companies were authorized to issue, then the people would he able
to tell at once whether any security was legal or not. It could
"be safely expected that no man would think of lending money uoon
1
debentures which wore not registered.
The agitation for a simple and effective system of regis-
tration appears to have been most keen; the matter was of wide in-
terest. The general opinion of stock brokers, money-lenders, and the
like was unanimously in favor of some sort of governmental regis-
tration. The railways as a whole, according to the representatives
- -
no
ox some of the leading lines in the Kingdom, entertained. objection
'3
against the compulsory registration of their securities. Some
of them were even ready to welcome such a procedure. The solicitor
of the Bank of England, which establishment was then a large in-
vestor in the securities of railway conmar.ies was also strongly in
favor ox such a system of registration. indeed, the consensus of
opinion as expressed before the Lords 1 Committee of 1864 was that the
investors had too much trust in the honor of railway officials in
connection with their borrowing powers and that a public registration
of railway debentures, if constructed upon some simple principle
was needed to restore and maintain confidence, Such a system of re-
gistration would ultimately prove to be an advantage not only to the
1. Evidence before Lords' Committee, 1864, p. 12.
2. More than eight of the influential chambers of commerce open ly
expressed their desire for such a course of public registration.
Evidence before Lords' Committer, 1864, pp. 14-15.
3. Hansard, vol. 181, pp. 338-9.

investing public but to the railway eompanios as well.
Furthermore, since neither investors nor borrowers v/ere ablo
to ascertain the legality of some of the existing securities, it was
asked : Why was it not feasible for the Government to investigate
and establish the legality of such securities for them? It was
suggested that the Board of Trade might effectually do for every
person what he could not do for himself, and which, even if it were
possible for each individual, would have to be done over and over
again by every successive holder of each railway debenture. Thus
it was urged that the railway companies should be required to certify
to the Board of Trade every new issue of debentures. Upon due exam-
ination and after being satisfied that the company had not exceeded
its borrowing powers, the Board of Trade should give the company
stamped debentures for that specific amount. According to the opin-
2
ion of the managing director oi the Lands Improvement Company,
securities, unless so stamped, should not receive any legal recog-
nition. By this process every debenture holder whose debenture had
the Board of Trade mark impressed upon it would be sure that he
held, a good security. The credit of the companies would also be
benefitted by the removal of the existing suspicion.
The consideration of the matter was taken up by Parliament.
3
As mentioned in a previous chapter, when the special report and
evidence upon the West Hartlepool Harbor and Railway bill were
1. Economist, May 2, 1863.
2. Evidence before Lords' committee of 1864, pp. 22-33.
3. See chapter on the 6ontrolof Borrowing Powers of Railway
Companies, p. 118.

presented to the House oi' Lords, great alarm was felt over railway-
borrowings "by that and other companies. Action by Parliament was
obviously necessary if the alcrm were not to spread* Accordingly
in 1863 the House of Lords appointed a committee on railway borrow-
ing powers to inquire and report as to what legislative measures
_ , . , _ ,
companies
were desirable to prevent the railway .from exceeding their borrow-
f\ 1
mg powers. This committee, therefore, recommended that semi-annual
declaration of the state of the borrowing powers signed by the
chairman, the secretary and a director of the company should be
published in the London Gazette by every railway company exercising
or claiming to exercise borrowing powers under any act of Parliament*
In this declaration, the amount paid up and the amount which the
company was legally authorized to borro?/ by the creation of debt,
should be clearly set forth. These officers of the company should
also declare that the "total amount now raised by the company upon
bonds or other securities did not exceed the above mentioned amount,
and which the company could legally borrow."
The committee also recommended that thereafter no mortgage
bond or any security for money should be issued by any railway i 1
company without having endorsed upon that security a certificate in
the following form, to be signed by the chairman and secretary
of the company :-
"A. 3. Railway Company. Date.
Bond for £ ... Ho.
,
be ins part of the total amount
which this company can now legally borrow."
A plan for the registration of all securities by an inde-
pendent public office was suggested to the committee, but while the
1. This part of the committee's report and evidence are published in
Railway Times for August 22, 1863. See also Report of Lord's
committee, 1864, p. 27.

committee conceded that such a regulation "might operation i'or the
security of the public", it felt that it did not have sufficient tim«i
to give full consideration to the subject.
Parliament did not take any immediate action to give effect
to these recommendations. But when the companies clauses bill of
1863 was considered in committee in the House of Commons, M. D.
Eassard moved the insertion of a clause requiring companies possess-
ing borrowing powers to make an annual return to Parliament of the
capital which they had raised. This motion was negatived on the
ground that it was not proper to insert a provision of such impor-
tance into a bill which was only intended to consolidate the clauses
1
commonly inserted in companies bills. In the same year, however,
in connection with the regulation of the issue of debenture stocks,
Parliament adopted a provision for the registration of such stocks.
2
Tfcis provision did not contain any new principle. It simply made
the rule regarding the registration, by the companies, of mortgage
deeds, etc. applicable to the registration of debenture-stocks. In
3
the same act, Parliament also adopted a clause requiring all com-
panies to keep a separate account of debenture stocks, showing how
much money had been received for or on account of debenture stock,
and how much money borrowed or owing on mortgage or bond, or which
they had power to borrow, had been paid off by debenture stock in-
stead of being borrowed on mortgage or bond.
1. Hansard, vol. 172, p. 936.
2. S. 28 of the Companies Clauses Act, 1863, provided that the
company should from time to time enter the debenture stock created
in a register to be kept for that purpose. In the register it was
to enter the names and addresses of the persons and corporations who
arc holders of such stock, with the respective amounts of each; and
the register was to be accessible for inspection and perusal at all
reasonable times to every mortgagee, etc. without charge.
3. Sec. 35.

At the same time some members of Parliament also placed
under their consideration the advisahility of bringing in a bill
for the purpose of carrying out the recommendations of the committee
1
on railway borrowing powers of 1863. But it was feared that these
recommendations would be of little value unless provision wore made
for general registration of debenture transactions. Moreover, it
was still felt that further information was needed on the subject
of registration before any efficient system could be adopted to
cope with the situation. Therefore, another select committee was
appointed in 1864, to continue the inquiry commenced by the select
2
committee of the previous year. In its report, this committee
first of all recommended the requirement of a compulsory public
registration of railway debentur s and debenture stocks as an ef-
ficient means whereby to restrain the directors from exceeding the
limit of their statutory borrowing powers. The committee was also
of the opinion that holders of statutory debentures duly registered
should have a right to recover and secure the payment of all
principal and interest due to them in priority to the holders of
Lloyd's bonds, or of any other obligations or acknowledgments of
4indebtedness not issued under the authority of Parliament.
Following the recommendation of this committee, the Re-
gistration of Railway Debentures, etc. Bill was introduced into the
5
House of Lords in 1865. This bill was in a great measure founded
1. Hansard, vol. 173, p. 1317.
2. Hansard, vol. 175, p. 697.
3. Report of Lords committee, 1864, p. iii.
4. Ibed.
5. Hansard, vol. 180, p. 848.

the 1
on the roport of ..foregoing committee. It passed the upper House
/
without much discussion, but it went to the lower House late in the
2
session. The promoters of the Bill thought it would meet with
severe opposition from the powerful railway interests in that
3
House. Therefore, they did not push the measure vigorously. After
being read a second time, it was "put off* for a fortnight, and
4
nothing was done with it that year.
At this time it must be remembered that there was much
confusion over the legality of railway securities. Many companies
were forced to declare their inability to observe accurately the
limits of borrowing powers prescribed by the numerous acts of
Parliament. The public also became aware that under the semblence
of compliance with the limit prescribed by Parliament, money was
borrowed every day beyond the authority given. Parliament itself
5
was forced to recognize the unfortunate state of affairs. It
appeared timely to legislate on the matter. It was thought impoli-
tic, however, to start too stringent rules so as to "make it safe
1. Hansard, vol. 184, p. 1704.
2. Hansard, vol. 180, p. 848.
3. In 1864 there were no less than 153 railway directors (not
to st>eak of " fineers, bankers, or contractors] in the House of
Commons, nearly- one-fourth of the cheif branch of the legislature wai
"thoroughly identified with the railway interest in the country."
Some of the railway directors, however, were not returned to Parlia-
ment for the purpose of representing the railway interest, others
solicited to become members of railway boards in consequence of the
being members of Parliament. Railway Times, January 16, 1864.
4. Hansard, vol. 180, p. 848,
111
5. Hansard, vol. 183, p. 869

for people to jump in the dark." As a compromise between the extre-
me views, the Marquese of Clanricarde revived the agitation of the
previous year by proposing that every company should be compelled
to Liake periodical returns and that Parliament should adopt some
system of public registration so as to enable the people to judge
1 2
for themselves. In the meantime a bill for the registration of
railway debentures, which was substantially the same as that of the
3
previous session, was introduced into the House of Commons . This
bill contained thirteen clauses and dealt in detail with the yearly
returns to the registrar of joint stock companies, the appointment
of assistant registrars by the Board of Trade, and the question of
fees, etc. It also contained three schedules, of which the first
was concerned with the returns of borrowing powers, the second with
the registration of the issue of bonds and debentures and of certi-
ficates of debenture stock, and the last with the registration of
discharges of debentures, and debenture stock.
In spite of the general need of some system of registration,
however, the railway interests raised considerable objection to the
1
provisions proposed by this bill. In the first place, they claimed
that such a system of compulsory registration would give to the re-
gistered securities an apparent validity which they did not have
intrinsically, and that it was impossible for the proposed registrar
in charge of the annual returns, etc. to ascertain whether bonds
submitted to him were or were not issued within the borrowing
powers of that company. But the railway interests, as remarked the
Earl of Belmore, failed to notice that all the bill proposed to do
1. Hansard, vol. 183, p. 869. 3. Hansard, vol, 182, p. 1577.
2. Bill Ho. 109, 1866. 4.Hansard vol. 181, pp. 336-38.

was exactly what had been done for the preceding 150 years with
regard to the registration of deeds in Ireland. All land deeds
had to he registered in the Rolls Office in Dublin. This was ex-
actly the proposition as regards the registration of railway se-
curities, and it did not seem probable that the registration in the
case of railway securities would give the debentures any more valid-
ity than it would convert a false deed in Ireland into a good one.
The only object of the requirement was to show the numbers and am-
ounts of the securities issued by each company so that the in-
tending lenders might be able to ascertain for themselves what was ir
priority to them.
Another objection against this compulsory registration of
railway securities was that this requirement would take away from
the directors the feeling of responsibility, which they were then
supposed to have. If the directors were divested of their duty of
looking into the limits of their borrowing powers and were required
by law to rely upon the findings of some government office in regard
to the exercise of their borrowing powers, they might be induced to
shirk the responsibility of keeping their loans within the limit.
But this argument could not hold in the face of the fact that many
railway directors often did not know themselves either the extent
of their responsibility or the exact limit of their borrowing powers.
A general objection was also made on the ground that such
registration would interfere with the proper conduct of the com-
panies' business. Extra forces of men would have to be employed in
order to prepare the required returns, and the regular business
would be interfered with. But the supporters of the bill retorted

that no one would for a minute dony that tho required compulsory
registration would mean some extra work for the railways, but that i1
must also he conceded that the increased value of their securities
due to such registration would more than compensate them for any
minor inconveniences which they would have to incur.
While this hill was progressing, the Government was also
planning to bring in a bill to give effect to some of the recommen-
dations of both of the select committees on railway borrowing powers.
Thus, in May 1866, a measure called the Railway Companies Securities
Bill was introduced by the president of the Board of Trade into the
2
House of Commons. This bill differed from the Registration of
Railway Debentures, etc, Bill in that while the former was based
largely on the report of the lords' committee on railway borrowing
powers of 1863, the latter embodied the recommendations of the
committee of 1864.
Soon after the introduction of this measure, the Regis-
3
tration of Railway Debentures, etc. Bill was withdrawn without any
discussion. The Government measure, after being examined and consi-
dered in committees and amended considerably, was adopted and has
4
since been known as the Railway Companies Securities Act of 1866.
Its primary purpose was to amend the law relating to securities iss-
ued or to be issued by railway companies. The principal provisions
may be summed up as follows: (l) Every railway company, on or be-
fore January 15, 1867, should register and keep registered at the
office of the Joint Stock Companies the names of their secretary,
1. Hansard, vol. 181, pp. 338-339,
2. Hansard, vol. 183, p. 1197.
3. It was withdrawn on July 23, 1866. See Hansard, vol. 184 £279.
4. 29 & 30 V. c. 108.

accountant, treasurer, o r chief cashier for the time being authoriz-
ed to sign instruments under the act (2) V/ithin fourteen days after
the end of each half year every railway company should make an accou-
nt of their loan capital authorised to be raised and actually raised
up to the end of that half year, specifying the particulars des-
cribed in the schedules of the act (3) The Board of Trade was author-
ized to prescribe, by notice in the London Gazette, the forms in
which the falf-yearly accounts were to be kept. Such accounts were
to be open to the inspection of shareholders, etc. at all reasonable
times, without charge. (4) Within twenty-one days of the end of
each half year every railway company should deposit with the
Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies a copy, certified and signed by
the company's registered officers as a true copy, of their loan-
capital half-yearly account, and it should be unlawful for any rail-
way company to borrow any money unless and until it has first depos-
ited the aforesaid accounts. Failure to deposit such accounts or
to register its proper officer should render the company liable to
a fine not exceeding £20 for the initial offence and a penalty not
exceeding £5 per day during which the offense continued. (5) Any
person might inspect the documents kept by any registrar on the pay-
ment of one shilling for each inspection, and might have certified
1
extracts furnished him on the payment of additional fees. It was
further provided that thereafter two of the directors and the regis
tered officers of each company should endorse on every debenture,
"each for himself", as stated in the act, that, so far as he know
the debenture was issued duly and was within the prescribed limits
1. Section 12 of the act provided that sixpence should be charged
for every 2000 words.

1
to the borrowing powers. In caso any mortgage deed or "bond was de-
livered without such a declaration, the company should bo liable
to a penalty not exceeding £20 ±'or every offence, and if any officor
or director knowingly permitted the delivery of such mortgage deed,
etc., he should be personr.lly liable to the same penalty as that of
the company. Moreover, if any director or registered officer of a
company signed any declaration, account, or statement required by
the act, knowing the same to be false in any particular, he should
be deemed guilty of an offence against the act and should be liable
to a fine or imprisonment*
It may be noticed that all the provisions contained inthe
act had been, more or less, generally conceded as being necessary.
Parliament did not adopt any of the more stringent measures, such as
the compulsory stamping of each security by the Government, etc,
for fear that in trying to require too much at a time the whole
program might be either defeated or made hard to carry out. Most
of the provisions, therefore, were passed without much opposition
in either House of Parliament.
Eut what was of even greater importance were the provisions
governing the make-up of these returns as required by the act. iio
1. The following form of declaration was to be endorsed on each
mortgage deed, bond, or certificate of debenture stock:
"The Railway Company.
We, the undersigned, being two of the directors of the company
specially authorized and appointed for the purpose, and I,
the undersigned registered officer of the company, do hereby
declare (each for himself) that the within-written (or as the
case may be ) mortgage deed (or bond or certificate) is issued
under the borrowing powers of the company as registered on the
day of , and is not in excess of the amount there stated
as remaining to be borrowed. Second schedule, Railway Co-
mpanies Securities Act, 1866.

matter what efficient rules were adopted to enforce the making of
returns, the system would be of little value if the returns themsel-
ves were inadequate. It may be remarked that two distinct things
were required, namely - (1) half-yearly account of the loan capital
of the company, and (2) a statement of the borrowing powers. The
half-yearly accounts were required to show the acts of Parliament
under the power of which the company had borrowed money, the amounts
of loans authorized and the amounts raised by loans, besides other
1
important accounting details; while the statement of the borrowing
powers should contain information concerning (l) the acts of Parlia-
ment confering the borrowing powers and the conditions under which
the powers may be exercised, (2) the amount of mortgage or bonded
debt or debenture stock authroized, and (3) the date at which such
conditions have been fulfilled.
This act proved disappointing to some, in that it failed to
embody many of the more stringent measures agitated for. Thus the
2
Economist said:
"English legislation abounds in abortive expelents. It
shrinks from difficulties. There is very commonly an admitted evil,
and very obviously only one real remedy. But very often that real
remedy is painful, and if public attention is but half aroused to
the subject, we are apt to put up with some half-measure which gives
little or no trouble, which looks as if it might mend matters a
little, and which has no disadvantage save that it is not a search-
ing cure of the evil to be remedied, and that in a little while it
will be forgotten on account of the slightness of its effect, while
the malady itself will rage as much as ever."
"One of these half-way laws is the Act of last session as
to railway securities."
This important financial paper contended that the precau-
tions provided by this act failed exactly at the weak point. '.That
1. For details see the first schedule of the Railway Companies
Securities Act, 1866, and Chapter VII of this study.
2. Economist, October 27, 1866.
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was wanted was an independent audit, a warranty by a oompetant and
impartial authority that such and such debentures were good. "The
confusion, not to say worse, oi' the affairs of some railways has beei
so great that those connected with all of them are inevitably sub-
ject to a doubt. Half of the directors in disorganized railways do
not know what is being done, and others wish to do what is illegal.
Against such dangers, the act gives no security; it requires cer-
tain statements to be made which all the good companies, and 99 out
of l6o.....will make honestly, but which an exceptional company, or
rather some few people about such a company, may make dishonestly.
As long as you rely on the bona fides of the issuer of the debenture
you are not
;
and cannot be^safe from his mala fides .
"
The act seemed to have failed to check the confusion over
debentures at least during the three or four years after its passage.
ITor did it prevent some of the companies from exceeding their
borrowing powers, as shown by the fact that a good number of rail-
ways continued their former practice and that neither the share-
holders nor the public were at all aware of the liabilities to which
the companies were subject. Moreover, during 1867, the year after
the act was passed, many railway properties became greatly depreci-
ated and a feeling sprang up throughout the country that further
reform was needed. Thus Lord Redesdale felt it "extremely neces-
sary" to adopt some provisions to the effect that railway securities,
unless properly registered, should be regarded as invalid.
:.. Ibid.
:!. , JIansard, waft.* 190; **, 1962.
).^ga&&a^u, ¥%i. 190; g*. 1955.
190; p. 1962.

In tills connection it may "bo remarked that the apparent
failure of the Railway Companies Securities Act during several years
after its passage was perhaps due more largely to the special
momentum of the established habit of the railway companies to over-
borrow rather than the weakness of the act itself. When the state
of railway borrowing had reached such a chaotic condition and the
companies had become so used to CTSgJi&*ng/tne limit oi their
borrowing powers, as they were during the early sixties, it would
take some time to make any signal improvement, no matter what
measures were adopted. Therefore, the contenporary dissatisfaction
and the apparent lack of good results from the act during the years
immediately following its enactment do not necessarily prove that t
the act was ineffective. On the contrary, time seemed to have jroven
the act of great value in spite of its defects, in helping to restore
order out of the financial chaos which existed during the fifties
and sixties. An English writer, after criticising the English sys-
tem of regulation, gave much credit to this act as having done "a
great deal towards placing railway finance on a sounder footing,.."
After the enactment of the Railway Companies Securities
Act, Parliament commenced to give its special attention to the ad-
option of some effective system of accounting as a possible method
of regulating railway loan capital as well as other branches of
railv/ay finance. Accordingly special legislation for the purpose
of regulating the borrowings of railways may be said to have closed
with the passage of this act.
How it may be asked, why did the railway companies excedd
il J. S. Jeais: Railway Problems, p. 23.

the limit of their borrowing powers? What was the reason that dir-
ectors even risked their personal liability to issue illegal securi-
ties? It is true that some directors violated the law for inde-
fensible reasons; but it is equally true that in some instances
they were practically compelled to borrow beyond the legal limits.
By reason of the restriction of loans to one-third of the share
capital the companies were naturally always at the limit of their
borrowing powers. Thus the directors were placed under an obli-
gation it a certain time to meet a large amount of debts falling
due, whatever might then be the state of the money market. There-
fore, they often felt it necessary to raise money beforehand when
the state of the money market was easy. Moreover, it often became
necessary for a company to create new debts in anticipation of the
falling due of the old debts so that its creditors or financial
agents might not be able to take advantage of the occasion to
in
embarrass the company. With its loans up to the limit, ^.ssuing
fresh debentures, the company in either case would exceed the
1
statutory limit of its borrowing powers.
In answer to the question as to why railway directors,
especially ox small lines, were willing to evade the law and assume
the risk of personal liability, the Economist said, "But human
nature is vain and weak, and the directors are puffed up by the>
little local importance, and flattered by secretaries who live by
the line, and engineers and attorneys who make a large profit out
of it, and so they yield and ruin themselves."
lJ'Pcf. Economist , May 2, 1863 and Hansard, 181* ^. 338.
J. ufceonomist , December 14, 1867.
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It appeares that the limit of the borrowing powers of rail-
way companies was regarded as by no means entirely satisfactory or
even adequate. Some people felt that the limit of the borrowing
powers, which was only one-third of the share capital, was "utterly
inadequate"
1
that the limit was too small compared with the general
o
practice of borrowing on other mortgages, and that too strict rules
would invite their evasion. Indeed, it was contended that this
inadequancy of borrowing powers was responsible for the gross
violation of the limit.
Owners felt that it was not within the power oi the legis-
lature to put any effective restrictions upon the borrowing powers
of railway companies, even if it were proper to do so. If a company
wanted to borrow, it would find some way of doing it in spite of the
law. Therefore, it was urged that the limit upon borrowing powers
4 .
should be removed and railways should be allowed to borrow what tney
liked, provided that they made known all their proceedings. If the
public had the necessary information, they might be safely given
4
absolute freedom in advancing their money. If the limit was not
o
entirely done away with, it should at least be extended.
Farther it was urged that the borrowing powers of railway
companies should be made more definite and more strictly enforced.
If the railway directors realized that there were absolut limits
1. Evidence before lords' committee, 1864, p. 34. ot6
2. The ordinary margin of borrowing with reference to good mortgc v
e
securities was 2/3 of the share capital. See evidence before
lords' committee, 1864, pp. 34-35. . i*^™™
3. Evidence before lords' committee on Railway sorrowing
Pov.ers,
4. Evidence before Royal Commission on Railways 1867 j>p.
803-836.
5. Evidence before lords' committee on Railway Borrowing
Powers,
1864, pp. 33-35.
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to their "borrowing: which it was not possible to evade, they would
make better arrangements beforehand, and would not be so speculative.
Indeed much of tho difficulty was attributed to the facility with
which railway directors in general .;ere able to get their wrong;; ^et
Z
right by the assistance of Parliament in pafehing up their former acts
Although they did not always succeed in getting what they asked for,
55/
the hope of being able to do it operated ctrongly upon them.
Parliament in its desire to protect debenture holders by limiting
the borrowing powers had led the public to believe in the thorough-
ness of the protection; while in reality their protection was by no
means satisfactory so long as the law was indefinite and loosely
enforced. Therefore, it was urged that the limit of tho borrowing
powers of railway companies should be made more definite and strict-
ly enforced, or that there should be none at all.
Another defect in the law prior to 1866 was that there was
not any effectual means to ascertain whether or not the law had been
complied with. The lav/ said that railways should not issue any
debentures unless and until a certain proportion of their capital had
been paid up, but itfcsm&ff ]«s* a justice of tho peace W Bee to—j^fe
that T ift <i rr 8 HEqn'iiyomo.TV&B wo rn fnTrPliliUijfl •
_
lt-~ orde-re-4--^ha%'''r^l"ways
skoul£-%orro^^^ failed
tQ--g=e&3£XLZ-*^^ The whole trouble in.
irfrs— seemed to be briefly this: The ^Legislature had given a
privilege of borrowing and had defined the extent of the privilege
as well as the conditions under which the privilege might be exer-
cised; but under the circumstances which existed during the sixties
Evidence before lords' committee on Railway Borrowing Powers,
1864. p. 27. . Evidence^} before lords' committee 1864, p. 33.
._ .
5* U l*a

/(,/
no one had any adequate means of ascertaining whether or not the
limit had "been exceeded or the requisite conditions had been ful-
filled. Therefore, it was recognized that the difficulty was a
legal one and not an economic one, in that the earning powers of the
railways, on the whole, were such as to make a mortgage on railway
undertakings "one of the very best securities." Toward removing
this difficulty, the agitation as well as the laws adopted during the
sixties for the registration of railway securities seem to have done
much.
Mr.
Economist, May 2, 1863.
Economist, October 20, 1866.
also Eansard, *ai.l71',j^ 1303
<

CHAPTER VI.
THE ATTITUDE OF PARLIAMENT TOWARDS THE WATERING
OE RAILWAY STOCKS.
Stock-watering by railway companies may "be carried .out either
directly or indirectly. Direct stock-watering in a general way f
has three forms: (1) stocks issued partially to represent monpy ,
which, instead of being paid out as dividend^ is used for improv-
ing the property; (2) stocks issued to represent an actual in-
crease in the earning capacity and market value of the property;
and (3) stocks issued to give certain parties control of the line
without actually risking anything like the amount nominally repres-
ented by their stocks. 1.
Stock-watering under the first form came up before Parliament
in 1868, in connection with the Regulation of Railways Bill of that
year. The Duke of Richmond proposed the insertion of a clause in
that Bill to enable railway companies to issue preference shares
which had been authorized and remained unissued at the time, in lieu
of dividends, in cases where by a vote of no less than three- fourths
of the holders of ordinary shares any portion of thetamount declared
by the auditors to be applicable to the payment of dividends on the
ordinary shares is applied to the redemption of debentures or to
the execution of authorized works. This proposition was objected
to on the ground that it would enable a company to apply its earn-
ings to the construction of new works or the redemption of debentures
p
without paying anything to the preference shareholders,
1. Hadley: Railroad Transportation, 1903, pp. 54-55.
2. Railway Times, May 23, 1868, p. 548.

This objection, per se, did not appear valid, for the dividend
on the ordinary stock was distributable only after the claims of the
preference shareholders had been satisfied. Since the dividend
on the ordinary shares of a company was duly earned, as it was
required to be in this case, there was no reason why that company,
with the consent of the holders of its ordinary shares, should not
be permitted to issue its existin- preference shares in lieu of
such dividends. Indeed, as the Railway Times
1
maintained, it
appeared strange why the shareholders could not, on their own
accord obtain the privilege of paying themselves "in paper instead
of in cash." The difficulty appeared to be that Parliament feared
the proposal would prove "extremely unjust and that it would pro-
bably lead to gross mismanagement, though it would not be open to
so much objection if the payment were made in ordinary instead of
in preference stock." Some prominent members in the House of
Lords2 contended that "if Parliament could have foreseen the evil
which had resulted from the issue of preference stock", it would
have never given its sanction to these preference shares. The
difference of opinion with regard to this proposition of issuing
preference shares in lieu of dividends appeared to be so strong
3
that it was withdrawn.
Thus direct stock-watering in England has been practiced only
under the various shades of the second form. The first form, as
has just been shown, failed to receive the sanction of law; and
the last form, which is by far the most objectionable, has proved
impracticable under the English system of regulation and the con-
1. Ry . T. , May 23, 1868.
2. Lord Eedesdale et_ al, Hansard, v. 192, pp. 420-422.
3. Hansard: 3. 3, v. T3"2, p. 422.

servative business sentiment of the people.
But stock-watering has been practiced indirectly, altho on
a small scale, ever since the thirties. One of these early methods
of indirect stock-watering was to pay interest on calls before a
line was opened, and then charge such unearned interest to capital.
This practice became quite common during the forties.
1 Prom its
appearance it was quite harmless, but in reality it was nothing
but a pure case of stock-watering, in that such charges of unearned
interest would swell the capital account to the extent of the
interest so charged, without any corresponding addition to capital.
Altho the magnitude of these nominal additions was small, the
effect became rather objectionable. So in 1847, after the panic
which followed the great railway extension, the House of Lords
adopted a Standing Order 2 prohibiting the payment of interest out
of capital. This was done, however, not primarily for the pur-
pose of preventing stock-watering, but to discourage speculation.
Nevertheless, this Standing Order had considerable effect upon
stock-watering, and remained in force for many years.
This restriction was again emphasized in 1864 in connection
with the loans made by the railway companies. In the Railways
Construction Facilities Act of that year a provision was made to
the effect that railway companies should not out of money raised
under the certificate of the Board of Trade by calls or borrowing,
pay interest or dividend to a shareholder on the amount of calls
4
made on his shares.
For twenty years these restrictions remained in force. Prac-
tically nothing was done during that period to change them. But
1. Railway Times, April 27, 1844.
2. Standing Order No. 167.
3. Report of Select Co mittee, May 19, 1882, p. in.
4. 27 & 28 V. c. 121, sub-sec. (3) of section 29.

in 1882 on behalf of the small undertakings, which were in demand
at that time, an effort was made to obtain from Parliament a
modification of these restrictions. The reason advanced was
that the payment of interest out of capital would offer a great
inducement to local investors and small capitalists, who could not
afford to put their money into these undertakings without obtaining
at once some returns upon it. Altho the effort was unsuccessful,
it brought about considerable agitation, as a result of which the
House of Lords in 1886 modified its Standing Order so as to make the
payment of interest out of capital permissible under certain string-
ent conditions. 1 This relaxation of the law, howevei , was not
accompanied with such good results as was expected. It soon proved
that it was the bright prospects of the undertaking and not the
power of the company to pay interest out of capital that could
induce investors to come forward. So this relaxation of the in-
direct check against stock-watering proved to be ill-advised.
Since then, however, specialprovisions have been made to restrict
the payment of interest out of capital. Thus the Coventry Railway
Act of 1910 provided that no interest should be paid on any share
until at least two-thirds of the authorized share capital had
been accepted by bona fide shareholders, nor should interest accrue
in favor of any shareholder when calls on any of his shares were in
arrears. The aggregate amount to be paid foiinterest was also
limited to a definite sum, and the company was required to give
notice of its power to pay such interest in every one of its pros-
pectus advertisements or other documents inviting subscriptions,
1. According to Earl Beauchamp in House of Lords, By. Times, March
16, 1889.

so that investors might know what might take place. Moreover,
the borrowing powers of the company should be reduced to the
extent of one-third of the amount paid fl> r interest, and the half-
yearly accounts were required to show the amount of capital on
which and the rate at which interest had been paid, 1
Another indirect method of stock-watering was to declare
unearned dividends. This practice was quite as extensive as the
payment of interest out of capital. A member of Parliament^ was
reported to have said that many railways paid dividends out of
their capital stock as if they were in a most flourishing condition;
and that they sometimes carried the practice so far that their
capital no longer existed. This practice soon became alarming;
and the House of Commons felt itself compelled to insert a clause
3
in the Companies Clauses Act of 1845 to the effect that companies
should not declare any dividend whereby their capital stock would
be in any degree reduced. By the Companies Act of 1862, it was
also provided in Table A that no dividends should be paid except
out of profits earned. But this regulation was not compulsory on
the companies registered under that act, for they were empowered
by sec. 14 to make rules of association excluding the regulation in
Table A. Much conflict consequently resulted between the applica-
tion of this act and the enforcement of Standing Order No. 167.
4
But they soon found another method of adding water to their
capital by the issuing of stocks at a discount. They issued stock
certificates for nominal sums larger than what was paid into the
1. Sec. 41 of the Coventry Railway Bill, 1910.
2. Lord G. Somerset. Hansard, vol. 78, pp. 48-49.
3. 8 v. c. 16, sec. 121.
4. Report of Select Committee, 1882, p. iii.

treasury of the company. This practice also became obnoxious, as
Companies *
a result of which a clause was inserted in the ^ Clauses Act
of 1863, 1 prohibiting the issue of any shares for less than the
full nominal amount.
This law lasted three years. Owing to the agitation of the
railway interests as well as the changeableness of the attitude of
Parliament in railway matters during the period, the law was amend-
ed by the Railway Companies Act of 1867, 2 and the provision pro-
hibiting the issue of shares at a discount was eliminated.
There was no debate upon the amendment in the public bill.
But the question regarding railways was debated in connection with
3
the proposal made in the Brighton Railway Bill . This company
(the Brighton Ry. Co.) being very much in want of funds proposed
to raise money by the issue of preference stocks; but being unable
to raise the amount required by such means, they sought to issue
ordinary stocks at a discount. The proposal was regarded by the
lords as "perfectly new" and of great importance. Lord Redesdale,
who recommended the passage of the Bill, confessed that it was an
objectionable course, but he thought that "it was less objectionably
than the creation of preference stocks, and he therefore felt dis-
posed, under the cir oust ances , to allow the company to issue stocks
at a discount." In other words, the proposal was recommended on
the ground thataltho it was a bad thing, it was not so bad as
something else. Hone of the lords who spoke on the question were
certain as to the advisability of such a measure; but with the
1. 26 & 27 V.c.118, sec. 21.
2. 30 & 31 V. c.127, sec. 27.
3. Hansard, v. 188, pp. 1423-24, (July, 1867).

feeling that "when a railway company was in diff ialty it was the
interest of all parties that money to carry it through should be
raised in some way," they did. not oppose the measure openly. Fol-
lowing the example of the Brighton, four other companies also ob-
tained similar powers, and £4,043,000 in water^idded in that year
to the railway capital by the issue of stocks at a discount. 1
By the amendment of 1867 and the interpretations given to
that^amendment in the cases just cited, it was generally considered
that the issue of shares at a discount was permitted. This free-
dom was made more unmistakable in 1869 by the Companies Clauses
Act of that year, in which it was provided that the repeal of the
proviso against the issuing of stocks at a discount was made appli-
cable generally to all companies coming under that Act. Thus all
restrictions were removed. The railways at once made use of this
relaxation of the law; and the issuing of stocks at a discount soon
became quite general.
Altho these discounts were ipso facto nominal additions, they
were, however, comparatively negligible in magnitude and were done
only indirectly. Open stock-watering was still under the ban of
law. There appeared, however, to be much latitude in enforcing
the law governing such nominal additions. Since 1867 many railway
companies have obtained powers to "convert" their stocks, by which
process considerable nominal additions were made. But in most of
these cases the "infusion," as it was then called, was still small
compared with the capital of the companies, and was made more or
1. The Chatham & Dover, theOreat Eastern, theSheffield and the
Metropolitan. Eraser, J.F.C.A., British Railways, p. 54.
2. 32 & 33 V.c 48, sec. 5. on the conversion of rail. stocks
3. Evflence before the Select Committee^of 1890, p. 39.

less incidental to other arrangements. Out and out stock-watering
by duplication did not take place until 1388, 1 when a new departure
took place under the scheme known as stock- splitting. In that
year the North British was authorized to make an "absolute
duplication" of its existing stock of £5,181,000. By this so-
called process of duplication, every holder of the company's
ordinary stock on which, say, 5,100 had been paid, was given a cer-
tificate for £200 in the converted stock. In the same year the
Great Northern made a nominal addition of £1,803,000, and in the
following year the Taff Vale obtained powers to increase its ordi-
nary capital of El, 300,000 two and half times by the same process. 2
The latter case led Parliament to make its first inquiry into stock-
watering. We shall, therefore, examine it briefly.
When the Bill of the Taff Vale for triplicating the amount of
its ordinary shares was lodged in Parliament, it aroused considera-
ble anxiety. Therefore, in spite of the fact that it was not the
duty of the Board of Trade to examine questions dealing with capi-
tal in railway bills, the matter was brought informally to the
notice of that Board for consideration. The view which that Board
took on the question was that the proposed nominal increase was so
extensive that it ought to be dealt with in a public manner, and
should not be allowed to pass as a matter of course, notwithstand-
ing their general opinion that the "greatest freedom should be
permitted to companies to arrange their capital as they pleased."
Eventually the Bill was passed and ample powers of duplication
1, Prior to 1890 complete information regarding the amount of
nominal addition was not obtyined by the Board of Trade, but
the Board of Trade's returns of 1890 show a total of -£57,800,000
Deduct from this the sum of about £21,000,000 added in 1888,
1889 and 1890, the amount of nominal capital existing prior to
1888 would be about £37,000,000.
9 HhHriftnnP hpfnrp gplgnt. P. nmm i 1 1 e e of 1890^1310 . 39-40.

wore granted to the company, subject to the provision that surplus
profits above 15 per cent, on the old ordinary capital, or 6 per
cent, on the new enlarged capital should be given to the public in
the form of reduced rates or improved accommodations. It was also
provided that the nature of the nominal increase as well as the old
capital should be shown in front of the accounts of the company, so
that every one should be able to understand what had happened. 1
Leaving theadv isability or inadvisability ofgranting powers
for stock-watering for future consideration, we may notice from the
beginning the erroneous idea which Parliament had in regard to
railway finance as evidenced by the proviso under which the exten-
sive powers of duplication were granted to the gjaff Vale. Although
the high level of the maximum rate of dividend fixed to "balance"
the favors granted might have been warrantable at the time by the
specific circumstances of that company, the method to limit the
maximum was altogether misleading and ineffective. According to
that method any surplus above 15 per cent. etc. was to be given to
the public in the form of reduced rates. It was fairly well re-
cognized then as it has been generally recognized since that a rail-
way company under restriction as to the maximum rate of dividend
would be constantly tempted to increase its expenditures, whenever
pits profit promised to exceed that limit. There are always many
ways in which a railway company can s~end money before it will
give it to the public. This must be especially so during that
1. Ibid.
2. "To forbid a corporation to increase its profits is to encour-
age waste and discourage enterprise." A.T. Hadley; Railroad
Transportation, 1903, p. 102.

period when the system of accounts was far from being effective to
check up the expense charges of the company.
Then again, the proviso was based on a false premise . The
maximum was fixed at 15 per cent, only because the company had been
declaring an average dividend at that rate during the previous
seven years. Prom this it would follow that a company which might
have gone on the principle of charging high or discriminating
rates and had thus been enabled to pay high dividends would have itii
maximum fixed at a high point, whereas a company that had been
content with moderate rates would be punished for its moderation by
having its maximum fixed at a low level. 1 It is needless to say
that such a practice would mean gross injustice.
To the public such a principle would also be unfair. One
district would be given a right to receive all profits above say
5 per cent, of dividend of the railways serving it, while another
district would not be entitled to enjoy such a right until the
dividends of its railways had reached say 10 or 15 per cent. But
the question of rates is not within our scope of study. Suffice r:
to say that strange as it appeared to others, Parliament at the
time thought it had gained a great concession from the railway by
the provision mentioned and referred to it in subsequent years as
a principle to be followed instead of regarding it as a bad prac-
o
tice to be avoided,
1. "The market value (of Railway stocks) depends upon the rate
which has been charged ... 11 Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion Report, Feb. 22, 1911, p. 259.
2. Economist, March 22, 1890, p. 364-5.

The case of the Taff Vale, significant as it appeared to "be,
was nevertheless only the prelude to what took place immediately
afterwards. It was in 1890 that stock -watering reached an extra-
vagant scope, and it was in that year when the most important par-
liamentary inquiry regarding stock-watering was made. In 1890
four companies1, lodged "bills for powers to add some £36, 000,000
nominally to their capital, and those "bills were not opposed.
2
The vast interest involved in f-ese proposals at once attracted
much attention. The Board of Trade in spite of its policy to favor
non-intervention in such matters, thought the question of such
an extensive increase of nominal capital to be of "novel impression*
and a "new departure so important that it ought not to "be passed
sub silentio . . .", so it urged that the question should be fully
debated and the whole matter thrashed out. The chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, under whose hands such unopposed bills
were usually disposed of without much discussion, also considered
that the vast interests involved in them required special investi-
gation. He disregarded, therefore, the usual rule of procedure,
and hand ed these frills as if they were opposed. Accordingly
they were referred to a select committee of nine members, five
being nominated by the yov.se of Commons and four by the Committee
of Selection. 3 This Select Committee was empowered to send for
1. The Isle of Wight, the London & South Western, the Caledoniam
and the Great Northern. The London & South- Western may be
taken as a simple and typical example of stock-duplication.
In the second clause of this company* s Bill it was provided
that the company would create ordinary stock of two classes-
-
(1) preferred A% ordinary stock and (2) deferred duplicated
ordinary stock, both classes of which to be in substitution of
a corresponding amount of the paid up ordinary stock. That
is to say £100 of the preferred and S100 of the deferred ordi-
nary stock should be substituted for every L100 the existing
ordinary stock. It was also provided that the maximum divid-

persons
,
papers and records, etc. concerning both sides of the
question, and to consider what provisions should bemade for the
benefit of the public, if the applications wereallowed. 1
Two distinct questions at once presented themselves for solu-
tion, namely :-
(1) Whether or not the proposed duplication of stocks ought
to receive sanction,
(2) How far it was necessary or expedient for Parliament to
interfere with the methods by which the duplication was done, and
if Parliament should so interfere, whether the terms and conditions
under which duplication might be done should be prescribed in a
general enabling bill.
With these questions before it, the committee, besides taking
testimony from the representatives of the railways and other inter-
ested parties, called for much independent evidence, among which
was that of the representatives of the Board of Trade, the Stock
Exchange Committee and of prominent members of the London and
Scottish banking fraternity. A remarkable phalanx of opinion
was obtained.
One very striking feature of the evidence on the question
of stock-watering was that not one of the witnesses thought the
practice good in itself. Even those who appeared in behalf of
end on the preferred stock should be at the rate of 4 per cent,
non^cumulative, and that the remainder of the net profits
would go to the deferred ordinary stock. The voting powers
were to remain as before, as if the splitting or duplicating
had not taken place. See Railway Times, May 17, 1890 and
testimony of the representative of the L. & S. W. before the
Select Committee of that year.
2. (Previous page) Railway Times, March 22, 1890 and June 21, 1S90,
p. 784.
3. (Previous page) Select Committee of the House of Commons on
stock conversion, 1890, hereafter called select committee of
1890.
1. Reoort of Select Committee© on the conversion of raxlvray stocks
1890, p. ii.

the railways did not attempt to justify it on its own merits. On
the other hand, all the witnesses agreed that in principle stock-
watering should "be avoided. But the railway rejr esentat ives
claimed that if the oractice were an evil, it was a necessar; one,
1
since if they did not do it themselves , the conversion companies
were going to do it for them.
The second question upon which much discussion took place
was how to ameliorate the anomalies of this necessary evil. What
was elicited upon this question was enlightening. The Board of
Trade2was of the opinion that if the freedom of stock-watering were
at all to he generally conceded, it was most important that they
should retain a record of the actually paid-up capital as distin-
guished from the nominal addition. The position of that Board
was to leave railway shareholders to duplicate, triplieate, or to
give any name or units to their capital for the purpose of buying
and selling that suited them best, "but," they said, "let us take
care of the' public interest so far as the record is concerned."
The Board of Trade was also of the opinion that there should be
uniformity in recording these nominal additions. If no special
act like that of 1868 was enacted, a uniform clause requiring such
records should be inserted in all private bills asking for powers
1 The first stock-conversion company was floated in February,
1889 The object of the company, which was new at the time,
was to effect the duplication or triplication of the stocks of
railway companies independent of the railways themselves, ihe
conversion company, or trust, used its own capital for the
purchase of railway stocks, and also gave its own shares and
debentures in exchange for any railway stocks that mignt be
deposited with it. Thus, it obtained a considerable amount
of railway stock, which in turn was made the basis oi a very
much larger issue of the trust's own shares and bonds. Eor_
details of the working of the conversion company see Economist
1889, p. 596. ^ m , -| can
2. For details of the position of the Board of Trade see 1890
Evidence, pp. 37-44.

to make nominal additions "as far as possible," It also proposed
under the powers of obtaining statistical information conferred "by
the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 18881 to obtain and record the
same information in the annual returns under the Regulation of Rail
ways Act of 1871. 2 Attention must be called to the fact that
the purpose of the Board of Trade in insisting upon the keeping of
a clear record of the original ^aid-up and the nominal capital was
"mainly in the interest of the Government and the public with re-
ference to the powers with which the companies have been entrusted,
and not for the purpose of benefiting or shielding the investing
3
classes in any way."
Whatever the purposes were
,
all the evidence agreed on the
necessity of keeping a clear record of all nominal additions.
4A practical banker- in testifying, believed that to keep a separate
record of such nominal additions was very important not only to the
railway companies themselves but to the general investors as well.
The chairman of the stock exchange considered it very important
tha^Government should insist upon paving the original capital
placed on the face of the accounts, so that there should be no
doubt as to what was the real paid-up capital. By this means,
"every person who buys or sells these shares will always have
before him every six months what his position is." In short, the
consensus of opinion both in Parliament as well as outside of it
1. 52 & 53 V.c.66, sec. 32.
2. 34 & 35 V.c.78.
3. Evidence before the Lords' Committee on the Conversion of Stock
1890, p. 43.
4. Evidence before the Lords' Committee on the Conversion of Stock
1890, pp. 53-56.
5. Evidence before the Lords' Committee on the Conversion of Stock
1890, p. 47.

was that a clear, separate record of the conversion and the conver-
ted stocks was prima facie necessary for the general interest of
the railways and the public. It is interesting to notice that no
objection whatever against this requirement was raised by the
railways
.
The select committee, after examining these witnesses repres-
enting different interests, made a special report three months
after its appointment. As above stated, the committee had to
decide two distinct questions: (1) whether the proposed nominal
additions ought to receive the sanction of Parliament, and (2) how
far it was expedient for Parliament to interfere with the process
by which the nominal additions were to be effected. In answer to
the first question, the committee said that there was "nothing
unreasonable or objectionable from a public point of view in the
conversion of ordinary stocks into a preferred and a deferred
class," and, therefore, it recommended "that the necessary power
for that purpose should not be refused when a railway company de-
sires it." With regard to the second question, which was of gen-
eral interest, the committee instead of trying to solve it as it
was expected, dodged it by throwing the responsibility u^.on the
Royal Commission of 1867 which stated "that Parliament should re-
lieve itself from all interference with the financial affairs of
railway companies, leaving such matters to be dealt with under the
Joint Stock Companies Act.
. ."; and 'purged "that Parliament
should continue to act upon the principle of non-intervention...,
believing that while the public are naturally concerned in the
solidity and stability of corporations to which Parliament has
given large exclusive powers, these objects are, in most cases,

"best secured "by trusting to the self-interest of the shareholders .
"
]
In order to avoid the confusion inherent in these nominal additions,
the aommittee believed "it right to insist (1) that the dividend
should in all cases continue to he declared on the original stock,
and (2) that the original stock or paid-up capital shall be recorder
and shown in the accounts as though no alteration had been made...",
and (3) that the new stock should bear a different and uniform
nomenclature
.
This report proved, as might have been expected, disappointing
2
to many parties, with the exception of the railway companies.
Throughout its length it showed that the committee took for granted
the very matters into which it had been expected to inquire. Most
of its conclusions were drawn from the fact that some commission
said so and so; and much of the evidence seemed to have been dis-
regarded. In the first place, the conclusion of the committee
that "there was nothing unreasonable or objectionable from a public
point of view in the conversion of ordinary stocks..." did not
seem to be well-fcunded. In the face of the numerous objectionable
features of stock-watering brought out by the evidence, no one could
have expected such a conclusion.
Then the statement made by the committee that the established
principle was that Parliament should not concern itself any more
with the financial affairs of railways than with those of other
stock companies was open to serious question. In fact the truth
seemed to be that Parliament had never assented to this dictum.
On the contrary it had never permitted railway companies to deal
1. Report, pp. IV-V.
2. Both the Economist and the Railway Times published editorials
strongly criticising the report.

with their capital accounts with the same degree of freedom as
the ordinary j int stock companies. Numerous facts
1
could "be
cited to show that Parliament had drawn a clear and broad line of
demarcation between the principles governing the finances of rail-
way companies which enjoyed a state-conferred monopoly and that of
ordinary industrial undertakings. "To assume, therefore, that
Paiiament had acted on the principle of non-intervention in the
financial affairs of railway companies seemed to be directly opposec
to facts." 2 Whether the principle involved in stock-watering was
right or wrong, it was certainly not to be summarily disposed by
quoting a twenty-years 1 old opinion which Parliament did not en-
dorse at the time and which in its subsequent actions it had often
deliberately set aside.
It must not be inferred from these disappointing features
that the inquiry of the committee was entirely fruitless. At
least two of the recommendations of the Oommittee have since proved
to be sound. The first was that regarding the keeping of a clear
record of all nominal additions and the other was that of requiring
a uniform and distinct nomenclature to be put on the face of the
"watered" stocks. It is to be regretted, however, that sound as
these recommendations were, they were shorn of much of their force
and value by the lack of emphasis placed upon them.
This report was received by Parliament on the 13th of June,
1890. No general or special legislation resulted from the inquiry,
1. Parliament has put railway finance upon a different footing
from that of other companies by specially authorizing trustees
to invest in certain classes of railway stocks. It Ma® re-
served to itself the power to deal with the affairs of an in-
solvent railway; and it has intervened to limit railway divid-
ends, etc.
2. Economist, June 21, 1890.

But clauses embodying the recommendations of the committee to
require the recording of all nominal additions were introduced into
the bills then under consideration. 1 Moreover, a precedent was
established, according to which similar clauses have continued to
be inserted in all Subsequent bills for pov/ers to make nominal
additions to railway stock. Parliament also occasionally required
that dividends be paid on the original ordinary shares, exclusive
of the nominal additions, as in the case of the Midland, where it
was provided that the "company shall notwithstanding the conver-
sion. . . continue to ascertain and declare their dividends on the
amount of ordinary stock which would have been entitled to divid-
2
end if no such conversion had taken place..."
Parliament, however, failed to make use of the .committee »
s
recommendation of adopting some distinct nomenclature for the
converted stocks. Neither was any uniform method of procedure
adopted to compel all railway companies to report their nominal
additions. An indirect but more effective check against stock-
•vatering, however, was adopted in the following year, by the
enactment of the Stamp Act in which it was provided that in case
of any nominal increases of the share capital, an ad valorem duty
of 2s. per £100 should be charged, with a cumulative penalty
for neglect to render due statement of such increases. This
measure has been rigorously enforced. Thus the railway companies
have been compelled under penalty to pay duty on, as well as to
render due statements of, all nominal increases to a government
1. "Railway Times, June 14, 1890.
2. Sec. 67 of the Midland Act of 1897, quoted by J. Fraser:
British Railways, p. 68.

office. It may be added that a further check against unnecessary
stock-watering was effected by a subsequent enactment in which the
stamp duty was increased from 2 to 5 per cent.
In this way, the question of stock-water ing was disposed of,
and the policy for its regulation settled once for all. Ho new
departure from the policy has been made by Parliament since.
The status thus established may be summed up as follows:
(1) Railway companies shall have complete freedom to deter-
mine their policies and practice in making nominal additions to
their capital,
(2) Before such nominal additions are made, the company must
come to Parliament for power.
(3) Bills for such powers are dealt with the same as an-
other kind of private bill.
(4) Clauses requiring the keeping of a clear record of all
nominal additions as distinguished from the paid-up capital are
uniformly inserted in such bills before their passage.
(5) An ad valorem duty of 5 per cent, is to be paid on the
nominal increases and a due statement of all nominal additions is
to be furnished to the Stamp Duty Commissioners 1 office.
By this system of regulation, complete liberty has been
given to the companies on the one hand, and publicity has been
insured to the public on the other. Although England had to
suffer from her leniency toward stock-watering, she has never known
those vicious schemes of stock-watering practicedin the United
States. Thus, disappointing as the 1890 investigation and imper-
fect as the action of Parliament appeared to be, much good was
brought about, which was, perhaps, due both to the efficacy of the

English system of regulation as well as the readiness of the
English railways to mitigate as far as possible the evils inher-
ent in stock-watering.
Following the suggestion of the Select Committee of 1890, the
Board of Trade in preparing its railway returns for 1890 also
endeavored to find "some way" to give practical effect to the
recommendations in regard to the records to "be kept. On account
of the lack of definite power, the Board of Trade, however, had to
request the companies to show in their semi-annual returns the
amount by which the various descriptions of their stocks and
shares had been nominally increased or decreased. But the
"request" of the Board of Trade, though not as effective as a
command might have been, proved quite useful, and considerable
information regarding nominal additions was obtainedfrom the com-
panies which had added water to their capital. These figures of
nominal capital have since been published by the Board oi:' Trade
from year to year,~ to theadvantage of the public as well as to
the railways themselves. By turning to these returns one may at
once see for himself what part of the company^ capital represents
nominal increases, which information is an advantage in itself as
well as a means to clarify confusion or, in a neasure, to prevent
speculation in stocks.
1. Gen. Report to Board of Trade on shares, etc., 1890, p. 4.
2. In the Board of Trade Annual Returns showing the authorized
and paid-up share and\loan capital of the railway companies,
the amounts by which the capital of each railway company has
nominal^ increased by the conversion, consolidation, and
division of their stocks, are shown with figures in ital ics
under the figures of the total capital of each company.""
There is also a separate table showing, in abstract, the
nominal increases of each individual company as well as the
whole system.

But, as remarked before, the policy of freedom in stock-water-
ing in England was established; and the aforesaid indirect check
against this practice was not felt seriously in some cases. The
significance, of this policy may be seen from the following table
which exhibits the development of stock-watering in England from
the time when its first record appeared in the Board of Trade
returns
.
Nominal Additions to Capital, 1890-1907 .
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1890 49.3 8.5 57.8 6.4 6.0 14.9
1891 64.1 7.0 7.0 14.8
1892 53.7 15.0 68.1 7.2 4.0 20.9
1893 53.7 24.4 78.1 8.0 10.0 17.0
1894 54.2 26.8 81.0 8.2 3.0 11.1
1895 56.7 31.8 88.5 8.8 7.5 8.2
1896 68.9 37.4 106.3 10.1 17.8 10.6
1897 114.5 38.0 152.5 14.0 46.2 14.1
1898 139.8 43.7 183.5 16.1 31.0 13.7
1899 141.0 43.8 184.8 16.0 1.3 16.5
1900 142.7 44.2 186.9 16.0 2.1 21.6
1901 143.7 43.7 187.4 15.8 .5 19.0
190 2 145.7 43.7 189.4 15.7 2.0 19.4
1903 147.5 43.7 191.2 15.6 1.8 16.8
1904 149.2 44.3 193.5 15.4 2.3 20.5
1905 150.0 44.3 144.3 15.4 .8 13.5
1906 151.0 44.3 195.3 15.2 1.0 13.3
1907 151.5 44.4 195.9 15.0 .6 6.6
1. The figures in thetaole are obtained from the annual Railway
returns of the Board of Trade and the percentages are calculated
with a slide-rule. They represent the United Kingdom, but
the part of England and Wales is about 75-80^ in almost every
case
.
The nominal increases due to discount on issue, payment
of dividends out of capital stock, are not included in the
figures of column of "Nominal increase during year."

Prom this table, it may be aeon that at the time when the
parliamentary inquiry was made, £57 , 800, 0001 or about 6 per cent,
of the total paid-up railway capital in the United Kingdom repre-
sented nominal additions. This equaled a" out £3,000 per mile of
line opened. Tni e effect of the attitude of Parliament and the
seclect committee of 1890 may be seen from what happened during the
subsequent eight years, when an average of £16,000,000 in water
was added annually. In 1895 the nominal addition made was as large
as the real increase in capital; in 1896 it was about twice as much
and in 1897 it reached the enormous proportion of £46,200,000
which was more than three times as much as the increase of real
capital made during that year. This shows how extensively stock-
watering was practiced during that period. On account of the
encouragement given by the findings of the select committee of 1890
the railways appear ed to have thought that there was a gold mine in
stock-watering, and plunged into its depth. Thus by a stroke of
pen, so to speak, the amount of the stocks of a number of companies
was doubledor trebled, without adding anything materially to their
properties. The significance of such extensive and violent manip-
ulations can hardly be overestimated. When over 16^ of the paid-
up capital represents water, and when nominal additions made in a
year become three times as big as the increase of real capital, we
have something that is at once important. I"c becomes hard to
agree wit h the select Committee of 1890 that such stock-manipula-
tions as these mvde no difference whatever to the public.
1. Of this amount, £6,000,000 was due to the conversions made by
the Midland which has been by far the most important company
in stock-watering. This company has about £41,000,000 of its
capital representing water.
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Another peculiar feature of the English practice of stock-
watering is that water is added not only to the shares and stocks
"but to the debenture debts as well, 1 and that the nominal additions
to these debts, as shown in the preceding table, represent a consid-
erable proportion of the total amount of water.
But st ode-watering reachedit s zenith in 1897, and its decline
hasbeen more striking than its growth. In 1898 the annual increase
declined to £31,000,000, and in the following year, it dwindled to
the insignificant figure of a little over a million pounds. Ever
since that time theannual increase has never been more thar
£2,300,000, and the practice has continued to decline until it
reached the negligible proportion of only about half a million in
1907.
The course of these annual increase may be seen more clearly
by the help of the following diagram. In the first place, it may
i.
y<? <?f fZ 13 1* 1& fl? 97 % W of <>2 e* *b
Bed line represents nominal increases during year.
Black line represents actual additions of capital during year.
The watering of the debenture debts has been done generally by
giving a new certificate for a debt of say £200 at 2f for a
former and an actual debt of £100 at or above 4^3 per annum for
either the purpose of making the security more attractive or
that of reducing the rate of interest.

be noticed that the annual increases of nominal capital from 1690
to 1895 were about equal. The curve suddenly commenced to rise
the
in 1896, it reached ^dghest point in 1897, it commenced to fall in
1898 and it reached a very low point in 1899.
This course is especially interesting when studied with the
curve showing the increases of real capital during the same period.
Before 1895 the "real increase" curve always stays above the
"nominal increase" curve. During the following four years the
latter rises above the former by an enormous margin; and since
1899 the "nominal "curve remains considerably "below the "real "
curve. Then the curve showing the real increases does not have
any such violent and abrupt changes as that showing the nominal
increases
.
These facts also reveal that there is some truth in the prin-
ciple which had a grea.t influence upon the English legislators that
railway shareholders would generally find out for themselves, what
is good or bad, though sometimes after much loss, and to a certain
extent explain why Parliament has been so lenient in the regulation
of stock-watering. But even this self-conviction of the railways
could not right what was wrong. While the individual roads had
to suffer enormous financial losses in the payment ofstamp duties
and litigation penalties, the whole system also could not escape
from the disastrous confusion created in the minds of the public.
In spite of thefar-sightedness and moderation of most of the Eng-
lish railways in stock-watering, today about £200,000,000, or
about $44,000 per mile of line1 still encumber s the English rail-
way capital, to say nothing of the unrecorded nominal additions,
all of which serve to add more confusion and uncertainty to the
1. The mileage of the UnitedKingdom given in the Eoard of Trade

all of which serve to add more confusion and uncertainty to the
complicated questions of railway finance.
This leads us to ask why stock watering came into vogue and
what were the underlying notions regarding it. First ofall it mus1
he remembered that stock-watering has xoract ically never been
defended on its own merits. Nothing was elicited from the inquiry
of 1890, which was by far the most important of its kind, to justi-
fy the practice. Bankers and large merchants r retted the nec-
essity for stock-watering, and many railway officials were opposed
to the practice. In short, all seemed to agree that stock-water-
ing was a evil, because it was nothing but a pure ca,se of mis-
representing actual facts. Stock-watering was advocated not as
anything good in itself, but as a measure of self-defence against
the operations of the stock conversion and investment companies.
As these conversion companies had achieved some apparent success in
securing and duplicating large blocks of railway stocks, the rail-
way directors ma.de it their plea for powers to follow the example
of the conversion companies
.
Their reason was that there might
be danger to the properties if large blocks of their stocks were
merged in successive trusts. If such duplications were a neces-
sary evil, it was better that they should be effected by the rail-
ways themselves rather than by certain irresponsible conversion
companies, which were making it a business to effect such duplica-
tions for speculative purposes. Besides other objectionable
features, the special danger apprehended from theoperation of the
conversion companies was that as holders of large blocks of stock
"Returns for 1908 was 12,845, double track or more, and 10,263
single track, making a total of 23,108.

they would possess a voting power which might be used to thwart
the policy of the directors conceived in the best interest of the
company
.
There appeared to be much justification for this apprehension.
But it must be noticed that the argument of the railway companies
postulated that the operations of the conversion company had alreadj
proved such a financial success that shareholders hi d a strong
inducement to avail themselves of its agency. This, how ever,
was not exactly the case. Take the London & South-Western as an
example, we find the price of the company's ordinary stock in May,
1889, when the scheme of the conversion company was first put into
operation, was 5,180. Ax this price, £3,000 would have bought
£1,666 of stock. The latter amount of stock sold at the price of
I?17 9, which prevailed at the time1 when the company lodged its
bill for duplication, would have realized £2,970. On the other
hand hand, if an investment of a similar amount was made in the
stocks of the conversion company which operated on the London &
o
South-Western stocks, the result would have been as follows:*
Stock.Amount
invested
.
£
1,000
1,000
1,000
3,000
Issue Amount Price in Market
price Purchased. May, 1890 value
May,»89. May, 1890.
1st pref'd
2nd »
deferred
h £
100 1,000 99.5 995
104 962 101.0 972
39 2,562 36.0 923
2,890
Prom these figures it may be seen that the duplication pro-
cess as carried out by the conversion company did not work out to
the advantage of those who invested in its securities in preference
to invest directly in the railway stocks. While the investor who
1. May, 1890.
2. Economist, May 17, 1890, p. 618.

put £3,000 into the ordinary stock of the London & South-western
in May, 1889, got a security which was worth £2970 a year later
when the company wanted to duplicate its stocks, the person who
invested the same amount of money in the stocks of the conversion
company which represented the London & South-Western stocks, had
securities which were worth only I»,?890. In other words, the in-
vestor who availed himself of the agency of the conversion company
had lost £80 more on the capital value of his L3,000 investment
than he would have lost had he bought the railway stock itself.
In addition he hadto suffer loss by paying to the conversion com-
pany as commission one-eigith ofwhatever annual dividend he received,
If the Caledonian stocks were analyzed, similar results would
have been obtained. Therefore, the assumption that the duplica-
tion ortriplication of railway stocks by the conversion companies
had become so attractive to investors as to necessitate the adop-
tion of the same ^roceso by the railways seems to be eroneous.
It was, however, generally recognized that the conversion
companies by manipulation might exercise some baleful influence
and interfere with the voting power of the railway companies.
Stock-watering, however, did not appear to be the real remedy, for
the railway companies, as was then recognized, 1 could never have
hoped to keep pace with the conversion companies in the matter of
stock-manipulations
.
Furthermore, even if the railways could
have manipulated their stocks as rapidly as the conversion compan-
ies, it was no reason why they should be induced to join the gambl-
ing ranks of the conversion companies. Both the Railway Times1
and the Economist 2 strongly criticised the participation in it by
1. Railway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 541.
2. Economist, May 7, 1890, p. 619.

the railway companies.
The foregoing was the principle reason given "by the railway
representatives before the salect committee of 1890 in advocating
stock-watering. But, the reasons emphasized within the walls of
the committee rooms are often different from those emphasized
without. The case in 1890 seemed to be no exception. For in the
report of the Isle of Wight Railway1 we find the only reason given
by the directors of that company to their shareholders in advocating
the duplication of stocks was that the process would "(1) increase
the capital value of the debenture stocks... (2) It will benefit the
ordinary stock-holders, because experience has abundantly shown
that preferred and deferred stocks... are together moi e valuable
than one ordinary stock. (3) It will benefit the preference
stockholders" by making their securities more negotiable, and so
forth. These might not have been the only reason for every case
but seemed to be the most important ones why the railway companies
wanted to water their stocks. It was not the fear of the conver-
sion companies, as emphasized by the railway representatives before
the select committee that led to the watering of stocks, but it
was the hope of pecuniary gains.
There was no doubt that the railway directors had some reason
for believing that stock-watering would make the securities more
valuable. It must also be admitted that some companies had made
some apparent gains from the operation. But, as we have shown,
such gains were by no means always the rule. On the contrary
actual losses have been suffered from such manipulations, More-
1. "Railway Times, March 1, 1890, p. 304.

over, even if "by stock-watei ing the prices of railway securities
were inflated, as was expected, such temporary gains of the exist-
ing investors would only mean a corresponding loss to the investor
who came afterwards. Indeed as the Railway Times maintained,^" tho
who looked to the future must have entertained grave misgivings as
to the wisdom and even the honesty of the financial legerdemain
linvolved in stock-watering. It is hardly conceivable that the
change of the name sof securities could create any lasting and
real advantage to the gere ral investor without a corresponding los
to some others.
The reason given by the Board of Trade^ for permitting
st ock-water ing is especially worth noticing. That department
shared "the common feeling rather against a watering of capital,"
hut, as said one of its officers, if the railway shareholders
desired it, it would "incline to think.. .it is rather covered by
the general idea that they should be allowed to do what they
please ..."
One may see plainly that the opinion of the Board of Trade
was a negative one. It was one of suspense. They advocated
that Parliament should permit stock-watering not at all because
they thought stock-water ingwas good, but because thay thought
non-intervention was their policy, and hence, they must follow it.
The immediate effect of stock-watering in England has been
unmistakably bad. In the first place, this process has unnecces-
sarily added treacherous elements of speculation in railway
finance, in turn the cause of much disastrous fluctuations in
1. Railway Times, April 24, 1690, p. 541.
2. Evidence before Select Committee of 1890, pp. 42-43.

railway stocks, especially the "adulterated" classes. Genuine
investors have been victimised. Many people have sustained dis-
astrous and irr eti ievable loss from the practice. 1
Moreover, the .rocess of stock-watering, as was prophesied
at the time, 2 has conclusively proved to be not only non-productive
ofany real advantage, but delusive, as shown by the fact that
"the subsequent balance-sheets can hardly show the true position of
the undertaking with so much water added." In spite of the
efforts of the Board of Trade to set forth clearly the nominal
additions ofeach company, stock-watering is largely responsible for
the subsequent misconception of many people regarding the true
nature and extent of railway capital in England. It is hard to
tell exactly how much harm these nominal additions have done, but
it is certain that they have contributed their part to delude fut-
ure generations into thebelief that the English r ailway system has
cost a great deal more than it really has. And this delusion
has undoubtedly done more harm than good. ficticious capital has
long been recognized as a real evil in railway finance,
4 and stock-
watering has, perhaps, created more ficticious capital than any
other known process.
The effect of stock-water ing upon the general investing pub-
lic is of even greater consequence. The creation of so many
nomenclatures for the watered stocks at once caused much incon-
venience to the holders of existing stocks. As was expected, the
1. J. Eraser: British Railways, p. 109.
2. Railway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 41.
3. E. H. McDermott: "Railways, p. 164.
4. London Times, May 15, 1S66
.

misrepresentation of actual facts by this ^roces- brought about
much confusion. The numerous descriptions of stocks which had
been already complicated enough were made alto ether beyond the
comprehension ofany ordinary investor. 1 The public was puzzled
as to the value of such securities. The stock-holder couldnot
know exactly what was the real position or status of his investment
the new investor was unable to tell the value of what- he was buy-
ing. As the readiness of an average man to invest varies directly
with his knowledge of the steadiness and true value of the securi-
ties, these new elements of uncertainty have virtually frightened
away many investors who would have come forward otherwise.
Abstractly considered, stock-watering is also objectionable.
It cannot but work to the disadvantage of thegeneral public. A
company with an inflated capital account is usually under ^res-
sure to "wring" big profits out of its customers so as to pay
dividends on its ficticious as '.veil a.i real capital.
Again, stock-watering as President Hadley said, has been re-
sorted to in order to furnish an excuse for paying higher dividends
than the law or public sentiment would otherwise permit. Indeed
as an English writer claimed one reason for the adoption of stock-
watering in England was that the nominal reduction of dividends
would render the companies concerned less liable to attack on the
ground of excessive profits. 3
Moreover, it is generally recognized that the watered stocks
1. The best known varieties of ordinary stock are those known as
ordinary, as preferred and deferred ordinary, as preferred
and deferred converted ordinary, besides consolidated "A" and
"B" ordinary stock and "consols." See J . Eraser: British
Railways, p. 65 .
2. Hadley: Railroad Transportation, 1903, p. 55.
5. E.R.McDermott : Railways, p. 164.

of arai Iway company usually have some baleful effects upon the
wages which it ..ays and the rates which it charges. The com-
pany with a large capital and consequ ently a low rate of dividend
certainly has a more plausible reason for opposing the payment
of highei wages to its employees as well as for objecting to any
reduction of its c .arges than it would have otherwise. Altho
the actual relation between capital and railway rate;: is unsettled
there is hardly any question that, other things being equal, a com-
pany with a low rate of dividend is less liable to have its charges
reduced by the government than it would be if its rate of dividends
were high.
Furthermore, stock-watering seems to have been one of the
worst causes in giving rise to speculation, and sometimes, to
fraudulent manipulations, both of which results have been
responsible in making railway securities a much less reliable form
of investment that they might have been, 1 The best managed com-
panies have either been cautious or have never attemptedto indulge
in stock-watering. It is the promoter and the speculator who
find opportunities in this practice. The general investing public
and the responsible railway director are safer and much better
off to keep away from it. Indeed, the phrase of stock -watering
"in truth is still altogether indefinable j' 3and the evil effects of
stock-watering have been recognized in the United States as well
as in England.
1. E.R. Johnson: Am. Railway Transportation, 1907, p. 94.
2. Of the nine witnesses who testified before the U.S .Industrial
Commission of 1900 in regard to stock -watering, every one was
of the opinion that the practice was harmful. Chief an ong
these witnesses were Professors Seligman, Johnson and Hewcomb,
U.S. Industrial Commission Report, 1900 \k IV, pp. 55-60-70 and
100-101 etc.
3. J. Eraser: British Railways, p. 30.

the
The principle, or rather^lack of principle, involved in stock-
watering "is to "be deprecated."! It is "opposed to conservative
2
railroad financiering," it gives rise to objectionable specula-
tion and gambling, 3 it leads to pursue short sighted policy; 4 it
should be "emphatically condemned; v ^ it "is a practicekgainst
which Parliament should have resolutely set its face."^
Thus, from all the evidences, statistics and authorities
consulted and after examining the principal reasons given by
various parties, we are led to conclude that stock-watering in
railway finance is objectionable.
Now what shall be the remedies? No general rule can be laid
down for all countries, nor could any be laid down for the same
country for all times. Any empirical formula or dogmatic doctrine
is liable to be useless, or even harmful. But takingEngland as
an example, it seems that more strict rules were warranted and
could have been adopted for the regulation of railway stock-water-
ing. Even at the time when the practice was most vigorously ad-
vocated, there did not appear to be much objection against some more
stringent measures than those adopted by Parliament. The only
excuse we find for the attitude of the select committee of 1890
and the legislature in giving much freedom to stock-watering was
that the established principle seemed to be non-intervention. It
is hardly necessary to emphasize that to fall back always on old
principles in order to solve new problems is a dangerous policy.
Even the English people are opposed to all kinds of government
1. E.R.McDermott : Railways, p. 164.
2. E.R.Johnson: Am. Railway Transportation, 1907, p. 90.
3. Railway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 541.
4. Hadley, p. 22. Railroad Transportation, 1903.
5. The Economist, Eeb. 9, 1889,' p. 172.
6. Economist, July 13, 1889, p. 891.

interference, it seems thatPari lament could have done more to safe-
guard the public interest. If nothing else, it certainly could
have required the appearance of uniform nomenclatures on the face
of the converted stocks as recommendedby the select commitree. It
could have enacted some lav/ to enable the Board of Trade to compel
the companies to furnish returns showing thenominal additions as
distinguished from the actual capital; and it could have enacted a
general law so as to insure uniformity inthe whole matter , instead
of leavingit to be dealt with piece meal.
On the other hand, we must not criticise the English Parlia-
ment according to our understanding of what stock-watering means
in the United States. In the first place, the "worst forms of
stock watering, unhappily so common in America... is practically
unknown in England."1 If at all, stock -watering must be done
openly. It must be sanctioned by Parliament. Such publicity
removes much of the temptation to effect stock-watering for dishon-
est purposes. Moreover, the indirect checks imposed by the Stamp
Acts have made stock-watering almost impossible. Let stock-wat-
ering be done openly and be investigated first by some dignified
government office, it will disappear on its own account. There-
fore, stock-watering in England, extensive as it is, has never
been nearly as objectionable as in some other countries. More-
over, the English railways seem to have seldom, if ever, watered
their stocks for dishonest purposes. On the other hand, they
appear to have been eager to help the government to prevent the
difficulties inherent in stock-watering. Hence a request of the
Board of Trade has been sufficient to secure full information re-
1. Hadley, Railroad Transportation, 1903, p. 156.

garding their nominal additions made each year. Thus by turning
to
the annual Railway Returns of the Board of Trade, one may see
at
a glance what proportion of the capitalization of each company
represents water. This difference partially explains why Par-
liament has taken such lenient measures in regulating it.
Thus, it appears publicity is one of the most effective and
practicable checks against objectionable stock-watering in railway
finance. To insure this, railway companies should be compelled
to
show in their accounts and balance-sheets all their nominal
addi-
tions. They also should be required to furnish periodic and
due
statements exhibiting clearly such nominal additions as disting-
uished from the actual capital, with remarks as to the time when,
and circumstances under which, the additions were made. A
uniform
nomenclature should be marked on the certificates of all adulter-
ated stocks so as to avoid confusion. It further appears
that
stock-watering in railway finance should be discouraged and
placed
under government supervision in all cases, and prohibited
whenever
circumstances permit.

CHAPTER VII.
The Regulation of Railway Accounts
.
The English legislature tool: pains to regulate railway
accounting as early as it endeavored, to regulate other "branches
of railway finance; hut it did not prescribe any precise system of
accounting "before 1868. The keeping of accounts was ohligatory
upon the railway companies in common with other joint stock compa-
nies. For this purpose separate provisions v;ere made in the
special acts of incorporation. Thus a clause in the Croydon act
1
of 1837 provided:
"That the said directors shall cause a hook or hooks to
he kept by a hook-keeper who shall he expressly appointed hy the
said directors for that purpose, and who shall enter or cause to
he entered in the said hook or hooks true and regular accounts of
all sums of money received and expended for or on account of the
undertaking.
.. ; and such book or hooks shall at all reasonable
times he open to the inspection of the respective loan creditors...
without fee or reward, and the said loan creditors or any of them
may take copies of or extracts from the said hook .or hooks with-
out paying anything for the same; and in case the said hook-keeper
shall refuse to permit such loan creditors or any of them to in-
spect such hook or hooks, or to take such copies or extracts as
aforesaid, such hook-keeper shall forfeit and pay for every such
offence any sum of money not exceeding £20."
In 1841 a member of Parliament inquired of the president
of the Board oi Trade as to whether it had not become necessary
to take evidence to show that all railway companies should period-
ically furnish to the Board of Trade a debtor and creditor account,
drawn out on a simple hut uniform plan, of their half-yearly
receipts and expenditures, etc. To this inquiry, however, the
president of the Board of Trade answered that he did not think
that it had become desirable to make aiysuch regulations.
1. I. V. c. cxix, s.CLXXXVIII.
2. Hansard, vol. 73, pp. 1070-1071.

In 1842 in connection with the collection of stamp duty
1
on passenger fares, a clause was inserted in an act of that year
to the eifect that all companies should keep accounts of their
passenger receipts in such form as should be prescribed by the
Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, and should, within five days
after the first Monday in each calendar month, deliver to the said
commissioners or other duly appointed officers a true copy or
2
copies of the accounts so kept. Another section of this act pro-
vided that all hooks containing passenger receipts should "be open
to the inspection of officers of stamp duties, under penalty of
L50 for each offence against the law.
For the purnose of government purchase of railways, a
3
clause was introduced in the Railway Regulation Act, 1844, to the
effect that, during the period of three years previous to the
time when option of revision of rates or state purchase of a rail-
way should "become available, true accounts should he kept of all
sums of money received and paid, that a half-yearly account in
abstract should be prepared, showing the total receint and
expenditure, and that these accounts should be open to public
inspection.
This general provision as well as those contained in
the act of 1842 just referred to, were, however, not made pri-
marily for the purpose of regulating accounts. It was not until
1845 that general provisions were made to regulate railway accounts
1. 5. & 6 v. c. 79, s. Iv.
2. Section Y.
5. 7 & 8 Y. c. 85, s. 5.

1
In the Companies Clauses Act ol* that year, no less than eight
clauses were devoted to the regulating of this "branch of railway
finance. By this act, railway directors were required to cause
"full and true accounts to he kept of all sums of money received
or expended on account of the company.. and of the matters and
things for which such sums of money shall have been received or
2
disbursed.." The act further provided that the hooks of a company
3
should he "balanced at the prescribed periods, and an exact balance
sheet should be made up, exhibiting a true statement of the capi-
tal stock, credits, and property of every description belonging
to the company as well as the debts due by the company at the
date of making the balance sheet. A distinct vie?; of the profit
or loss which night have arisen in the course of the preceding
half year should also be presented. Such balance sheet was also
required to be examined by at least three of the directors, and
was to be signed by the chairman or deputy chairman of the com-
pany. Lloreover, both the shareholders and mortgagees were author-
ized to have access to these accounts at the prescribed or other
reasonable times, with the liberty of taking extracts therefrom
without charge. In the railways Glauses Act of the same year,
6
a further provision was made to require, under penalty, railway
companies to prepare and transfer to the clerks of the peace and
the over-seers of the poor of the counties and parishes traversed
1. 8 Y.c. 16.
2. Section 116.
3. If no period is prescribed, then the balance should be made
fourteen days at least before each ordinary meeting.
4. 8 T. cap. 16, ss. 55 and 117-119.
5. 8 Y. cap. 20, s. 107.
6. In case any railway company should fail to prepare or transmit
such accounts as reoiiired by lav/, it should forfeit for
each failure the sum of twenty pounds.

1
by the railway, aostracts of their annual accounts.
The financial depression caused "by the railway mania of
1847 led to investigation of the accounts of railv/ay companies.
A committee of the House of Lords was appointed in 1849 to con-
sider "whether the railway Acts do not require amendment, with a
view of providing for a more effectual audit of accounts to guard
against the application of the funds of such companies to purposes
for which they were not subscribed, under the authority of the
2
Legislature." This committee pointed out that a serious omission
in the existing law lay in the want of any prescribed and uniform
system of accounts, and recommended the enforcement of some
statutory forms to oe "binding, within certain limits, upon all
railway companies. It further proposed tnat the statutory forms
4
should embrace the following particulars:"
"1st. A full statement of all the parliamentary powers
granted for raising money, ana showing the undertakings to which
they were applicable; the manner in which the money had "been
1. "107. And he it enacted that the ?ompany shall every year cause
an annual account in abstract to be prepared, showing the total
receipts and expenditure of all funds levied by virtue of this or
the special act, for the year ending on the 21st day of December
or some other convenient day in each year, under the several dis-
tinct heads of receipt and expenditure, with a statement of the
balance of such account, duly audited and certified by the direct-
ors, or some of them, and by the auditors, and shall, if required,
transmit a copy of said account, free of charge to the overseer
of the poor of the several parishes through '^he railway shall pass,
and also to the clerfc of the peace of the countries through which
the railway shall pass,..; which last-mentioned account shall be
open to the inspection of the public at all Reasonable hours, on
payment of the sum of one shilling for every such inspection."
2. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p.xviii.
3. Report of 1909 Departmental Committee on Accounts, etc. p. 4.
4. Report of Royal Commission on Railv/ays, 1867, p.xciii.

raised under These parliamentary powers, showing the nature of
securities issued under each Act, with tne conditions and rate of
interest applicable to each, and the amount oi money obtained
and arrears; and the balance of parliamentary powers unexhausted.
"2nd. A capital account explaining how the money shown
as having been raised under the parliamentary account had been
disbursed.
"
"3rd. An account of the ordinary income and expenditure
of the railway company."
It also recommended that separate accounts should be
kept for separate branches.
Moreover, it was further urged that the right of inspec-
tion by shareholders of the companies' accounts should be unres-
trained; that all accounts without exception touching or relating
to the receipts or payments of each company should be required
to be produced, and that in case of refusal the statutory penalty
should be extended -from the book-keeper to the governing body.
About the same time, the Railway Commissioners "'"also
voiced the opinion, apparently with the general approval of the
railways, that the companies should specify in Their accounts
every loan contract, the period ior which it was contracted, with
the ra-ce of interest and the liquidation of such loans or portion
2thereof as might be made from time to time.
These recommendations, practical as they were, failed
to mature into legislation. They were too much out of line with
the laissez faire ideas of the time.
1. These early railway commissioners had the duty of examining
Railway bills and diffeimmaterially from those appointed since
2. G. L. V/ebb: Letter to the President of the Board of Trade,
Smith Elder & Go., London, 1848, pp. 59-60

During 1859 to 1862, the Board of Trade persistently
recommended that separate accounts should be kept oi" the amounts
of debenture stocks created and disposed of, and oi' the applica-
tion oi the money raised by such issues.
1
It was, however, not
until 1866 that Parliament began to give effect to some of these
recommendations. In the Companies Securities Act, 1866, provis-
ions were made to require all railway companies, within fourteen
days after the end of each half year, to make an account of their
loan capital authorized to be raised and actually raised up to the
end of that half year. In the account, the railway companies were
required to specify the following particulars:
fl). The amount of perspective amounts of loans author-
ized or confirmed by Parliament.
(£) . whether or not the obtaining of the certificate of
a justice of sheriff for any purpose, or the obtaining of the
assent of a meeting or the company, was made a condition prece-
dent to the exercise of the borrowing powers.
(3) . The date at which such condition was fulfilled.
(4) . The aggregate amount of the company's existing
debts contracted on mortgage, bond, or debenture stock, up to
the end of the half year.
(5) . The aggregate amount remaining to be borrowed.
Then the second and every subsequent half-yearly accounts
were required to show the items described in paragraphs (1) and
(4) for two consecutive years, and the increase or decrease of
any of those items in the second of those half years as compared
1. General report of the Board of Trade on railway bills , 1861, p .23
.

with the first. The Board of Trade was authorized to prescribe,
by public notice in the London Gazette, the forms of the half-
1
yearly accounts of the loan capital of railways from time to time.
The act further provides tnat within tv/enty one days
after the end or each half year, every railway company should de-
posit with the registrar of joint stock companies, a copy, certi-
fied and signed by the company's registered officer as a true copy,
of their loan capital half-yearly account. Moreover, these accounts
were to be open to the inspection of share-and stockholders , etc.
at all reasonable times without change.
Furthermore, the act made it unlawful for any railway
company to borrow any money or mortgage or bond, or to issue any
debenture stock, "unless and until they have first deposited with
the registrar of joint stock companies... a statement certified
2
and signed by the company's officer" in the prescribed manner.
By this series of enactments, Parliament endeavored to
secure a faithful record and account of all tne financial trans-
actions of the companies to be kept under the authority of the
directors; a power for any shareholder within limited bounds to
examine the company's accounts; the periodical exhibition of a
balance sheet showing all the capital, stock, credits, and
property of and debts due by the company, and giving a distinct
view of the profit and loss; and the payment of a dividend out
of profits coupled witn a prohibition against reduction of capital
3
by means of dividends .
.
1. 29 & 30 T. cap. 108, s. 6.
2. 29 & 30 s. 10. Y.O. 108, s. 10.
3. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xxiii.

It may be observed however that all except the last one
of the statutes referred to have "been enacted for the purpose of
requiring the companies to keep accounts according without any
governmental interference. Even the act of 1866 just referred to
went no further than to authorize the Board of Trade to prescribe
and alter some forms of loan accounts. Indeed, it was not until
the report of the Royal Commission on Railways of 1867 was made
that steps were taken "by means of the Regulation of Railways Act,
1868, to give effect to the far-sighted recommendations of the
select committee of 1849 regarding the adoption of a uniform
system of accounts. We shall, therefore, examine (1) how the
results of the old system of regulation of railway accounts
led to the adoption of the new system of 1868, (2) the nature of
the principles set forth in the new system, (3) the defects of
the new system, and (4) what Parliament has done since.
The early system of regulation required railway companies
themselves to keep true and clear accounts of all their incomes
and outgoings for the purpose of preventing irregularities in the
application of the companies" capital. This was based on the
assumption that the ordinary maxims of prudence and good faith,
combined with the usual practice of persons engaged in commercial
affairs would he sufficient to secure the observance of these
regulations. 1 "Unhappily," as Sir William Hunt remarked in the
House of Commons in 1867, 2 "the fact was far otherwise." It was
true that railway companies always kept accounts and uniformly
prepared a sort of balance sheet every half year; "but it was
frequently such as no merchants or bankers would be satisfied
1. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 1588.
2. Ibid.

with." It was claimed that a great number of companies considered
a balance sheet a means of mystifying and misleading their pro-
prietors and the public and that balance sheets were often used
to conceal the real state of a company. The London Times said
that the "balance sheet of a railway company has no more effect
than a sheet of waste paper.**"
Moreover, there was no uniformity whatever in the matter
2
of railway accounts during those years. One company had one form
of accounts; a second one, another; and a third one a form still
different. It was not only impossible to compare the accounts of
the different companies, but quite impractical even to compare the
accounts of the same company for different years.
Regarding the prohibition against the wrong application
of the companies 1 capital, Sir William Hunt In introducing the
railway and joint stocks companies' account bill, 1868, said,
that no one coiild read the act of 1854 for the consolidation of
railway and joint stock companies, or the Companies 4 Act of 186£,
without being struck by the grave and imperative language in which
the acts directed that no dividend B&otlia be paid unless their
accounts showed that the dividend has really been earned, and
could be paid out of the net profits of the company. But in this
case also the law has proved ineffectual. Directors were often
tempted to disregard all the moral and legal obligations in order
to make things look "pleasant- to their proprietors. Dividends
were frequently declared out of capital, until it became impos-
sible to tell whether or not it was really earned.
4
1. John F. C. A. I'raser: British Railways, 1903, p. 140.
2. See Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
3. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 1588.
4. London Times, August, 27, 1866.

The effect of this practice was that railway shareholders
were so "bewildered and mystified by cooked accounts, manipulated
figures, partial statements and delusive representations of rail-
way property" "^that they actually regarded the payment of dividend
out of capital as a legitimate practice and looked at the chaos of
railway accounting as hopeless. Apparently they imagined that
they could "eat their cake and have it too,""1" As a natural con-
sequence of this state of affairs, suspicion arose, which proved
harmful not only to the public but to the railways as well. As
said the London Times in 1866, "nothing has damaged railway pro-
perty so much as the suspicion, notoriously reasonable, that the
truth was not put before the public in the reports of railway
directors
The magnitude of the evil due to the lack of confidence
could not be fully comprehended at the time. The problem facing
the railway companies was not merely to satisfy the then share-
holders. It was necessary that they should give assurance to the
investing public if they were to get additional money to keep the
railways "alive". Explanations at meetings, statements of figures
capable of favorable inference sometimes sufficed to satisfy those
who had already put their money in; but they could not gain new
money. Following the suspicion of the investing public, the share-
holders rapidly became discontented. They saw their property de-
preciating; they found that their shares could be disposed of only
at great sacrifices. No longer were they prepared to be satisfied
X. london Times, November 3, 1867, p. 6.
2. London Times, August 27, 1866.

with "information" alone.
however
,
The difficulty ,was not exactly an economic one. The
London Times was reported to have said that if there was a single
company where shares were considered "by its directors to have
fallen too low in the market, they could set the matter right
easily. There were plenty of shrewd people at the time waiting
with money to find investments. "Give them a statement such as
they require, and such as any city accountant ... .would prepare,
in a form that the simplest tradesman might understand it, and
forthwith tney will "bid within a fraction of the true value of
the shares." Thus the problem "before Parliament was to stop
3
suspicion and to restore confidence.
To solve this problem, it was recognized that besides
retreating from the costly litigations, in which the railways
were fond of indulging, there was only one thing required to set
the railways "straight before the public."4 They must make a
clear statement of their affairs. However unpromising these
might be, the whole truth must be told so that no disguise or
5
reserve could be suspected. It was urged that there was no cure
for the mischief of delusion nor any hope for railway property
except by the introduction of a principle of accounting in which
nothing should be admitted as profit but surplus of actual receipts
over actual expenditures. The Royal Commission on Railways in its
6
report of 1867 also recognized that greater facilities should be
1. Economist, December 28, 1867.
2. John P. 0. A. Fraser: British Railways, 1903, p. 140.
3. Economist, December 23, 1867.
4. London Times, February 9, 1863, p. 9.
5. London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.
6. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
1

afforded for the detection and repression of acts by wnich the
public were mislead or deceived. It further said, "The concealment
or imperfect representation of important facts, which no one is
charged with the duty of faithfully disclosing to the shareholders
or the public, will be found to underlie most of the delinquencies
and there can be little doubt that many objectionable trans-
actions would not be embarked in if they were to be immediately
1
followed by publicity...." A member of Parliament urged before
the Commission that Parliament should take care to see that the
periodical railway accounts should "comprise not only every item
of escpenditure but every liability, and every contract that they
have entered into...., and leave the public judge for themselves.
Many other member of Parliament were also of the opinion that
shareholders should only ask the legislature to require that
accounts be kept in an intelligent way so that they may have a
g
chance to "sift them to the bottom."
But it was the report of the Commission that gave uniform
2accounting its proper place of importance. It emphasized that the
provisions of the law regarding the financial affairs of railway
companies would always remain defective, until a uniform system of
accounts was secured. Until that was done, each company was at
liberty to adopt its own form of accounts and to vary that form
from time to time. The result would always be that no adequate
comparison of the financial affairs of different railways, or even
of the same railway, could be made. This lack of uniformity in
ff
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* P *' b0for " Koyal Commission on Railways, 1867Evidence n before Royal Commission, p. 803.
2. Hansard, vol. 191, pp. 1541-1542.
3. Report of Royal Commission, 1867, p. XXIII.

accounting not only deprived the public ol" the power to ascertain
the relative conditions of different companies, but also deprived
one company of the means of profiting by the experience of another.
Thus it soon became generally recognized that until
clear, complete and truthful accounts on a common system could be
obtained, there would be continued doubt. The urgent need for a
uniform system of accounts was recognized, alike, by the railways
and Parliament. This was well shown by the fact that while both
Houses of Parliament were giving the matter attention, the railway
men themselves were holding meetings, in 1868, to discuss the same
1
subject
.
To give effect to some of these recommendations, Sir
William Hunt introduced the Railway Audit of Accounts Bill early
2
in the session of 1867. In the following year, another bill
called the Joint Stock Companies Accounts Bill was introduced the
aim of which, similar to that of the bill of the previous year,
was to secure to shareholders and the public, periodically, a
true balance sheet of the financial affairs of railway companies
3
and a true statement of the assets and liabilities.
Neither of these bills, however, was enacted into law.
In the meantime, the Government prepared the Regulation of Rail-
ways Bill, which embodied many of the principles contained in the
two previous bills just referred to. This bill was introduced
into the House of Lords first, under the auspices of the Board of
4
Trade, in preparing the bill, the Board of Trade, had given much
1. Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
2. For purpose of this bill, see Railway Times, June 15, 1867.
3. Hansard, vol. 187, p. 1588.
4. Hansard, vol. 192, p. 1294.

careful attontion to the report of the Royal Commission on Railways.
A considerable proportion of the bill was based, in fact, on the
1
recommendations of that Commission. Moreover, the Board of Trade
had also received frequent deputations and much correspondence on
2
the subject from railway experts. In fact some of the very
fundamental matters, such as the forms of accounts, etc., were
adopted only after extended consultation with some of the most
3
prominent railway accountants.
When the Regulation of Railways Bill was introduced,
the legislators recognized the great change which had taken place
in the English railway system since the forties. Thus attention
was called to the fact that all legislation connected with rail-
ways must be cautious, practical, and well-considered, and that
in dealing with the subject it was as necessary to look at the
interest of the public, on whose behalf the railways were con-
structed, as it was necessary to take care of the interest of the
shareholders who expended their money in those great undertakings.
Parliament was also reminded that it was by no means desirable to
adopt a policy by which Parliament would lay down stringent rules
with respect to all the details of accounts and the management
of the companies. It was believed that sufficient time had
elapsed since the panic of 1866-18.67 to afford Parliament the means
of legislating upon the subject without acting in the hasty and
1. Hansard, vol. 192, pp. 115-116.
2. Hansard, vol. 192, p. 1294.
3. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 19b
V
4. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 1955.
5. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 1956.

ill-considered manner which might have been inevitable if they
had dealt with it during the previous session."^" The complete col-
apse also led the public and the railways to appreciate more fully
whatever action might be taken.
The first part of the act of 1868 relates to accounts
and audit; the second to the liabilities of railway companies in
certain cases as general carriers; the third provided for the
safety of passengers; the fourth dealt with the matter of compen-
sation for accidents; the fifth had to do with light railways;
the sixth referred to the appointment of arbitrators of the Board
of Trade; and the last part was given up to miscellaneous matters.
2
"None of these" said the Economist, "are unimportant; and all are
designed to bring railway law into accordance with recent exper-
ience". But the "novel part of the bill is the first section,
making new rules for the auditing and inspection of railway
accounts." On account of its importance and novel nature, that
part of the bill, therefore, received much discussion both in and
out of Parliament. This was particularly true of the prescribed
forms of accounts shown in the Schedule o± the Act. For the
convenience of the reader, we have reproduced these forms in the
appendex. They include, in the first place, a set of capital
accounts. Ho
.
1 is a statement of capital authorized and created
by the company, requiring the enumeration in detail of the acts
or certificates of the Board of Trade, authorizing the creation
of capital, and a statement in each case of the amount actually
created and the balance left. Uo. 2 is a statement of stock and
share capital created shov;ing the proportion received, and requires
1. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 1956.
B. Economist. March 21.

the exhibition in parallel columns of the amount of capital
created under each act or certificate, the amount received, calls
in arrear, amount uncalled and amount unissued. Ho. 3 shows the
capital raised "by loans and debenture stock, and the amount of
each at the "beginning and end of the half-year compared. These
are, however, subsidiary to HQS. 4 and 5, the object of which
is to show at a glance how the capital account stands and what
has been done upon it during the half year, especially how the
money has been spent. The statements are quite detailed, and
"shareholders and all concerned should be able to tell," it was
expected, "at a glance whether there is any item here properly
belonging to revenue."1 Ho . 6 is a return of the working stock,
which was regarded as of great importance in connection with the
2
engineers* certificate which must be affixed to the accounts.
The object of Hos. 7 and 8 is to show in detail the proposed
further expenditures^ p^m^^i^^ aGC0
'an " in following half year
and subsequent years, ,cf the proposed expenditures compared with
the available assets of the company was expected to be of groat
value. The need of such an account had been insisted upon for
some years and its usefulness was well recognized. It was, how-
ever, pointed out at the time as a defect that the directors
were in no way bound by their estimates even as to the half-year;
but it was hoped that this would be safe-guarded by the fact
1. Economist, August, 29, 1868.
2. The engineer and the locomotive superintendent were required
to certify, respectively, that the company's permanent way,
stations, etc., and the company's plant, engines etc. were main-
tained in good working condition and repair during the half
year.

that the ensuing account would show whether or not the estimates
v;ere correct, although the remedy would "be only ex post facto .
Uos. 9, 10 and 11 are revenue accounts. The first deals
with the gross revenue, the second the net revenue, and the last,
the appropriation of the balance, if any, available for dividends.
Supplementary to ITo. 9 is ITo . 12, which consists of abstracts
A. B. G. etc., referred to in Ho .9. These abstracts were expected
to prove especially useful in enabling the shareholder to study
his own company's affairs and compare his expenditures with that
of others. Form ITo. 15 is the general balance sheet, which ex-
hibits the whole system. Forms to show mileage statements and
those to be used by the company's engineers and locomotive
-
superintendents were also prescribed.
Itaing the course of the passage of the bill, Parliament
laid great emphasis upon the importance of these forms of accounts.
It had in mind that the accounts should neither on the one hand be
limited to the ordinary payments and receipts, nor on the other
hand be so extensive as to make it hard "for the eye to follow or
1
the mind to comprehend. They should be sufficiently elastic to
meet the varying circumstances of the different railways; and at
the same time precise enough to enable shareholders of ordinary
intelligence to compare one years' accounts with those of any
other year ana the accounts of one company with those of another.
The guiding purpose was that ever;- person looking at these forms
should be able to see at a glance the exact financial position
of each company.
1. Hansard, vol. 190, pi 1972.
2. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 1957.

The importance of uniformity in railway accounts was
greatly emphasized. The advocates of such a uniform system had in
mind two important objects: First, to prevent the "dressing" of
accounts, and secondly to insure that every item of expenditure
should pass through the hooks of the company. Incidentally, it
was also hoped that when all companies adopted the same form of
accounts, the public and the investors would he enabled to form
some estimate of the values of the shares and securities of
1
railways
.
But it was recognized that according to the provisions
of the hill, the usefulness of the prescribed uniform system of
accounts would largely depend upon the voluntary efforts of the
companies themselves. If the companies made use of these pre-
scribed forms, as they should for their own interest, the uniform
system would be of great value. The auditors and inspectors would
have a convenient guide in the "Labyrinth of accounts." 2 The
common form would become familiar, and people would know what to
verify. One more important and general use of such a common
system was that so long as there was no downright falsification,
it would be possible to compare one railway with another, and
that, where circumstances were nearly similar, the comparison would
be invaluable. As a prominent railway accountant said,
in a paper read before the Manchester Railway Conference in 1868,
"The importance of the adoption by all railway companies of a
clear, complete and uniform system of accountants, properly audited
1. Hansard, vol. 191, p. 1538.
2. Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 993.
3. Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 993.

and vouched, can scarsely "bo over-estimated . . . . " It was generally
recognized that it was exceedingly desorable to have one form of
2
accounts. In fact all those members of Parliament, who spoke in
connection with the hill during its passage, advocated the adop-
tion of a uniform system.
Some contended, however, that it was impossible to have
a uniform scheme of accounts for all companies, because the
circumstances of the different companies were so dissimilar. A
uniform scheme would not furnish any accurate comparison, it was
urged, unless people knew what were the gradients of each line
and the prices of fuel and labor in each instance as well as other
3
details which varied in different places.
The greatest defect of the bill, however, was said to be
the lack of any regulations governing the "filling up" of the
uniform forms. It was urged that the usefullness of these forms
might be much lessened, if not nullified, by irregularities in
the entering of the different expenses into the accounts. Thus
4
the Economist said, "TCe question very much ... .whether the dic-
tation of a certain form in -che accounts will do much good....
There will be room for endless disputes as to whether certain
expenses are for renewals or new works, or as to whether capital
5
or revenue should be changed...." It also believed that the
distrust of the people had been related to the substance of the
accounts, and changing form would not mend matters much.
1. Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
2. Hansard, vol. 190, pp. 1961-62.
3. Hansard, vol. 187, pp. 1590-91
4. Economist, March 21, 1868.
5. Economist, August, 29, 1868, p. 992.

The London Times elso pointed out that "a uniform system
of accounts would prevent one line from showing "better than another,
hut it would not prevent them all from showing untruly" . This
paper believed that the people clamored mostly over the evil itself,
instead of the source of the evil. "The root of the evil," it
said, "lies not so much in the system of accounts, of which every
2
"body complains, as in the principle of accounting...."
It was also urged that there should have been inserted
in the act provisions for a "wear and tear" account. It was
believed that the proper way of providing for renewals was to lay
aside certain sums annually in proportion to the value of the
material and the depreciation it would suffer. This was regarded
as being especially important, since the pressure of heavy renewals
had been one of the chief factors in tempting railway boards to
charge capital with what did not belong to it. In spite of the
requirement of the engineers* certificates concerning rolling
stock and permanent ways as provided by the bill, some railway
men thought that it would be impossible to ascertain the real
surplus profit to be divided as dividends without a depreciation
I account.^
Furthermore, there were also other persons who were
entirely opposed to any such regulation of accounting. Such
persons based their opposition chiefly on the ground that England
"had grown great by having private parties to manage their own
affairs in their own way- by individual care of individual interest
1. London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6
£. London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.
3. See Economist, August £9, 1868, p. 993.

which could not "be superseded by the action of any government
1 2department whatever." The Railway Times, it is not surprising to
note, concurred in this view. It said, "The entire railway
history of the kingdom is redolent of the idea as well as of the
practice or shareholders being at all times and under all circum-
stances fully cognisant of any matter or detail in which their
a
property may be involved." After citing the satisfactory results
of several of the companies who had been left to manage their
accounts in their own way, the paper concluded that "all these
private parties have been conducting their own affairs in their
own way; and is not to be endured that they should be interferred
with. ..."
Furthermore, in the debate in Parliament, it was also
agreed that it was quite impossible to control directors by acts of
Parliament. If they were determined to "cook" the accounts, they
would do so, in spite of all the acts in the statute book.
However, after much animated discussion and debate, the
forms were adopted and ample provisions were made in the act to
give effect to the forms. According to these provisions, every
incorporated company, seven days at least before each ordinary
half-yearly meeting, should prepare and print, according to the
statutory forms, a statement of accounts and balance sheet for
the preceding half year and an estimate of the proposed capital
expenditure for the ensuing half year, which should be the same
as those submitted to its auditors. In case of default, the
company should be liable to a fine oi five pounds per day. The
1. See Hansard, vol. 187/ p. 1589.
2. Railway Times, June 8, 1867.
3. See Hansard, vol. 191, p. 1540.

Board of Trade, with the consent of a company, was authorized to
alter the statutory forms to suit special circumstances.
The act further required that every statement of account
"balance sheets, etc. required by the act, should "be signed by the
chairman or deputy chairman of the company's directors and should
be preserved at the company's principal office. A printed copy
was required to be forwarded to the Board of Trade. Shareholders
and holders of debentures, etc. were also entitled to receive
copies of such accounts on application. Moreover, all persons
interested in the company's affairs were permitted to peruse the
original copy without charge. When a company should act in
contravention of these provisions, it would be liable to a penalty
not exceeding fifty pounds for each offence.
Another important provision of the Regulation of Rail-
way Act, 1868 was that regarding the penalty for falsifying
accounts. This question did not receive so wide discussion as
that concerning the accounts thenselves but it exicted more ani-
mated debate in Parliament than any other part of the bill. The
original bill provided that "if any statement of accounts, balance
sheet, estimate or report, which is required by this act is false
j
in any particular, the auditor or officer of the company who
signed the same shall, unless he satisfies the court that tries
the case that he was ignorant of such falseness, be liable, on
conviction thereof on indictment, to fine or imprisonment, or on
summary conviction thereof to a penalty not exceeding 50 pounds."
Tne most striking feature of this provision was that the
onus of proof was placed on the defendant. This at once aroused
1. Railway Times, March 21, 1868.

intense opposition. The beneficial effect of punishing the wilful
falsification of railway accounts was generally admitted; but the
manner of inflicting such punishments as provided by the clause
proved extremely distasteful to many. The provision was strongly
opposed because it was entirely contrary to ordinary principles of
law. According to usage, a man was assumed to be innocent until
he was proven guilty, while according to the provision in the bill,
the railway officers were to be held guilty until they could estab-
lish their innocence. According to this principle, it was feared
that if there was any falsehood in any of the accounts, statements,
balance sheets, etc., so voluminously required by the bill, and
which the chairman and secretary were required to sign they would
be held guilty and might be sent to fauil unless they could prove
their ignorance of the falsity. Hot were railv/ay officers ever
to be allowed the ordinary privilege of trial by jury like other
Englishmen, but -chey must prove tiieir ignorance to the satisfaction
of the court trying the case. It was urged that this system was
liable to be attended with great oppression, to say notning of the
violation of all established customs. The judges, in spite of
their ability and the respect oar the people for them, were not
immune from errors. In occasional instances
,
they might also have
a grudge against railway officials. It would be necessary, it was
contended, to appoint railway officers who knew nothing of the
accounts so that they might be able to prove their ignorance and
could sign the required documents without danger of being im-
prisoned or fined. If these disgraceful penalties were to be
attached to the ordinary performance of the duties of a railway
1. Hansard, vol. 192, pp. 6-7 and vol. 190, p. 1962.

officer, it would, becomo impossible to find any respectable people
to perform such duties.
The Economist also severely questioned the practicability
of the provision, not only because the provision was contrary to
the ordinary practice of law but because it was illusory. It
called attention to the fact that particular falsities were as
likely to creep into accounts by neglect as by wilful perversion.
Therefore it believed that the clause, as it stood, instead of
doing any good to insure true accounts would offer a premium on
1
being neglectful and ignorant.
Ultimately, the heated discussion resulted in the amend-
2
ment of the penalty clause so as to read:-
"If any statementment , balance sheet, estimate, or report
which is required by this act be false in any particular to the
knowledge of the auditor or officer of the company who signs
the same for the company, such officer or auditor shall be liable
upon conviction thereof on indictment, to fine or imprisonment."
Thus the onus of proof was removed from the defendant
and railv/ay officers who signed accounts were only liable to pun-
ishment for making statements which they knew to be false.
It was recognized by the promoters of the bill that the
;
measure was not as comprehensive as was desired by some. The bill
when first introduced, was quite a voluminous document, but it was
found, on close examination, that many of the provisions, though
admirable in theory, were impracticable. Accordingly, it
was greatly reduced in size before it reached the second reading
;
in the House of uords, so as to make it a small and practicable
measure rather than a large and unworkable one. After various
modifications and improvements, the Bill received the Royal assent
on July 31st, 1868, and became the Regulation of Railways Act of
1. Economist, March 21, 1868.
-
2. Hansard, vol. 192. tvp. 7-8.

1
Railways Act of that year.
Upon the enactment of the act, the Railway Times ex-
2
pressed much dissatisfaction over the whole measure, and several
memhers of Parliament also regarded the act as being too weak to tie
3
of much value. More than anything else, the means for securing
the object of the act was, severely criticised. Dissatisfaction
Y/as especially expressed at the purely permissive character of the
requirements. The only compulsory clause was that requiring the
publication of the accounts in a certain forfD, Even this compulsory
provision was regarded as weak. A maximum penalty of £35 per week
was regarded as being ineffective to give any great stimulus to
exertion, at least in the case of important companies where a body
of directors at any time had much to gain by a stealthy evasion of
the act. Much mischief might be done long before it could become
4
worth while to prevent the accumulating penalties.
On the other hand, the Economist at once recognized the
prescribed accounts as being very "skillfully framed." After ex-
amining and criticising every feature, it concluded that "the ac-
counts are very perfect and likely to be useful, in spite of all
5
defects."
It was further recognized that the silent influence of
the provisions would have an immense amount of influence in pre-
venting companies from violating theres regulations. The fact that
a departure from the prescribed forms would at once expose a de-
faulting company to the penalty of discredit, which was far more
1. 31 & 32 V. c. 119.
2. Railway Times, August 1, 1868.
3. Hansard, vol. 190, p. 1968.
4. Economist, March 21, 1868.
5. Economist, Aug. 29, 1868.

severe than a fine, would insure at least a nominal compliance with
1
the provisions.
The Regulation of Railways Act, I860, closed the legis-
lation on railway accounting. The regulations governing, and the
forms of accounts adopted in that year were generally recognized
as "being very good in themselves. They emphasize the advanced
ideas which English legislators entertained long "before others
realized the importance of this branch of railway regulation. But
they went no further. Instead of following up her good start and
taking advantage of her subsequent experience to improve these
regulations and principles as courageously as she adopted them,
England settled down to the idea that nothing further was needed.
Thus many defects in these regulations have "been suffered to exist
during the last forty years
.
Among these defects, first of all, may he mentioned the
fact that there seemed to "be much variation in the date of closing
the financial year of some of the companies. This defect, though
apparently of little consequence, had the undesirable effect, as
pointed out "by the departmental committee on railway accounts and
g
1 statistics of 1909 of rendering comparisons less valuable than
they would have been if the same date were common to all companies.
Then the established regulations required that railway
companies should prepare their accounts in accordance with the
i
1. Economist, March 21, IS 68.
I 2. Report of the Committee of the Board of Trade on Railway
Accounts and Statistical Returns, 1909, (hereafter called
report of departmental committee on accounts and statistics
1909
, ) p. 4.

forms prescribed in the act of 186G half-yearly . The presentation
of detailed accounts to the shareholders half-yearly is not in
accordance with, the usual practice of other companies and does not
1
seem necessary according to expert opinion.
But another defect, which is of far greated consequence
lies in the lack of uniformity in practice. "It is obviously of
the first importance," said the departmental committee on railway
2
accounts and statistics, 1909, "from the point of view of compar-
ison between the different companies, that there should be uniform-
ity of practice among all the companies with regard to the keeping
of accounts and statistics; that is to say, that every heading
both in accounts and in the statistics, should bear precisely the
same meaning in the case of all railways- should, in fact, be
standardized." In this connection it may be recalled that one of
the leading purposes for enacting the act of 1868 was to afford the
means of a comprehensive comparison between the different companies,
and that it was emphasised at the time that uniformity in practice
was even more important than uniformity in the system of accounts.
In practice, however, the emphasis seems to have been placed, in
the wrong place. The accounts themselves are uniform, but the
manner in which these accounts are filled up differs among the
different companies. Thus after reviewing the diverse nature of
the capital accounts of some sixteen leading railways, the Econ-
rr
omist in 1882 stated that "it would appear to be wholly impossible
to construct a statement, setting forth the actual money expenditure
In railway accounts and statistics
1. Report of departmental committee . 1909
,
p. 4.
2. Report of departmental committee, 1909, p. 5.
3. Economist, Liarch 4, 1882, pp. 248-249.

upon those sys terns- in many oases it would be difficult even for the
companies themselves to construct such a statement." This finan-
cial paper further stated that the capital accounts of railway
companies "were wholly unreliable for purposes of contrast with
revenue, almost every company constructing its capital account upon
1
a different principle." An English writer also stated that "the
first item of every railway balance sheet, which has yet been
published to the world under state authority during the past seventy
years, is the deliberate expression of an unmitigated falsehood
In arriving at each of these balances, every conceivable irregu-
larity ... .has been introduced, and has thereby received, not only
the sanction but the approval 01 the state." This writer further
said that "the account is not a balance sheet at all, nor is it
even a very defective shadow or skeleton of one. It is.... only
the declaration of an untruth, in every instance, coupled with a
list of a few of the most insignificant balances, which appear in
a company's set of subsidiary book of accounts."
»7e are not prepared to sustain the strong terms used by
' the above-mentioned English writer. But the lack of uniformity in
I
practice has recently attracted considerable attention. The de-
partmental committee on railway accounts and statistics, 1909,
gave much time to this difficulty, and the evidence taken by that
committee goes to show that much needs to be done in making the
:
uniform accounts really as useful as they should. Indeed, this
j
committee was convinced that unless some permanent machinery is
established to define the scope of the various headings and to
decide authoritatively from time to time the questions of detail
1. John F, G. A. Eraser: British Railways, 1905, pp. 138-139.

which most arise in this connection, much o±' the value of the uni-
form system of accounts would "be lost; and. they accordingly rec-
ommended the formation of a standing committee, to be appointed "by
the Board of Trade, which should include representatives of the
railway companies, to decide on points arising in connection with
1
the preparation of the accounts and statistical returns.
This departmental committee also recommended that n in
the interest both of the railway companies themselves and of the
general public" a system of yearly accounts and statistical returns
should he substituted for the present system of half-yearly accounts
It further recommended that a uniform date should he adopted to
close the financial year of all the companies, instead of permit-
ting each company to adopt its individual date.
Furthermore, this committee tool: great pains i in prepar-
ing a set of forms for financial accounts and. returns, with the
aim. of meeting the changed circumstances. Special effort was made
to exclude from the financial statements all matters of a purely
statistical nature, thus making a strict division "between the
financial and statistical parts of the returns which does not ex-
ist in the existing statutory forms.
A personal letter from the Board of Trade dated December 9
1910, informs us that a Bill was recently introduced into the House
of Commons to give general effect to the recommendations made in
1. For this and other recommendations of this departmental
committee, see its report, pp. 1-6.
2. TTiose interested in railway accounting will find their time
well spent in examining the forms which are to be found in
appendix I of the committee's report.

the report of this departmental committee, but was withdrawn in
consequence of the dissolution of Parliament which was then pending.
Prom the foregoing, we have seen that England endeavored
to regulate the accounts of railways, to some extend from the
beginning, "but it might be said with substantial truth that prior
to 1868, the companies were free to keep their accounts in their
own way. The panic of 1867 and other events led Parliament to
adopt a definite and uniform, as well as quite a useful system of
accounts twenty years before the united States attempted to regulate
however,
railway accounting in any definite way. England,,made no further
progress after her splendid start; and hence to-day she seems to
have fallen behind the XTnited States in this respect of railway
regulation.

CHAPTER ~TIII
STATE AUDITI1TG ADD INSPECTION.
Parliament has required from the beginning an authentic
audit of ra'lway accounts by the railway companies themselves.
It has also adopted elaborate, although ineffective, regluations
governing such auditing by the companies, Thus in the Companies
Clauses Act, 1345 numerous provisions were made governing the
1
appointment and duties of auditors, etc. The subtance oi these
rules may be briefly summed up as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by the company's special act,
the shareholders at the first meeting aftar the incorporation of
the company should elect, either in nerson or by proxy, the T>res-
2
cribed number of auditors, in like manner as in the case of the
election of the directors. One of the auditors, to be fiet jiv/iined
in the first instance by ballet between themselves or in any other
way suitable to themselves and afterwards by seniority, should
3
retire at the end of the first ordinary meeting in each year; and
tiis annual vacancy should be filled by election at the same meet-
ing. If no other qualif : cations were required by the special act,
every auditor should have at least one share in the undertaking,
and should not hold any other office in the company nor should he
"be in any other manner interested in its concerns, except as a
1. 8. V. c. 16, ss. 101-108.
2. If no numb.r is prescribed, then two would be the number.
3. Each auditor should be immediately eligible to re-election.

shareholder.
"
In regard to the duties and powers the act stipulated
that the auditors should receive and examine all the half-yearly
or other periodical accounts and balance sheets of the company,
which should be delivered to them "by the directors at least four-
teen days before the ensuing ordinary meeting at which these accounts
etc. were to be produced to the shareholders. They were also re-
quired either to make a special report or simply to confirm the
accounts, etc. submitted. Furthermore, these reports or confirm-
ations together with the reports of the directors should be read at
the meeting. In performing their duties, the auditors were empower-
ed to employ at the company's expense such accountants and other
persons as they might deem proper.
After the financial disaster of 1847, general proposals
concerning the auditing of railway accounts were made, but no result
was obtained from these attemps. In 1848 a bill was sent down from
the upper house of Parliament, in which it was proposed that on the
requisition of a certain number of shareholders who were ready to
deposit £200 to meet the expense, the Government should appoint
impartial persons as auditors. The object of the bill, it was re-
ported, was to protect the minority. It was urged that as the
directors were elected by majority, if the auditors were also elected
by the same majority, the check would be imperfect. This measure was
opposed .however, on the ground that there was no demand for it
by railway shoreholders, and that one might just as well have an

audit of the accounts of the Bank of England.
But 'the financial difficulties of the railways were too
apparent to escape the attention of Parliament. A select commit-
tee- was appointed by the House of Lords in 1849 to consider "Whether
the railway Acts do not require amendment, with a view of providing
for a more effectuc. audit, of accounts, to quard against the
application of funds of such companies to purposes for which they
2
were not subscribed, under the authority of the legislature."
This committee recommended that the right of inspection by share-
holders of the accounts should be unrestrained; that all account
without exception, touching or relating to the receipts or payments
Of the company should be required to be produced; and that in case
of refusal the statutory penalty should be extended from the hook-
keeper to the governing body. The committee further recommended
that the restriction upon selecting auditors from among the share-
holders should be repealed, and that the auditors should he empowered!
to call for all hooks and documents of the company necessary to
elucidate not only the balance sheet, but the entir financial
condition of the company. Moreover, the committee also urged that
the government should name one auditor to act in conjunction with
two auditors to be named by the company; and that if the government
auditor differed in opinoin from the company's auditors, his opinion
should he recorded and published with the accounts for the informa-
tion of the shareholders.
lAccording to Stephen Cave. See Hansard, v. 187, pp. 158y-15yo.
Report of Royal Commission on Railways. 1867. p. xviii.

Bills embodying come of these provisions were introduced
into Parliament in subsequent sessions, but they did not become law
until 1868.
In 1851 the railway companies themselves brought in an
audit bill, proposing to appoint a board of auditors elected by
shareholders. The then president of the Board of Trade objected to
the ^proposal, on the ground that it would make the people judges in
would
their own case and that such a tribunal Alack independence and con-
tinuity. The last proposal made to trie House of Commons up to 1867
was that the railway companies should elect a body of 300 persons,
out of which five auditors should be chosen to hold their places
during good behavior. It was proposed that the debenture-holders
should also take part in the election. Uo legislation, however,
1
sprang from these bills.
Thus up to 1857 the main objects aimed to be secured by
2
Parliamentary action may be summed up as follows :-
(1) A clear and faithful record and account of all the
financial transaction of the company.
(2) Authority for shareholders to inspect within certain fix
ed periods the company's accounts and to take copies or extracts.
(3j The appointment of auditors from among the shareholders
to audit the balance sheets and accounts.
1. Hansard, v. 187, pp. 1589-1500.
2. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.

(4) The preparations of a scheme for the declaration of a
dividend to be paid out of the profits of the company.
For the purpose of securing these objects, Parliament
adopted the following rules.
Each company at its annual meeting should appoint two
auditors, one of whom should retire annually hut should be re-eligible.
The directors should deliver to the auditor half-yearly or
other periodical accounts and balance sheets fourteen days, before
the meeting at which they were to be produced.
The auditors should receive and examine the came, and
might empiyye at the expense of the company such accountants and
other persons as they might think: fit to assis" them. They should
either made a special report on the account c or simply confirm them.
The directors should keep the accounts of the company.
The hooks should be balanced at the principal periods, and there-
upon the exact balance sheet he made up, which should exhibit a
true statement of the capital stock, credits, and property of every
description helonging to the company, the debts due by the company,
as v:ell as a distinct view of the profit or loss which had arisen
1
in the course of the half year.
The application of these provisions, however, was by no
means free from difficulty. In practice, it was found that only
a very short summary was usually laid before the auditors who made
2
an examination of it within a very limited time.
1. Report of Rpyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p.xiv.
2. Economist, Hay 18, 1867.

The daily transactions of railway companies were so numerous and in-
tricate that the company was compelled to employ a staff of clerks
and accountants proportionate to the magnitude of its business in
order to examine and check every transaction as it took place.
Since the manner in which every transaction was debited or credited
depended upon the orders issued at the time when the transaction
was made, the accounts could, therefore, be checked efficiently only
by a contemporaneous audit by an establishment employed in the same
office, or by a complete transfer or transcript of the accounts,
vouchers, correspondence, minute-books, etc. to be examined else-
1
where. It was quite competent for the shareholders of any company
to direct their auditors to investigate the accounts of the company
to any extent they thought necessary after the accounts were re-
ndered each half-year, but it did not seem to be within their
power to direct any continuous, daily audit.
The Royal Commlsdion on Railways, 1865-67, however, dis-
covered that in many cases, especially as in that of the London
2
and north-western, much could be done by the companies themselves
for the purpose of ensuring a supervision and effective audit in
the interest of the shareholders. At the same time, the Commission
pointed out that tne powers conferred by the Companies' Clauses Acts
were manifestly insufficient for this purpose, in case the directors
3
were otherwise disposed.
It has already been shown in a previous chapter that under
the system of independent auditing much abuse arose, especially in
the declaration of dividends otherwise than out of net profits.
1. Ibid.
2. See apoendix E P of the report of the Royal Commission on Rail-
way 1865- v-
.
L3^....ItepQr:L.nf ftoyal-£amm1a s ina -oBy-Bai^ p. x1**

1
It was a "striking fact", said the London Times, "that.. the
auditors have never discovered or, at any rate, disclosed any one of
the numerous cases of false returns to the Board of Trade, pay-
ments of unearned dividends, charging of revenue expenses to capital,
or any other of the various forms of 'cooking 1 accounts by which
shareholders have "been lured to ruin..."
Therefore it was again urged that no legislation to repress
the existing abuses would be of any avail without a system of
2
government audit of the companies* accounts. On the other hand the
Royal Commission apprehended that it would not be desirable to
impose upon the Crown the duty of auditinp the accounts of joint
stock companies and to certify to the shareholders the corredtness
of their own balance sheets, for in practice this would require a
would
very large staff of officers as well as involve very serious respon-
f \
sibility merely to relieve the shareholders of a duty which they
could well perform for themselves by the election of competent audit-
ors with adequate powers and sufficient remuneration. But this
Commission agreed with the select committee of 1849 that the re-
striction upon selecting auditors from among the shareholders should
:
be repealed, and was also of the opinion that the auditors should be
empowered to carry on a continuous audit and to call for all books
and documents necessary to elucidate not only the balance sheet,
3
but the whole finanoial position of the company.
In commenting on the report of the Royal Commission regard-
ing government audit of railway accounts, the Economist stated,
4
I 1. London Times, Hovember 13, 1867, p. 4.
2. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
3. Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867 p. xlv
4. Economist, May 18, 1867.

"These remarks seen to us full of wisdom. The attempt to separate
the accountant from the transactor will fail, unless pursued into
the minutest details. The man who does the business will give what
accounts of it he pleases."
The general chaotic condition of railway finance which has
been repeatedly referred to and the recommendations of the Royal
Commission led Parliament to insert a clause in the Railway Com-
1
panies Act, 1867, giving to the shareholders a control through the
auditors, and imposing on the auditors a responsibility which they
never had before. This clause provided, as briefly stated in a
previous chapter, that no dividend should be declared by a company
until the auditors had certified that the half-yearly accounts con-
tained a full and true statement of the financial condition of the
company, and that the proposed dividend was bona fide due after chargJJ-
ing the revenue of the half-year with all expenses which might be
paid out of such revenue in the opinion of the auditors. The
auditors were empowered to examine the books of the company at all
reasonable times, and to call for such further accounts, vouchers,
papers, etc. as they saw fit. They were also empowered to refuse to
certify any accounts or statements of the company until the directors
and officers of the company had produced the required accounts and
given their assistance as far as they could. Furthermore, the audi-
tors might 'at any time add anything to their certificates or issue
to the shareholders independently at the expense of the company, any
statement respecting the financial condition and prospects of the
company which they thought material for the information of the share-
1. 30 & 31 V. c. 127, s. 30.

holders.
Under the existing cricumstances when every imaginable
mystification was thrown over the declaration of dividends, when
auditors never disclosed any of the numerous serious irregularities
and when general confusion seemed to hang over the financial affairs
of the whole system, it was natural that the clause was highly valu-
ed at the time of its passage. It was expected, not v/ithout reason,
that henceforth the auditors v/ould no longer have any excuse, when
1
actions were "brought against them for neglect of duty.
So far so good. But in the act a further provision, as
2
referred to before, was made to the effect that in the declaration
of dividends and auditing of accounts, if the directors differed
from the judgment of the auditors with respect to the payment of any
expenses of the company, such difference should, " if the directors
3
desire it". be stated in the report to the shareholders, "and the
company in general meeting may decide thereon, subject to all the
provisions of the law then existing, and such decision shall for the
purpose of the dividend be final and binding." This provision
proved to be a loop-hole through which the expected usefulness of
the system of auditing, as shown in a previous chapter, was practi-
cally nulified.
As the systems of auditing adopted in 1845 and 1367 both
failed to be effective enough to restore confidence, it was sug-
gested that a committee of inve.3tigation might be helpful ; in set-
tling the existing difficulties. But it was at once comprehended
1. London Times t ITovember 13, 1867, p. 4.
2. See Chapter 11," p. 57.
3* Italics are mine.

that the nature and composition oi' such committees of railway
companies would prevent them i*rom doing anything effective. They
could be composed in all kinds of ways, they could lay down every
species of doctrine, and they could accept as well as deny all sorts
of statements. The investigation of railway affairs was recognised
as an anxious and difficult task even for an expert, and the task
1
wholly surpassed the power of any untrained man.
Moreover, experience had taught that a committee of in-
vestigation was almost never both able and impartial. All the
competent people in a railway company, it was told, took a side
either for the directors or against them, and they would go into
the committee with a bias in their minds. Thus, in practice, the
reports of committees of investigation ?/ere either questioned or
denied. They often would not" settle so much as they unsettle...",
and they would "only add a new disputant and a new set of contested
2
figures" to the controversy.
Therefore, it appeared that the ture remedy for the lack of
5
confidence was an independent audit of all the railway accounts.
The Government was urged to excercise what philosophers called the
"function of verification." The railways, by which alone people
could travel and traffic could be conveyed, was regarded not only of
sufficient magnitude to justify the action of the Government, but
so important that the State would be to blame if it did not act.
1. Economist, December, 21, 1867.
2. Economist, December 28, 1867.
3. Ibed.

The Government was held as the only uniform authenicator possible,
-
the only one whioh could apply the same measure with the same weight
to all railways in the country* The shareholders themselves were
j
reported to "be desireus of having a system of government audit and
were ready to share the expenses. "An optional audit of petitioning
1
railways is", said the Economist, "both on grounds of theory and
reasons of practice, the sole outlet from the extisting difficulty."
In fact, during the early part of 1867 several proposals were pre-
sented to the Board of Trade, which, though varying much in detail,
contained the common recommendation that an auditor should be ap-
2
pointed by that department to audit railway accounts. Consequently
in the Regulation of Railways Bill of 1868, provisions were made
for a more effective system of auditing and inspection. When the
Bill was introduced, it was generally conceded that s system of
government audit of railway accounts would do much toward restoring
confidence. But it was also recognised that in this very matter of
restoring confidence lay the danger of the system. The public might
place too much faith in the system. They might bo led to believe
a
that the soundness of company's proceedings and finance were certi-
fy
fied and even guaranteed by the Government. Again it was recognized
that it was by no means an easy work for the Government to audit
efficiently and effectively the accounts of the railway companies.
An audit of business "from without" must be such as would be of avail
against directors who desiredlto deceive. The details which auditors
in such cases would have to look into and the minuteness of the
1. Economist, December 21, 1867.
2. Hansard, v. 187, p. 15yu.

evidence they would have to inspect, it was urged, could hardly be
properly appreciated by any hut those who had practical experience
1
in such matters.
On account ol" the possible dangers and the great difficult-
ies which might arise from a system of government audit, it was
suggested that railways themselves might constitute a central board
of audit, and that they might for that purpose make use of the exist
2
mg machinery of the Kail?/ay Clearing House. Such a board under the
control of the railways themselves, it was believed, would be less
2likely to give false security than an audit under the Government.
The most important question arose during the discussion,
however, was that as to what should be the scope or the audit. An
ordinary audit, such as the mere comparison of payments and vouchers,
was an operation which did not give the protection which shareholders
sometimes fancied it did. On the other hand it did not appear
politic to interfere too much with the policy of railway companies.
If the Government should give guarantee to all the railway accounts
presented to the Board of Trade, the various companies of other
4
pursuit might make similar demands.
After much debate, provisions were made., in the act of 1868,
to repeal the restriction imposed by the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,
that auditors should be shareholders, for the reason that it had
proven desirable in some cases to have independent auditors who
1. Economist, May 18, 1867.
2
* Sir Geo. Findlay's book on the Working and Management of an
^nglish Railway has an excellent treatment of the Clearing HouLe.3. Hansard, v. 187, p. 1591. &
4. Hansard, v. 191, p. 1538.

1
should be entirely unconnected with the company.
But what was entirely new and of great importance was the
provision for the appointment of auditors bjr the Board of Trade.
According to this provision, the Board of Trade, upon application
made in pursuance of a resolution passed at a meeting of the direct-
ors or at a general meeting of the company, might appoint an auditor
in addition to the two auditors of the applying company, and such
government auditors were to he paid, by the applying company a
reasonable remuneration prescribed by the Board of Trade. The
Government auditor was to have the same duties and powers as the
companies' auditors; and the company might declare a divident only
when the majority of these three auditors had certified that such
dividend was properly earned according to the rules laid down in
section 30 of the Railway Companies, 1867.
It was regretted, however, that the act provided for only
one government auditor in each ease where the company had two. As
a majority was to decide when a dividend might be declared, it was
apprehended that the official auditor might be over ruled. Then he
would only have the liberty, according to the act, of printing his
protest at the expense of the company. Even admitting that the
possibility of such a protest would be an obstacle in the way of im-
proper dividends and that the government auditor might receive more
consideration than those of the company, nevertheless it remained a
plain fact that he could be set at defiance, and that there were
many disputes in which the shareholders and the capitalists might be
2indisposed to give the government auditor their proper support.
1. Hansard, v. lyo, p. 1858.
2. Economist, March 21, 1868.

1
It was also urged both jn and out of Parliament that
auditing alone was not sufficient to prevent disorders in railway
finance, for frequently the hooks of unreliable companies were well
kept. The root of the evil was in the charging of the various items
in the books*
Another important provision contained in the Railway Regu-
lation Act of 1868 was that in case there were any difference of
opinion between the auditors-, then it should be imperative, instead
of permissive, as was originally provided in the bill, that the
dissenting auditor should issue to the shareholders, at the cost of
the company, a statement containing the grounds on which he differed
from his colleagues and prepare such other statements respecting
the financial conditions and prospects of the company which he
deemed material for the information of the shareholders.
To strengthen the position of the securities-holders the
3
act further provided that the directors, or two-fifths of the share,
stock, preference shareholders, or half of the creditors, might
apply to the Board of Trade to appoint inspectors to examine a
company's affairs, in case they produced evidence to satisfy the
Board of Trade. In so applying to the Board of Trade the applicants,
however, were retired to meet all expenses incurred in connection
with the inspection, unless the Board of Trade -should direct the same
or. any portion thereof to be borne by the company, and they might
also be required to give security for the payment of such expenses.
1. lansard, v. lyo, p. 1969, and London Times, IToverber 22 1867 p 62. Hansard, v. 190, p. 1962. ' * *
3. 31 & 32, V. c. 119, ss. 6-10.

The government inspectors were empowered to examine all the
company's books, documents, etc., as well as to administer oath; and
j
the directors, officers and agents of the company were required to
produce, for the examination of the government inspectors, all such
_ 1books and documents. The latter were also required under penalty
to render to the government inspectors all reasonable facilities
for discharging his duty.
Upon the conclusion of the examination, the inspectors were
to report their opinion both to the Board of Trade and the company,
the latter being required to print and deliver a copy of the same
to the Board of Trade as well as to every applicant who held any
securities of the company.
Furthermore, the companies were authorized to appoint, on
their own accord, at any extraordinary meeting instpectors for the
purpose of examining into the company's affairs, and such inspectors
of the company were to have the same powers and to perform the same
duties as those appointed by the Board of Trade.
This system of inspection was adopted for the purpose of
helping the shareholders to bring things into their proper light
without involving the assumption by the Government of any serious
2
responsibility. Such inspection of private business did not es-
tablish any new principles, as a similar system had been introduced
1. Incase any director, officer, or agent of the company should re-fuse to produce any books or documents, or to deny the facilities
necessary for the inspection, he should be held liable to a penalty
of £5 for every day during which the refusal continued. See sec-
tions 8 & 10, 31 & 32 V. c. 119.
2.Hansard, v. 190, p. 1958.

by the Companies Act of 1862, in the case of ordinary joint stock
companies.
The defect of this system of government inspection as
2
pointed out at the time, was that the inspection was contemplated
for
merely^extreme cases. The limitations placed upon the application
for government inspection were said to be too comber some. It was
urged that since the applicants were required to give security for
the cost of any government inspection, Parliament could have well
afforded to require the consent of a smaller proportion of the shares
3
'
or debentures of a company for any inspection. It would be aiimost
impossible to make any such inspection if a directorate objected to
it. The demand for an examination of a company's affairs, according
to the provision, would be a penal proceeding which the directors
would always resist. It would be made , therefore
,
only when a rail-
way came to grief, while what was needed was a government inspection
when the soundness of the company was not suspected and not merely
an inquiry when troubles had taken place.
Moreover, in spite of the great respnnsibility placed upon
the Board of Trade, no principle was laid down to guide that body,
as to what reasons were sufficient to justify an inquiry. Neither
was there any specific rule as to the kind of evidence on which it
should insist. Thus, it was apprehended that "the act might be w
wholly unworkable if the Board of Trade were judicial and exacting,
4
and looked too narrowly into prima facie cases."
1. Ibid.
2. Economist, August 29, 1868, o. 992.
3. Economist, March 21, 1868.
4. Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 992.

It was, however, conceded that the provision for the
appointment of government inspectors would generally be of some use
in that a "hanging in terrorem" over directors the posibility of a
1
searching inquiry would have much indirect influence.
In spite of its defects, however, the sjfsten of government
audit and inspection was recognized to "be a forward movement in the
regulation of railway finance. The holders of the securities of
the companies were at least afforded a chance to get government
auditors and inspectors to act with their own, thus bringing press-
ure to bear upon the directors. All good companies would gain by
taking advantage of the provisions of the act; and the "fashion"
being once established might compel companies to follow the example.
The discredit arising from shutting out the light might be even
worse than the discredit of the unwelcome truth itself. Although
the system of government audit and inspection has been resorted to
only occasionally, it appears to have proven beneficial. Parlia-
ment has not only retained the system of impartial audit, but has
2
given it special emphasis. Indeed, as said a member of the Hew
1. Economist, March 21, 1868.
2. In the "saving" clause of the Coventry Railway Bill, 1910, as
to general railway act, the only tov; topics which received
special emphasis were the impartial audit of accounts and the
revision of the maximum rates. See sec. 43, p. 17 of the
Country Railway Bill, 1910.

York Bureau of Economic Research in 1901 before the United States
1
Industrial Commission, the English auditors are independent and
form "almost a fourth "body—a fourth cog in the wheel of government
7
The fact that the Government has the pov/er to appoint its own audit-
ors to audit the accounts and to appoint inspectors to examine the
affairs of the companies seemed to have much influence in preventing
railway companies from many irregularities. Thus it appears that
the mere reservation by the Government of certain important privi-
leges may often prove quite effective in checking misconducts, even
if such privileges are seldom made use of
*
1. Eeport of the United States Industrial Commission, 1901, Vol.
IX, p. 93.

appei:dix.
forms of account referred to iii sec. 3. of the regulatici: of railways
ACT 1868.
Railway. Half Year Ending 18
(Ho. 1) Statement of Capital Authorized, And Created By The
Company.
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.
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.
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STATELIEST OF STOCK A1TD SHARE CAPITAL CHEATED , SEOHBQ THE
(ISO. 2.) PROPORTION RECEIVED.
Description.
(State each Class of Stock
or Shares in order of Date
of Creation, showing the
Premium or Discount, if any,
at which it was issued, the
the Preferential or fixed
Dividends, if any, to which
it is entitled, and any
other Conditions attached
to it.)
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Total Amount authorized to do raised "by Loans and by Deben-
respect of Capital created, as per Statement Ho. 1.
Total Amount raised by Loans and by Debenture Stock as a-
bove Balance being available Borrowing Powers at 186 - -
(No. 4.) Dr. RECEIPTS AHD EXPE1IDITURE Oil CAPITAL ACCOUNT.
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(No. 5.) DETAILS OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE FOB HALF YEAR
KSDII& 106 .
I Showing, under separate Heads
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Traffic Partic- and Compensation), Construc-
ulars - tion of Way and Station includ-
ing Rails, Chairs , Sleepers , &c
.
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.
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Salaries, Office Ex-
penses, and General
Superintendence - -
Wages
Materials ------
Waggons :
-
Salaries, Office Ex-
penses, and General
Superintendence - -
Wages -------
Materials -----
L s.
d.
Total
Traffic Expenses.
- s
.
d.
Locomotive Power.
Salaries, office Ex-
penses and General
Superintendence
- -
Running Expenses
Wages connected
with the working
engines - - - _
-oal and Coke - -
Jater
Oil, Tallow and
other Stores - -
Repairs & Renewals
-
Wages
Materials - - - _
Special Expenditure
:Salaries and Wages &c
:Pue1 , Light ing , Water
:and General Stores - -
:Clothing -------
•.Printing, Stationery,
:and Horses , Harness , Yang
:Provender, &c. - - - _•
:Waggon Covers ,Ropes ,&c
«
: Joint Station Expenses-*
:Miscellaneous Expenses-;
: Special Expenditure
:
: ( if any
)
E •
: General Charges
x refers to Half Yoar .
rDirectors
:Auditors & Public Accountants
: f if any)
: Salaries of Secretary
.General
:Manager, Account ant, and Clerks
:Office Expenses ditto ditto
:Advert is ing ________
:Pire Insurance - -
_
_
_
rElectric Telegraph Expenses!
:Railway Clearing House Exo's
:Special Expenditure ( if any)

[BO. 13.) GENERAL BALA1ICE SHEET.
:L si
To Capital Account Balance at
Credit thereof, as per Ac-
count Ho. 4. -------
" ITet Revenue Account, Bal-
ance at Credit thereof, as
per Account Ho. 10. - - -
" Unpaid Dividends and Inter-
est
" Guaranteed Dividends and
Interest payable or ac-
cording and provided for -
Temporary Loans ------
w Lloyd T s Bonds and other Ob-
ligations not included in
Loan Capital Statement,
Ho. 3. _ _ _
w Balance due to Bankers - -
Debts due to other Companies
" Amount due to Clearing House
" Sundry Outstanding Accounts-
" Fire Insurance Fund on
Stations, Works, and build-
ings -----------
M Insurance Fund or Steam
boats ----------
n Special Items -------
d.'By Cash at Bankers -Current :
Account
" Cash on Deposit at In-
terest
Cash invested in Con-
sols and Government
Securities ------
Cash invested in Shares
'
of other Railway Com- ;
panies not charged as
Capital Expenditure - - ;
n General Stores-Stock of :
Materials on hand - - - ;
" Traffic Accounts due to
the Company ----- - ;
n Accounts due by other
Companies ------ - :
" Do. Do. Clearing House ;
" Do. Do. Post Office - :
w Sundry Outstanding Ac- ;
counts
w Suspense Accounts fif
any to be enumerated -:
" Special Items
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